

AN ANALYSIS OF CIVIC ACTION IN SELECTED
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

An abstract for a thesis presented to the Faculty of
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree of

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
NEIL B. MILLS, Lt Colonel, USMC

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Name of Candidate Neil B. Mills
Title of Thesis An Analysis of Civic Action in Selected
Underdeveloped Countries

Approved for Publication by:

Alfred H. Victor, Lt. Col. CE, Research and Thesis Monitor
Joseph W. O'Brien, Col., Assistant Research and Thesis Monitor
Laurel H. Cole, Assistant Research and Thesis Monitor

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The foreign policy of the United States reflects the importance with which the independence and welfare of the emerging nations are regarded. Military policy contributes to foreign policy in these countries through the activities of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Military Missions. These U. S. advisory personnel are able to support both the welfare and independence of underdeveloped countries through the concept of civic action.

Civic action involves the use of military forces on projects that will raise the socio-economic standards in underdeveloped countries. Suitable projects are improvements in the fields of education, training, public works, agriculture, communications, health, sanitation, and public administration. The purpose of civic action is two fold: first, it is intended to raise the standard of living; second, it is intended to improve the relationship between the participating military forces and the indigenous population. Ideally, the participation of U. S. military personnel in civic action in underdeveloped countries is limited to advice and assistance. These MAAGs and Missions, augmented as necessary, sponsor civic action projects in coordination with the Ambassador and other members of his Country Team.

There have been many civic action projects in underdeveloped countries in recent years, and increasing national interest indicates that there will be many more in the future. In the past, there have been successes and failures in civic action operations; both successes and failures are likely to occur in the future. But, learning from

past activities is a logical method of improving those operations that are to follow. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze objectively the civic action activities in selected underdeveloped countries. From this analysis the features that have contributed to either successes or failures are isolated. These features are then translated into guidelines to encourage the repetition of the beneficial characteristics and to discourage the use of those that have been worthless or detrimental. These guidelines are intended for the future use of MAAGs and Missions in their execution of civic action. Civic action case studies in the Philippines, Malaya, Korea, Laos, and Vietnam are analyzed.

In the Philippines, Magsaysay integrated civic action into the counterinsurgency operations against the HUKs. He granted land to the reeducated dissidents to counter the Communist battlecry of "land for the landless" and to improve the economy of his country. This was accomplished by the EDCOR Plan under which the resettled HUKs received tracts of previously unused land. Civic action was also employed to gain the support of loyal peasants. These activities included the supervision of honest elections and the provision of legal advice in land courts for those peasants who held doubtful titles to their land. Civic action was successful in the Philippines for two fundamental reasons- it was honestly and ably administered and it was directed to the needs of a receptive people.

The British employed civic action in Malaya as a contributory method of suppressing Communist insurgency. They resettled over a half million Chinese squatters to separate the guerrillas from their logistic sources. Civic action was incorporated into these

resettlement projects. The British emphasized the application of civic action at the "grass roots" level from which Communist insurgency seems to so frequently spring. The term "new villages" evolved from this application of civic action to improve social and economic conditions in the resettlement projects. In this manner the British demonstrated the use of civic action as an element of a coordinated effort to suppress Communism, elevate the economy, and win public support for the established government.

U. S. military forces in Korea administer civic action through the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) Program. This program is a good example of civic action-type foreign aid being used to contribute to U. S. foreign policy. The AFAK Program serves as a model for other similar civic action activities, and it provides a good example of the rapport that can be established between U. S. forces and an indigenous population.

The case study of Laos illustrates the difficulty of achieving successful civic action in an environment of government instability. The many and frequent changes of government resulted in a series of civic action programs. This discontinuity of administration seriously hampered the improvement of socio-economic benefits. Another deterrent was the national religion of Buddhism which advocates self-denial and passivity. In Laos, these inhibitive social factors were reinforced by impoverished economic conditions and an unstable government. Consequently, the acceptance of civic action was understandably slow.

Civic action has been administered in Vietnam by both the MAAG and the Vietnamese armed forces. The MAAG efforts have been well supported by the U. S. Operations Mission and by outside military

augmentation. The deployment of Mobile Training Teams from Okinawa and the United States increased the civic action capability in the four tactical corps areas. Further augmentation was obtained through the test of a concept- that of the Engineer Control and Advisory Detachment (ECAD). Two ECADs were made available to the MAAG by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam. They conducted extensive civic action with considerable success. While the civic action activities of U. S. military agencies have accomplished much, those of the Vietnamese have been less successful. This has been due to a lack of leadership, technical ability, and command interest. Of course, in many cases these shortcomings are the result of the tactical demand for troops for strictly military duties. In other cases the reasons have not been so justifiable.

As a result of analyzing the five case studies of civic action, ten guidelines were developed for the use of officers assigned to duty with MAAGs or Missions. They are listed below in a probable chronological order of application.

1. Undertake self-preparation to become familiar with the concept of civic action and to learn as much as possible about the host country.
2. Understand the U. S. national objectives relative to the host country and how civic action fits into the country plan.
3. Determine the specific needs of the people and orient civic action to those needs.
4. Don't be handicapped by a restrictive definition of civic action.
5. Coordinate with other U. S. agencies in the area and work through command channels within the Country Team.

6. Be aware of the external assistance available for civic action.
7. Make every effort to get indigenous military forces to participate in civic action.
8. Be prepared for reluctant acceptance and a lack of interest in continuing civic action projects by the recipients.
9. Don't hesitate to actively participate in civic action projects.
10. Ensure that measures are taken to publicize civic action to indigenous civilians.

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Title of Thesis An Analysis of Civic Action in Selected

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Approved by:

Alfred H. Watson Jr. Lt. Col. CE., Research and Thesis Monitor
James W. O'Brien, Col., Assistant Research and Thesis Monitor
J. L. Lister, Assistant Research and Thesis Monitor

Date 15 May 1964

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PREFACE

This thesis represents my attempt to unite two fields of interest-- a professional interest in the employment of military forces and an academic interest in the development of emerging nations. Such a union is possible through the use of military forces to assist in the socioeconomic improvement of underdeveloped countries. This concept is called civic action.

As the attention of the Free World is drawn to the threat of Communist expansion in underdeveloped countries, civic action becomes more apparent as an appropriate measure of counterinsurgency. Since 1948, Communist pressure has been most evident in the Far East and Southeast Asia. At the time of this writing, the United States is heavily committed to containing this expansion and assisting in the development of the underdeveloped nations in this area. Consequently, this is the area selected for the analysis of civic action.

The persons from whom I have received assistance in this study are too numerous to mention. I am especially grateful to those faculty and student officers, both allied and U. S., who willingly shared their knowledge of civic action. I also appreciate the encouragement that I have received from Colonel John E. Decher, Jr., and Dr. Ivan J. Birrer of the faculty. Finally, I must express my personal thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Alfred H. Victor, Jr., my faculty advisor, who generously made his time and experience available.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	iii
LIST OF TABLES	v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	vi
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. FOREIGN POLICY AND CIVIC ACTION	7
III. UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND CIVIC ACTION	20
IV. THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AND CIVIC ACTION ..	29
V. CIVIC ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES	36
VI. CIVIC ACTION IN MALAYA	55
VII. CIVIC ACTION IN KOREA	76
VIII. CIVIC ACTION IN LAOS	93
IX. CIVIC ACTION IN VIETNAM	115
X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	141
APPENDIXES	
I. U. S. AID, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, BY REGION AND COUNTRY, FISCAL YEARS 1946-1962	160
II. BASIC ECONOMIC DATA FOR THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS OF THE FREE WORLD	164
III. PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S LETTER TO ALL AMBASSADORS ON 29 MAY 1961	170
BIBLIOGRAPHY	173

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Significant Dates and Events in the Development of United States Foreign Policy, 1947-1962	11
2. U. S. Aid, Military and Economic, by Fiscal Year, Fiscal Years 1946-62	16
3. AFAK Expenditures for Non-Construction Assistance, by Activity, Through 31 December 1963	82
4. AFAK Projects, by Number and Type, Through 31 December 1963	84
5. Expenditure of AFAK Funds and Value of Other Expended Resources, in U. S. Dollars, by Project Type, Through 31 December 1963	87

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Synopsis of United States Mutual Defense Arrangements	14
2. Military Assistance Program, Percent of Total Deliveries, Developed and Underdeveloped Countries	15
3. The Country Team	30
4. Organization for Strategic Hamlets Coordination	128

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, in the many struggles against insurgency in the developing countries, a new term has come into common military usage. This term, "civic action," is an abridged form of the more complete term that we know as "military civic action." It is defined as the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. U. S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in oversea areas.¹

There have been many civic action projects in underdeveloped countries in recent years. It is reasonable to assume that there will be many more in the future. In the past, there have been successes and failures in civic action operations; both successes and failures will undoubtedly be present when the results of future projects are examined. But, as with most ventures, an examination of past operations is one method of improving those that are to follow. So, the purpose of this thesis is to objectively analyze civic action activities

¹U. S., Department of the Army, Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title: AD) (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, February 1963), p. 235.

in selected underdeveloped countries. From this analysis it is intended to isolate those features that have contributed to either successes or failures. These features will then be translated into guidelines to assist in the repetition of the beneficial characteristics and the avoidance of those that have been worthless or even detrimental. These guidelines are intended for the future use of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Military Missions in their execution of civic action activities.

The countries in which civic action has been selected for analysis are the Philippines, Malaya, Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. These particular underdeveloped countries were chosen because of their geographic proximity, and because civic action was executed differently in each case. Of more importance, however, are the lessons that may be learned by analyzing each case. Of course, civic action has been used in other countries of Asia and in other parts of the world. However, no attempt is made in this thesis to examine civic action beyond the five countries mentioned. Undoubtedly, there is much to be learned by studying additional areas, but time and space limitations preclude further consideration in this paper.

The time frame of this study is generally from the end of World War II through 1963. There are, of necessity, variations of time coverage for each country. For instance, Laos and Vietnam did not achieve independence until 1954; and, in the case of Laos, U. S. military personnel withdrew in 1962. In Vietnam and Korea, U. S. forces are still present, and civic action through 1963 is examined. In the Philippines and Malaya, insurgency was suppressed by 1958, and civic action activities were sharply reduced. In each of the countries studied, analysis

of civic action was terminated at the apparently logical closing point in time.

The examination of civic action in this study will not be restricted to only those cases that are accurately described by the quoted definition. It must be remembered that this is a U. S. definition, and other countries may envision civic action differently. Where differences exist within the various case studies, those differences will be pointed out.

Civic action has undeniably become an element of U. S. military policy, which in turn is reflected by U. S. foreign policy. Therefore, U. S. participation in civic action in underdeveloped countries represents part of the foreign policy towards these countries. U. S. interests in these emerging nations is not always clearly understood. In fact, prior to World War II, the foreign policy of the United States did not include any special provisions for aid to underdeveloped economies. Therefore, to set civic action in proper perspective, in Chapter 2 the evolution of U. S. foreign policy is briefly traced through history. Foreign aid, both military and economic, is explained as an instrument of foreign policy. The development of foreign aid and the evolution of foreign policy are illustrated by frequent quotes from policy-making statesmen.

In Chapter 3, underdeveloped countries are described, and the characteristics common to all underdeveloped countries have been determined. With this as a point of reference, it is noted that civic action is particularly well suited to assist in the relief of these problems, as it is aimed at the very deficiencies that cause these countries to be described as "underdeveloped." It is stressed that underdevelopment is

most apparent at the village and hamlet level, and it is at this target that civic action should be directed.

Chapter 4 is concerned with the implementation of civic action. The MAAG is described as the action agency of U. S. sponsored civic action activities. The position of the MAAG within the "country team" is shown, with the Ambassador clearly established as the senior U. S. representative. The chains of command of the various U. S. agencies in foreign lands are outlined, and the manner in which the MAAG coordinates with these agencies is described. Then, the resources available to the MAAG for civic action are mentioned, and note is made of the way in which these resources may be employed to complement, rather than compete with, the efforts of other U. S. agencies. The scope of civic action activities is considered, and the countries in which MAAGs and missions are stationed are listed. As well, mention is made of the guidance for civic action that has been promulgated from the national level.

In Chapter 5, the action of the Republic of the Philippines in employing civic action against the Huk insurgency is described. Of primary importance here was the granting of land to the reeducated Huks to counter the Communist battlecry of "land for the landless." Other civic action activities conducted by the Philippine armed forces included the provision of legal advice for the peasants, enabling them to acquire title to their properties over a period of time. The EDCOR Plan is examined in some detail because it has been so frequently used as an example of successful civic action.

Chapter 6 is devoted to civic action in Malaya. Here the activities of the British in using civic action as a contributory method of suppressing insurgency is described. Of primary note is the relocation

of the peasants to separate the guerrillas from their logistic sources. Another point emphasized in the British campaign was the aiming of civic action at the "grass roots" level from which Communist insurgency seems to so frequently spring. Civic action in Malaya, as in the Philippines, owes much of its success to the resettlement projects that were carried out. It was these projects that gave birth to the term "new villages" which is often heard in connection with civic action projects of this type.

In Chapter 7, the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) Program is treated in some detail. This program is administered by U. S. rather than Korean forces, but it is a good example of civic action-type foreign aid being used to implement U. S. foreign policy. This program serves as a model for other similar civic action activities, and it provides a good example of the rapport that can be established between U. S. forces and an indigenous population.

Civic action in Laos is covered in Chapter 8. This case study illustrates the difficulty of achieving successful civic action in an environment of government instability. The many and frequent changes of government are related to the different civic action programs, and upon these changes is placed the majority of the blame for the failure of civic action.

In Chapter 9, civic action activities in Vietnam are described, and the role played by the MAAG is illustrated by examples. Because of the wealth of material on civic action in Vietnam, emphasis is placed on those activities that are administered to augment the normal efforts of the MAAG. This includes description of support by the U. S. Operations Mission (USOM) and by Mobile Training Teams deployed from the

United States and Okinawa. Also included is a description and analysis of a new concept- the employment of Engineer Control and Advisory Detachments (ECADs).

.This thesis is concluded with Chapter 10. Here the strongpoints and the deficiencies that have been determined by analysis are generalized into proposed guidelines for future civic action projects. If these guidelines are valid with a potential for future application, the time and effort devoted to this study are justified.

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN POLICY AND CIVIC ACTION

Since achieving independence in 1776, the United States has employed five distinctly different foreign policies. These may be designated as (1) Diplomatic Independence, (2) the Monroe Doctrine, (3) the Open Door Policy, (4) Collective Security, and (5) the Containment of Russian Expansion. United States' foreign policy was clearly defined for the first time by George Washington in his farewell address in 1796. To illustrate the contrast with post World War II philosophies, excerpts from President Washington's speech are restated below:

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concern. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enemies.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as well as cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.¹

¹ U. S., Department of the Navy, A Guide For The Study Of Modern Basic Strategy And Tactics, p. 1-2.

The world in which the United States finds itself today is far different than the one to which President Washington addressed his remarks in 1796. In the mid-1960's there are at least three manifestations of the times that could not possibly have been foreseen 167 years ago. First, of course, is the conflict of ideologies between the Western Powers and the Communist Bloc, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the opposing leaders. Second, we are witnessing a development and use of technology beyond the most imaginative predictions of preceding generations. Third, a number of new nations have emerged as colonialism has given way to independence.

The three points mentioned above are interrelated, and are reflected in the foreign policies of both the United States and Russia. Both countries possess vast capabilities for exploiting technology, and quite naturally both countries are interested in the newly formed nations. These awakening nations are in the main underdeveloped, and this condition makes them all the more susceptible to external influences exerted by the major powers. However, the position of the United States is not one of dictating ideology, culture, or religion, but to guarantee the freedom of the lesser developed countries that seek our assistance, regardless of their political beliefs. Dr. W. W. Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has clarified the American ideological interest as follows:

. . . the United States need not seek societies abroad in its own image. The United States does have a profound interest that societies abroad develop and strengthen those elements in their respective cultures that elevate and protect the dignity of the individual as against the claims of the state. Such elements of harmony with the Western democratic tradition exist in different forms everywhere; and they have been strengthened by the attractiveness of the Western democratic example at its best, notably by the example of British parliamentary government, the American Revolution, and the values on

which American society was erected. But the forms of legitimately democratic societies can vary widely.²

Nevertheless, the security of the United States is threatened when other countries join the Soviet orbit. While enjoying the fruits of technology, the United States has become increasingly dependent upon the other nations of the world for goods and resources. Our continued prosperity will require even more overseas trade for the procurement of goods and resources and the sale of our exports. But when a country, regardless of its level of development, comes under Communist domination, American prosperity and security have been potentially jeopardized. However, United States foreign policy goes beyond selfish interests and includes a humanitarian desire to improve the living standards of the world's impoverished. The sincerity of this desire has been demonstrated by the Food For Peace Program. This program represents the coordinated efforts of the United States to share its abundance of food with less productive nations, and to assist them in the development of their own economies. The objectives are entirely humanitarian and have been publicly expressed by President Kennedy as follows:

To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required- not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.³

The Soviet foreign policy has displayed few humanitarian qualities as Communist expansion has been aimed toward the underdeveloped

²W. W. Rostow, The United States In The World Arena (New York, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 544.

³U. S., President, John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Washington, D. C., January 20, 1961.

countries. In this endeavor, Russia has attempted to extend influence with a minimum of direct armed participation. The Communist strategy has been to reserve military power for those instances in which political and economic efforts were insufficient, or when success by military means was rapid and relatively easy. Force, when required, has been applied through the peripheral satellites. This strategy has been demonstrated in Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. The political method of insurgency has been even more popular. This technique has been employed in Latin America, the Philippines, and Malaya. The most recent Communist technique has been economic in nature. This has been used in India, Cuba, Indonesia, and the Middle East through military and economic aid programs. In the years 1955-1962, Communist countries expended 4.6 billion dollars in economic aid and 2.5 billion dollars for military aid. Of this total of 7.1 billion dollars, Russia provided 70%, the European Satellites provided 22%, and Communist China provided 8%.⁴ Modern Communist aggression is therefore a triple threat attack- military, political, and economic.

Reflecting world conditions and attitudes, United States foreign policy since World War II has become known as the Containment of Russian Expansion. Although emphasis has shifted among the various components with changes in administration, three elements have been consistently identifiable. They are: (1) the maintenance of armed forces capable of opposing Russia in either a nuclear or a nonnuclear war; (2) the establishment of alliances with other countries for mutual economic and military security; and (3) the provision of military and economic

⁴U. S., Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense, Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs FY 1964, p. 112.

assistance to underdeveloped countries that will permit them to retain their national identity and improve their standard of living. The development of this policy becomes evident by an examination of the significant dates and events in Table 1.

TABLE 1

SIGNIFICANT DATES AND EVENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1947-1962

Date	Event
15 May 1947	Congress approved economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey.
2 September 1947	The Rio Treaty was signed.
2 April 1948	The Economic Cooperation Act (Marshall Plan) created the Economic Cooperation Administration.
20 January 1949	Technical assistance to underdeveloped nations was proposed in Point IV of President Truman's inaugural address.
4 April 1949	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed.
28 October 1949	Congress approved the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.
1 June 1950	The Act for International Development (Point IV) created the authority for the Technical Cooperation Administration.
30 August 1951	The Philippine Treaty (bilateral) was signed.
1 September 1951	The ANZUS Treaty was signed.
31 October 1951	The Mutual Security Act of 1951 created the Mutual Security Agency and united the efforts of military, economic, and technical assistance.
1 October 1953	The Republic of Korea Treaty (bilateral) was signed.
10 July 1954	Public Law 480 authorized the sale and use of surplus foods for mutual security and economic development of underdeveloped countries.
8 September 1954	The Southeast Asia Treaty was signed.
2 December 1954	The Republic of China Treaty (bilateral) was signed.
30 June 1955	The International Cooperation Administration was formed.
24 November 1958	President Eisenhower appointed a committee to study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee).
17 August 1959	The Draper Committee submitted their final report and reaffirmed the significance and complementarity of military and economic assistance.
19 January 1960	The Japanese Treaty (bilateral) was signed.

TABLE 1-Continued

Date	Event
1 March 1961	President Kennedy called on the people of the Americas to unite in an "Alliance for Progress."
4 September 1961	The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 combined and strengthened the efforts of the United States to assist underdeveloped countries.
4 November 1961	The Agency for International Development (AID) was activated.

The United States became directly involved in the curtailment of Russian expansion when the United Kingdom became financially unable to continue aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947. After being fully briefed on the Communist threat to those two countries, President Truman requested and obtained from Congress the appropriation required to counter the Communist aggression.

United States assistance directed specifically toward the underdeveloped countries was first proposed by President Truman as the fourth point in his inaugural address. Henceforth, the technical assistance provided within his guidance and the subsequent legislation was known as Point IV aid. His proposal, in part, was as follows:

Fourth. We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.

The United States is preeminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible....

We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. Their contributions will be warmly welcomed. This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work

together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable. It must be a world-wide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom....

Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to the investors must be balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labor go into these developments.


The old imperialism--exploitation for a foreign profit--has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair play....

Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies--hunger, misery, and despair.⁵

In June 1950 President Truman's Point IV plan was enacted into law, and the following year the Mutual Security Agency was formed to unite the efforts of military, economic, and technical assistance. During the latter part of the Truman administration and throughout the Eisenhower administration the emphasis was directed to the formation of alliances as a measure of mutual security. By 1960 the United States had signed mutual security alliances with 43 countries. The world-wide span of these alliances is pictorially depicted in Figure 1. Throughout the 1950's both economic and military assistance were continued. The scope of this foreign aid, categorized by region and recipient country, is summarized in Appendix I.

By 1958 the direction and composition of foreign aid had started to change. Figure 2 illustrates that the direction of military assistance shifted to favor the underdeveloped countries. At the same time appropriations for military assistance were decreased while those for economic assistance were increased. Table 2 shows the various amounts of foreign aid that have been allocated to military and economic

⁵U. S., President, Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address, Washington, D. C., January 20, 1949.



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (15 NATIONS)

A treaty signed 4 April 1949 by which the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and each of them will assist the other Parties, taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force...

1 UNITED STATES
2 CANADA
3 IRELAND
4 DENMARK
5 NETHERLANDS
6 BELGIUM
7 LUXEMBOURG
8 FRANCE
9 ITALY
10 GREECE
11 TURKEY
12 PORTUGAL
13 SPAIN
14 GERMANY
15 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY (15 NATIONS)

A treaty signed 2 September 1947 which provides that an armed attack against any American State "shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and... each one... undertakes to assist in meeting the attack..."

1 UNITED STATES
2 MEXICO
3 GUATEMALA
4 EL SALVADOR
5 NICARAGUA
6 COSTA RICA
7 PANAMA
8 COLOMBIA
9 VENEZUELA
10 ECUADOR
11 PERU
12 BRAZIL
13 BOLIVIA
14 PARAGUAY
15 CHILE
16 ARGENTINA
17 URUGUAY

ANZUS TREATY (3 NATIONS)

A treaty signed 1 September 1951 whereby each of the parties recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and that each party "will act to meet the common danger..."

1 UNITED STATES
2 NEW ZEALAND
3 AUSTRALIA

PHILIPPINE TREATY (2 NATIONS)

A treaty signed 30 August 1951 by which the United States and the Philippines recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and that each party "will act to meet the common danger..."

1 UNITED STATES
2 PHILIPPINES

JAPANESE TREATY (2 NATIONS)

A treaty signed 19 January 1950 whereby JAPAN and the UNITED STATES each recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and that each party "will act to meet the common danger..."

1 UNITED STATES
2 JAPAN

REPUBLIC OF KOREA TREATY (2 NATIONS)

A treaty signed 1 October 1953 whereby each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and that each party "will act to meet the common danger..."

1 UNITED STATES
2 REPUBLIC OF KOREA

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY (8 NATIONS)

A treaty signed 8 September 1954 whereby each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and that each party "will act to meet the common danger..."

1 UNITED STATES
2 NEW ZEALAND
3 AUSTRALIA
4 PHILIPPINES
5 THAILAND
6 PALESTINE
7 SINGAPORE
8 MALAYSIA

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (14 NATIONS)


A treaty signed 1 December 1954 whereby each of the parties recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and that each party "will act to meet the common danger..."

1 UNITED STATES
2 CANADA
3 IRELAND
4 DENMARK
5 NETHERLANDS
6 BELGIUM
7 LUXEMBOURG
8 FRANCE
9 ITALY
10 GREECE
11 TURKEY
12 PORTUGAL
13 SPAIN
14 GERMANY

Source: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College

UNITED KINGDOM
14 TURKEY
42 PALESTINE
44 MAL

Figure 2-Military Assistance Program,
Percent of Total Deliveries, Developed and Underdeveloped Countries.



Source: Department of Defense

TABLE 2

U. S. AID, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, BY
FISCAL YEAR, FISCAL YEARS 1946-62
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Year	Military	Economic	Total
1946-48	481	14,055	14,536
1949-52	2,839	19,351	22,190
1953	4,272	2,613	6,885
1954	3,412	2,419	5,831
1955	2,509	2,686	5,195
1956	2,979	2,620	5,598
1957	2,134	3,287	5,421
1958	2,404	2,967	5,371
1959	2,160	3,574	5,735
1960	1,845	3,372	5,217
1961	1,454	4,426	5,880
1962	1,526	5,084	6,611
Total	30,678	66,455	97,133

Note: Due to rounding, total may not equal sum of components.

Source: Statistics and Reports Division, Agency for International Development.

assistance since World War II. However, the benefits to the recipient countries cannot be cleanly divided between economic and military categories. Obviously, the receipt of military assistance will have a favorable effect on the economy of an underdeveloped country. Not quite so obvious, but equally valid, is the fact that the receipt of economic aid creates contingent military benefits. This complementarity of military and economic aid programs was pointed out in an interim report of the Draper Committee:

We have kept in mind in our studies your reference in the Budget Message to our Committee in connection with the need for reassessing the "interrelationships of military and economic assistance" and "consideration of the new Communist techniques in waging the Cold War." In meeting the multiple threat posed by the activities of international Communism, we must utilize as needed both economic and military assistance. These programs are neither alternatives nor competitors. Both are means of achieving related aspects of our total foreign policy objectives, and they are mutually complementary.

Military assistance helps to build essential military strength, but armed forces are dependent as well upon the people and the government of the country and upon a sound economic base, including roads, railroads, food, fuel, and power. Economic assistance can help to develop this base. On the other hand, sufficient military strength to provide a feeling of security is a first requisite for the order and confidence required in a country for economic development. This is the purpose of our military assistance.⁶

Civic action has long been an element of U. S. military assistance. Known by various names, civic action has provided disaster relief on a world-wide basis, administered foreign governments, and even today maintains our domestic ports, harbors, and inland waterways. However, this is not the type of civic action to which this study is directed. This study is limited to those civic action activities that are administered to improve the relationship between military forces and indigenous populations, as well as to improve economic and social conditions in underdeveloped countries. While the concept may not be new, federal legislation encouraging these projects is relatively recent. When the Mutual Security Act of 1954 was amended in 1959, civic action was authorized by the Congress in Section 105(b)(5):

To the extent feasible and consistent with the other purposes of this chapter, administration of the military assistance program

⁶William H. Draper, Jr., et al., Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Volume I (Draper Report, August 17, 1959), pp. 59-60.

shall encourage the use of foreign military forces in underdeveloped countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development.⁷

During the first year of President Kennedy's administration Congress enacted the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The intent of this law was to unite the foreign aid efforts of the United States and to direct them "to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security."⁸ This Act is particularly significant to this thesis because of two provisions. First, it directs assistance toward the agrarian (underdeveloped) economies. Second, it authorizes civic action by U. S. military forces in these lesser developed countries. Pertinent sections of this Act are reprinted below:

Section 461. Assistance to Countries Having Agrarian Economies. Wherever the President determines that the economy of any country is in major part an agrarian economy, emphasis shall be placed on programs which reach the people in such country who are engaged in agrarian pursuits or who live in the villages or rural areas in such country, including programs which will assist them in the establishment of indigenous cottage industries, in the improvement of agricultural methods and techniques, and which will encourage the development of local programs of self-help and mutual cooperation.

Section 505. Utilization of Assistance. (a) Military assistance to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security.

⁷U. S., Congress, United States Code: Congressional and Administrative News, 86th Congress, First Session 1959, Volume I (St. Paul Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1959), p. 264.

⁸U. S., Congress, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87-195, 75 Statute 424.

(b) To the extent feasible and consistent with the other purposes of this part, the use of military forces in less developed friendly countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development shall be encouraged.⁹

Thus the concept of civic action was legislatively established as a component of the U. S. Military Assistance Program in underdeveloped countries. Subsequent directives by the Department of Defense and the three military Departments have translated this concept into action. A later chapter will develop those conditions in underdeveloped countries that constitute a receptiveness for civic action. So it appears that as long as military assistance is provided to underdeveloped countries, civic action will be included. It is also evident that the future foreign policy of the United States will include some provision for military assistance. The following remarks by President Kennedy seem appropriately prophetic:

Freedom is not on the run anywhere in the world- not in Europe, Asia, Africa, or Latin America- as it might well have been without U. S. aid. And we now know that freedom- all freedom, including our own- is diminished when other countries fall under Communist domination, as in China in 1949, North Vietnam and the northern provinces of Laos in 1954, and Cuba in 1959. Freedom, all freedom, is threatened by the subtle, varied, and unceasing Communist efforts at subversion in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. And the prospect for freedom is also endangered or eroded in countries which see no hope- no hope for a better life based on economic progress, education, social justice, and the development of stable institutions. These are the frontiers of freedom which our military and economic aid programs seek to advance; and in so doing, they serve our deepest national interest.¹⁰

⁹U. S., Congress, United States Code: Congressional and Administrative News, 87th Congress, First Session 1961, Volume I (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1961), pp. 481 and 483.

¹⁰U. S., President, John F. Kennedy, Message to the Congress, April 2, 1963.

CHAPTER III

UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND CIVIC ACTION

Introductory chapters emphasized two points significant to this study. First, the goal of civic action is to raise the social and economic standards of living in the underdeveloped countries while improving the relations between military forces and the population. Second, the preservation of democracy in the underdeveloped countries is essential to the security of the United States and its allies. With underdeveloped countries being the key to these and other points of international significance, the question often arises as to the exact characteristics that describe a country as being underdeveloped. These traits are innumerable. Some of those more commonly mentioned are a low national level of health; an increasing population which is not accompanied by an equal or greater increase in net national product; a lack of technology, and its attendant, skilled labor; a presence of traditional, sociological, and religious inhibitions; a lack of developed natural resources; limited transportation, communication, and power facilities; a high percentage of the working force employed in agriculture; inequitable land distribution; a shortage of capital, both by individuals and their government; and a low national level of education, evidenced by a low rate of literacy. Elements of any of these traits, combined with a lack of knowledge and an absence of desire for change, present a near insurmountable obstacle to unaided economic

development. Frequently these problems are further compounded by a corrupt or unstable government. The economic and social atmosphere is one of futility, or even worse, one of complacency.

Of the characteristics previously mentioned, civic action can cope with only a few. Of these, improvement in education, health, and production appear most important. Chapter 4 will describe the civic action resources through which this improvement is possible.

Economists disagree as to a precise distinction between developed and underdeveloped countries. Dr. Krause, Professor of Economics at the State University of Iowa, defines an underdeveloped country as one whose people have a consumption level and a standard of living inferior to those enjoyed by people in developed countries.¹ More finite definitions are also in academic usage. One popular with agricultural economists is that any country is underdeveloped if over one half its population is employed in agriculture. Another definition, perhaps more appropriate to changing times, is that any country is underdeveloped if its per capita income is less than one fourth that of the highest income country. With a 1961 per capita income in the United States of \$2820.00 as a criterion, any country with less than \$705.00 per capita income would be classified as underdeveloped. Appendix II lists all countries outside the Communist orbit that are generally regarded as being underdeveloped. Israel and Japan are questionably included in this list. Attention is directed to the columns containing data on health, education, and production- the three areas in which civic action can provide assistance.

¹Walter Krause, Economic Development (San Francisco, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1961), p. 6.

As previously mentioned, the United States and its allies are not alone in promoting the progress of the emerging nations. The Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc are equally interested in encouraging development as a means of expanding ideology. The two approaches, however, are quite different.

W. W. Rostow, in The Stages of Economic Growth, says that the acceptance of three policies are prerequisite to economic development. They are: (1) agriculture must become more productive; (2) external assistance must be organized; (3) and the developing country must provide the environment. Professor Rostow also states that economic development is traceable through five stages of growth, and that the economic progress of any country may be determined by placing it in the appropriate stage. These five stages of growth are: (1) the traditional society; (2) the pre-conditions for take-off; (3) the take-off; (4) the drive to maturity; and (5) the age of high mass consumption. Each stage will be briefly described.²

A traditional society is one whose structure is developed within limited production functions, based on primitive science and technology, and on unsophisticated attitudes toward the physical world. This society is based on family and clan, with a hierachial social structure. The people are of limited education, more or less satisfied with their lot, and with no vision of improving their status. Children expect to live the same sort of life as their parents, and

²W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 4.

in most cases expect to follow the same vocation. At least 70% of the people are engaged in some type of agriculture.³

The period of pre-conditions for take-off is one in which a society becomes prepared for sustained growth. The period may occur in "old" societies, such as those in Africa and Asia, or in "new" societies such as those in the United States and Australia. In new societies, the period is not necessarily as prolonged, because there are less traditions to be overcome. During this period, the nature of society commences to shift from agriculture to trade and industry. The attitude of the people starts to shift from local to national viewpoints. Income rates rise above the consumption level, and men become prominent because of ability rather than because of heredity. The investment rate increases faster than the population, and profits join nationalism as motivating factors. The people start to desire development in preference to the interests and attitudes of the traditional past. The government starts to reflect the attitude of the people, and becomes interested in capital formation and the organization of the economy. Also, during this period, agricultural development must become evident, in order to play three roles required during the transition. These are: (1) increased production to feed the increased population; (2) creation of the necessity for ancillary industries to provide fertilizers and farm machinery; and (3) provision of capital from increased agricultural production to assist in other development.⁴

The period of take-off is that decisive interval in history when growth is the natural condition of the society. This period may

³Ibid., pp. 4-6.

⁴Ibid., pp. 6-7.

be initiated by a stimulus which is political, technological, or the creation of a newly favorable international environment, or merely as a challenge to compete with other nations. In the United States, this period came with the expansion of the railroads during the middle of the 19th century. As a matter of fact, throughout history, the introduction of railroads has been the best single indicator of the take-off period. This period may also be identified by a rise in productive investment from less than 5% to more than 10% of national income, and the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors. For this period to continue, there must develop a political, social, and institutional framework favoring the progress. Capital must become available, from within or without the economy, to provide for equipment and loanable funds. Entrepreneurs must emerge in industry as well as in agriculture. During this period, growth will be manifested in three different sectors. The first of these, or the primary sector, is that of the formation of a new industry or the discovery of a new resource use. The second, or supplementary sector, is the formation of an industry to satisfy a need developed by another industry in the primary sector. An example here is the development of transportation required to deliver industrial output. A final area of growth is the derived sector, where the growth is steady in relation to some other factor, such as an increasing population. The growth of the clothing industry illustrates this sector. During the period of take-off, the population that is engaged in agriculture is reduced to about 40%.⁵

The drive to maturity is the period when a society has effectively applied the range of modern technology to the bulk of its

⁵Ibid., pp. 7-9.

resources. During this period, the working force changes in composition, wages, outlook, and skills. The people engaged in agriculture are reduced to 20% of the population. The character of leadership in the nation changes from the feudal baron-like individuals of the past to the efficient and professional managers of the present. Probably the characteristic that most definitely identifies this period is the recognition that industrialization is taken for granted.⁶

The age of high mass consumption is indicated by a shift toward the production of durable consumer's goods and services. During this period, three objectives compete for resources and political support. These are: (1) national pursuit for external influence through increased allocations to military and foreign policy; (2) pursuit of a welfare state in order to achieve human and social objectives; and (3) the expansion of consumption levels beyond basic requirements of food, shelter, and clothing.⁷

In contrast to Rostow's theory is that of the Communists as outlined by the seven propositions of Karl Marx: (1) political, social, and cultural characteristics of societies are a function of the economic process; (2) history moves forward by a series of class struggles; (3) feudal societies are destroyed because of the development of a middle class; (4) capitalist industrial societies cause their own destruction because the unskilled working class that is developed receives only survival wages, and they cannot afford to buy all the goods that are produced by the industrial capacity that develops in the pursuit of profits; (5) the conflict between heavy supply and

⁶Ibid., pp. 9-10.

⁷Ibid., pp. 10-11.

light demand results in the laborers seizing the production facilities; (6) the downfall of capitalism will stem from this unemployment and the imperialistic wars; and, (7) once power is seized, the workers income will be increased as the productive system improves, making true Communism possible beyond the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁸

In Rostow's theory, civic action can play a contributing role in the transition from the traditional society through the period of take-off. Of course, there is also a place for civic action in Marx's revolutionary concept. As a matter of fact, current Communist programs include civic action in attempting economic development by a more direct method than that of Marx. Nevertheless, today as in the past, there are two schools of thought as to the preferable solution to the problem of economic development- the Capitalist and the Communist. If we look to history for proof of validity, it is found that the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Canada, and Australia have all reached Rostow's fifth stage of high mass consumption. Under the Communist system, no country has yet been able to pass beyond the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁹

Regardless of the approach to economic development, the recipient population at times appears indifferent to the attempts to improve their status. This has been one of the most frustrating obstacles to both military and economic advisors. This attitude might be better understood by an attempt to be considered "underdeveloped," such as the one made in 1955 by Dr. Harold Clark, Professor of Education, Columbia

⁸Ibid., pp. 145-147.

⁹Neil B. Mills, "Economic Development- Obstacles, Requirements, and Stages of Growth" (Unpublished report, The Ohio State University, 1962), p. 6.

University, before the Sixth Conference for Agricultural Services in Foreign Areas.

On the 17th day of October, 1960, a group of people from Mars landed in Iowa. These visitors were appalled at the backward agriculture they discovered. The farmers still sowed little grains in the ground and had to go through and pull the grains off to get food. The farmers even still relied upon rainfall to provide moisture. That procedure had been out grown on Mars hundreds of years before.

The visitors were surprised at the primitive houses...Housing that had no real control over the temperature and humidity...that required a back-breaking amount of work to keep clean. They were even more surprised at the primitive diet of the natives. They had to take hours a day fixing meals, dirtying pots and plates, and other hours trying to get the dirt off them. It seemed as though the people had nothing to do and were trying to waste time by dirtying and cleaning dishes. The incredible inefficiency of it appalled the visitors. The crudity of the clothes of the natives amazed them. It was almost impossible to make any adjustments to temperature.

The natives seemed to be so backward that they had no control even of the purity of the air. Dirty air would hang over the villages and towns, people would get sick very frequently, they would catch something called colds several times a year. Physical conditions of life struck the visitors as primitive beyond belief. People still tried to move around in little bugs on stripes of concrete that had been poured over the early buffalo trails. Those bugs were extremely dangerous and killed many people, and were highly inefficient in moving people about.

The art expressions of these natives had been fossilized many centuries earlier, seemingly. The visitors thought the paintings were unusually primitive, the music had some attractions as much extremely primitive music does. The language of the natives was crude, even the symbols of their alphabet were easily confused. The poverty and crudity of their culture extended through all aspects of life. To the visitors, the values and beliefs of the natives were not essentially different from other primitive people in various places.

On the morning of November 10, 1960, the Des Moines Register carried an article stating that the visitors from Mars had returned home. "However, (it continued) they left twenty experts. The visitors are going to come back within a year. The twenty experts are to tell us how to change our agriculture and education, our economic and social life, our inherited culture, our basic values and beliefs. The last thing the visitors said before they left was that the income in Mars was more than ten times as high as the income of the primitive place they had been visiting and that they assumed when they returned within a year that the necessary changes would be made and that the income would be several times what it had been."

One further notation from the paper of November 20, 1960:
"The farmers in several communities in Iowa have been meeting in recent weeks. They are not sure they want to make the changes that would be necessary in order to increase their income to ten times what it has been."¹⁰

¹⁰ Mervin G. Smith, "Agricultural Development in the World"
(Unpublished text, The Ohio State University, 1959), Chapter XIV,
pp. 12-13.

CHAPTER IV


THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AND CIVIC ACTION

Within the limits established for this study, U. S. participation in civic action is administered by MAAGs and Missions. Other U. S. forces and agencies participate, of course, and their efforts must be coordinated with those of the Advisory Group. The responsibility for coordination quite naturally belongs to the American Ambassador in each country where civic action is sponsored. This unity of effort is reflected in the concept of the "Country Team," the structure of which is depicted in Figure 3. In the past, however, this unity of effort has frequently been more theoretical than actual. The recent improvement in this relationship has been largely the result of President Kennedy's letter to all Ambassadors on 29 May 1961. This letter, which directed local coordination within the country team, is included as Appendix III to this thesis.

The necessity for this local coordination is well illustrated by Colonel Bagnulo in his description of the controversy between the Ambassador and certain Navy officers during the landing of Marines in Lebanon in 1958.¹ While the authority vested in the Ambassador does not extend to forces in the field under a military commander, the direction for exchange of information is quite explicit. Appropriate

¹Aldo H. Bagnulo, "The Country Team" (unpublished thesis, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 25 January 1960), pp. 24-25.

Figure 3-The Country Team



Source: Department of State

compliance at all levels with the spirit as well as the letter of this direction will prevent repetition of such ludicrous situations as that which occurred in Bierut in the summer of 1958.

MAAGs and Missions are elements of the Country Team in 48 countries. Listed alphabetically, these are Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Korea, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Republic of China, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.² Thirty two of these countries are linked by mutual security pacts to the United States (see Chapter 2), and of these 23 countries are classified as underdeveloped (see Appendix II). The social and economic characteristics of these countries were described in the previous chapter. These conditions are also interrelated with the size and quality of their armed forces. Most of these countries maintain an armed strength out of proportion to the economy that supports it. The quantity allocation of manpower to the armed forces is not in itself considered an economic loss, because "hidden unemployment"³ is prevalent. However, the support of these armed forces does create a burden for the remaining population. The quality allocation of manpower to defense, moreover, does have an adverse effect on the economy of

²U. S., Department of the Army, U. S. Army: Progress '63 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 46.

³A term indicating that in agrarian economies excessive labor is used to accomplish even the simplest of tasks.

underdeveloped nations. Military service in these countries is relatively more respected than in developed countries, and consequently it attracts the better educated citizenry. This obviously withdraws quality manpower from an economy that has dire need for its services.

The MAAG advisor is in a position to encourage the use of indigenous military personnel to improve the local economy. An awareness of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the military forces should make the job easier. The relatively large standing armies, when not engaged in defense activities, provide a ready and prepaid labor force for strengthening the economy of the country. And, as previously brought out, military leadership is the best the country has to offer. Two major side-effects can result. First, the use of military forces in these non-military activities serves to bind the military and civilian sectors in a unified effort to improve the country. Second, an increase in economic strength will create a coincident increase in military strength.

In contrast to the absence of specific guidelines, there is an abundance of general guidance for MAAG personnel in the initiation and execution of civic action. Basic doctrine is promulgated in FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, which lists ten areas in which civic action is appropriate. These are: (1) agriculture and natural resources; (2) industry and communication; (3) transportation; (4) health and sanitation; (5) education; (6) public administration; (7) community development, social welfare, and housing; (8) mass communication; (9) mapping and project surveys; and (10) paramilitary organization.⁴

⁴U. S., Department of the Army, FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (May 1962), pp. 89-92.

It must be realized that the primary objective of MAAGs and Missions is the military training of the forces of the recipient nations. With limited personnel and funds, the MAAG Chief frequently finds few organic resources available for such additional tasks as civic action. However, outside assistance is readily attainable. Through Country Team coordination, funds, personnel, and surplus foods from the Agency for International Development (USOM/AID) and the U. S. Information Service (USIS) may be made available. Additionally, personnel and equipment from other U. S. forces in the area may be acquired on a short term loan basis.

Another major source of assistance is the Civic Action Mobile Training Team. Assignment of these teams may be requested through channels by the MAAG/Mission Chief under whom they will work while in the host nation. There are four tasks which they normally accomplish. These are: (1) orientation of the MAAG or Mission staff, and other members of the Country Team as appropriate, on the civic action concept and the role of the MAAGs and Missions in the program; (2) survey of the country for needs which can be met through civic action; (3) development of a civic action program for the specific country; (4) training and guidance of local forces and specific technical assistance on projects.⁵

Civic Action Mobile Training Teams normally consist of up to five people, some of whom may be civilians. Team members are so selected that at least one of the members is qualified in each of the following fields: (1) government (political-economic affairs); (2) military-civil relations; (3) engineering; (4) sanitation; (5) medicine

⁵Ibid., p. 94.

or public health; (6) community development; (7) commerce and industry; (8) agriculture; (9) education; (10) psychological operations; and (11) public relations.⁶

Upon arrival in the host country, the team first becomes familiar with the local situation through a series of meetings with the MAAG staff and other sections of the Country Team. They determine the basic economic needs of the country, and the ability of the indigenous forces to engage in civic action projects. During this period they become acquainted with officials of U. S. agencies and the host country. This indoctrination is supplemented by trips into the country to observe the conditions, needs, economic status, existing civic action projects, and civilian attitudes. Based on the aggregate of information collected, the team then prepares a civic action program. After approval by the MAAG Chief and coordination with other elements of the Country Team, the program is submitted to the Ambassador to determine its suitability into the overall country plan. If it is approved by the Ambassador and can be implemented without external funding, it is returned to the MAAG for execution. When requested by the MAAG Chief, the Mobile Training Team will remain in the country to work directly with indigenous forces on these civic action projects.⁷

Civic action programs that require additional funds must be approved through Military Assistance Program channels. When such a program has been planned and approved in the host country, it then must be forwarded to the Unified Commander for concurrence. The Unified

⁶Ibid.

⁷U. S., Department of the Army, Standing Operating Procedure For Civic Action Teams (Washington, D. C.: 16 November 1960), pp. 10-11.

Commander examines the plan, adds his comments and recommendations, and forwards it to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for review. At this level the civic action plan is reviewed for feasibility within the overall Military Assistance Program. It is then sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final review and concurrence.⁸

MAAGs and Missions have the capability of countering insurgency through civic action with no outside help. By winning the respect of the local forces with whom they work, MAAG personnel can accomplish much on an informal basis. This is especially true in the fields of education and sanitation where human resources are the prime requirements. However, whatever the project, coordination with other sections of the Country Team is a requisite. MAAG and Mission Chiefs must also be alert to the use of the resources of other U. S. agencies as well as to those of the Civic Action Mobile Training Teams. This external assistance can be an invaluable asset in the accomplishment of the overall mission of the MAAG.

⁸U. S., Department of the Army, "Review of Civic Action Program," Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 31 December 1963, pp. 3-4.

CHAPTER V

CIVIC ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Nearly every article or document published on civic action contains some reference to the civic activities in the Philippines since 1950. This civic assistance by the Philippines' armed forces is frequently cited as a major element in the suppression of the Communist HUK insurgency. The United States Department of the Army uses the Philippine civic action program to illustrate the constructive effects of this type of operation.¹ Although U. S. participation in civic action was far less in the Philippines than it has been in many of the underdeveloped countries, the success of the Philippine story dictates its use as an example for analysis.

Communism came to the Philippines during the period 1929-1930 with the immigration of an American called William Janequette, alias Harrison George, and an Indonesian named Tan Malaka, alias Pedro Fuentes.²

During the 1930s, Communism quietly expanded. Philippine leaders were in contact with Communist headquarters in Moscow, and in 1932

¹U. S., Department of the Army, Standing Operating Procedure For Civic Action Teams (Washington, D. C.: 16 November 1960), pp. 4-5.

²Jesus Vargus, Secretary of Defence (Philippines), "Counter-measures," Seminar on Countering Communist Subversion, SEATO Pamphlet, (Bankok, Thailand: 28 November 1957), pp. 79-80.

the Communist Party of the Philippines was accepted into the Comintern.³ Under the subsequent leadership of Pedro Abad Santos, the Communist organization was designated the Hukbong Magpapalaya Bayan, or Army of Liberation of the people.⁴ The party name was informally known as Hukbalahap, and this was later shortened to simply HUK. This was the organization that fought as guerrillas alongside loyal Philippine forces in World War II. By the end of the war the HUKs were well organized and well equipped with American and captured Japanese equipment. When the Philippine Islands were liberated, the HUKs did not choose to disband and surrender their arms. Instead, under the leadership of Luis Taruc and with the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, they declared themselves to be in revolt against the government. Estimates of the HUK armed strength ranged from 20,000 to 60,000, but the extent of the damage and havoc that they caused was out of proportion to their numbers. By 1949, bands of HUKs roamed the countryside at will, preying on the rural population and destroying government and private property. A Politburo was established in Manila, and plans were made to seize control of the Philippine government.⁵

The Philippine political situation further compounded the problem of government stability. President Quirino's administration was generally regarded as corrupt, with the high offices filled by political appointees and relatives. As a matter of fact, his election in 1949 was viewed as being "rigged," and was later termed the "dirty

³Ibid., p. 80.

⁴Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia (New York, New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1955), p. 93.

⁵Ibid., p. 99.

election." When the votes were counted, and in two provinces there were more votes than voters, it was said that "obviously even the bees and birds and the cadavers in the cemeteries voted."⁶

The social and economic conditions also contributed to the HUK progress. Two typical stories related by Carlos Romulo illustrate the conditions under which the peasants lived. The first story tells of a peasant tenant farmer whose daughter was engaged to be married when she was sexually violated by the landlord. When the peasant protested, he and his family were thrown off the land. Before the farmer and his daughter's fiance joined the HUKs, they waylaid and killed the landlord. In the other example, a captured HUK told of buying and clearing a patch of jungle in order to own his farm. He built a home for his family and planted his first crop. When the rice was ready to harvest, he was turned off the land because his title was worthless.⁷ The prevalence of absentee landlordism and social injustices provided sufficient examples to be used by the HUKs in their stated purpose of agrarian reform. The HUK slogan of "land for the landless" fell upon many receptive ears.

President Quirino ordered first the Constabulary, and then the Army, to suppress the HUKs. Both organizations were unsuccessful. The Constabulary were accused of abusing the peasants and confiscating their food. In many cases, the HUKs offered their services to the villagers to protect them from the Constabulary.⁸ The efforts of the Army were

⁶Ibid., p. 88.

⁷Ibid., pp. 148-149.

⁸Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom, 1946-1958 (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 144.

as ineffectual as those of the Constabulary. Poorly led, the units would pursue imaginary guerrillas, fire a few rounds, and return to their barracks. When deployed to the villages, they would help themselves to the farm animals and crops, and alienate the peasants just as the Constabulary had done previously.⁹

On 1 September 1950, an obscure Congressman from Zambales Province, Ramon Magsaysay, was sworn in as President Quirino's Secretary of National Defense. Conditions in the Philippines at that time are aptly described by Jesus Vargas, one of Magsaysay's fellow countrymen who was destined to be a subsequent Secretary of National Defense.

A close scrutiny, based on experience already learned, convinced the authorities that the Communist threat was many-faced in nature. Subversive in character, it presented simultaneously and immediately, numerous fronts in the military, social and economic fields. The growth and seeming success of the Communist conspiracy was traced to the general discontent, which in turn resulted from the existence of unprecedented graft and corruption in the high councils of government, by the abuses committed by some members of the military, by the almost total absence of social and economic reforms, and by the almost universal poverty of the great masses of the people who felt they were abandoned and completely left out from the dispensation of national benefits. In short, we realized that Communism thrives where discontent, poverty, corruption, ineptitude, abuses, and other social ills exist, and that in order to combat it, the government has to get at the root of these social ills. In other words, to prevent Communism from gaining an ideological and military foothold in the national life, it was necessary to deny it the fertile grounds in which it thrived. Towards this end, the government and the nation marshalled all their resources.¹⁰

Magsaysay lost no time in opening his campaign against the HUKs. However, he saw the problem as extending beyond military victory to include the winning of the people back to the government. The methods that he used in accomplishing this latter portion of his goal has

⁹Romulo, op. cit., p. 124.

¹⁰Vargas, op. cit., p. 82.

served as an example for the later civic activities of the armed forces of many countries. As he drove the incompetent officers from the Army, he took additional steps to establish good will between the military and civilian sectors. Soldiers were forbidden to live off the country when they went to the field. They were not permitted to confiscate food and lodging, nor to force the peasants to do their cooking, laundry, and other chores. Offenders were promptly and justly punished. When soldiers came to the villages, they brought their own food which they could now afford because Magsaysay had obtained an increase in their pay. They brought small gifts to the villagers and paid them for any lodging or emergency supplies that they required. Thus Magsaysay began to win the peasant support for his army. He described them as "a public relations outfit- with every officer, and every soldier, under orders to win the public esteem."¹¹

When the villagers began to accept the soldiers, Magsaysay went a step further. He made civic action a command responsibility, and assigned a civil affairs officer to each battalion. When one of these units was operating in the vicinity of a village, the battalion commander and his civil affairs officer would arrange a meeting with village officials to work out the relationship between the troops and the civilians. These arrangements frequently included the protection of the farmers from HUK raids on their crops and livestock, assistance during harvest, and advice on the village self-defense. Army officers were assigned to escort and protect Department of Agriculture advisers that came to the villages to assist the farmers. Troop labor was used

¹¹ Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray, The Magsaysay Story (New York, New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1956), p. 126.

to help the peasants to build schools and to dig wells. Civilians that were wounded in the fighting between the army and the HUKs were treated in army hospitals. As impressive as these civic activities were, they probably did less to gain the support of the peasants than the actions taken by the Army to help the farmers in their agrarian problems. Upon Magsaysay's authorization, a number of Judge Advocate officers donned civilian clothes and gratuitously represented the farmers in court to protect them from unscrupulous landlords or to assist them in acquiring a legal title to their land.¹²

As the 1951 senatorial elections approached, there was growing concern in the Philippines that they would be handled as they had been two years previously. As before, the Army was charged with the security of the voting under the direction of the Commission on Elections, a constitutional body with exclusive responsibility for the conduct of elections in the Philippines. Public groups were clamoring for an honest election, and the Communist Party was loudly predicting a repetition of the "dirty election" of 1949 with senatorial candidates of President Quirino's Liberal Party assured of victory. However, in 1951 the election was in different hands.

Magsaysay used his psychological warfare experts to conduct an intensive educational campaign prior to the election. These officers used various media to assure the public that the election would be honest and the people could vote in safety. Magsaysay's purpose in this

¹² Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, Civic Activities of the Military, Southeast Asia (Report of the Anderson-Southeast Asia Subcommittee of the Draper Committee, 13 March 1959), p. 2.

campaign was primarily to restore faith in democratic processes, but he was not blind to the effect of countering Communist propaganda.¹³

To protect the voters against the HUK threats, Magsaysay used all available army personnel, 5000 ROTC cadets, and a multitude of honest school teachers. He used the teachers as polling clerks and the cadets as election guards. The soldiers guarded the ballot boxes and escorted the voters to and from their homes, employing force as necessary to prevent HUK interference. A total of twenty-one people were killed, but there were over 4,000,000 honest votes cast. In 1949, there had been hundreds killed and there had been an indeterminable number of dishonest votes. The final mark of honesty was recognized when the votes were counted and it was found that the anti-Quirino candidates had won every contested seat and control of the Senate.¹⁴

These "clean elections" of 1951 won public support for the Army. The conduct of the elections climaxed the rebuilding of faith that Magsaysay had initiated when he directed soldiers to support the farmers rather than to exploit them. Although these were commendable examples of civic action, they were without the economic impact of the EDCOR Plan.

The EDCOR Plan probably originated in Magsaysay's mind as a result of his deep conviction that a land reform program was long overdue in the Philippines. He was well aware that many peasants had joined the HUKs because they were unable to own land or because they were the victims of oppressive absentee landlords. He was also aware that the government owned great tracts of unused land on the island of Mindanao.

¹³Romulo and Gray, op. cit., p. 151.

¹⁴Romulo, op. cit., p. 142.

To Magsaysay it was simple and logical to establish a homestead-type project that would rehabilitate the dissident HUKs and advance the economic development of the Philippines at the same time.

Magsaysay chose with care the appropriate time to present his plan to President Quirino. The occasion presented itself during a visit of President Sukarno of Indonesia. As President Quirino, members of his cabinet, and President Sukarno were on a cruise, Magsaysay spoke privately to Quirino of the proposed resettlement project. Quirino listened carefully, but offered no comment. Later, on the voyage home, Sukarno described how his government had been successful in resettling farmers by a method similar to that which Magsaysay had earlier proposed. Magsaysay quickly took advantage of this unforeseen opportunity and said to Sukarno, "This is a coincidence, Mr. President. Our own President Quirino, today, was telling us about a similar project he hopes to start right here in the Philippines." As Sukarno raised his eyebrows in increased respect, Quirino could do little other than to reply, "Yes, Secretary Magsaysay, go ahead and implement the project you have just mentioned."¹⁵

Magsaysay lost no time in creating the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) within the Department of National Defense and preparing the EDCOR Plan. The purpose of the EDCOR Plan was clearly stated in its nine general objectives which are listed below.

1. To rehabilitate both socially and economically the great masses of our people who need a new start.
2. To populate large, uncultivated tracts of land in order to distribute population from the congested to the less congested areas.

¹⁵ Romulo and Gray, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

3. To embark on an agricultural progress geared to the needs of the resettlement project with the end in view of recovering in whole or in part money invested in the resettlement project.
4. To solve the peace and order problem by establishing peacefully law-abiding towns.
5. To organize model communities in many parts of the Philippines, peopled by peaceful, progressive citizens.
6. To give landless persons a chance to own a piece of land at low cost through their own efforts.
7. To produce new money crops to hasten our economic self-sufficiency.
8. To pioneer in the establishment of new home industries.
9. To provide training in agriculture for trainees while undergoing military training.¹⁶

These general objectives were supplemented by the following seven immediate objectives:

1. To take over surrendered or captured dissident elements, who are neither indicted nor convicted by civil courts for the purpose of re-educating them in the democratic, peaceful and productive way of life.
2. To open resettlement projects in fertile but unpopulated areas where settlers will be given a chance to own a home and farm lot.
3. To operate EDCOR Farms which will conduct experiments and later produce on a commercial scale for the purpose of recovering in whole or in part the money invested in the project.
4. To establish poultry, piggery, and other livestock projects for eventual resale to settlers at cost or to continue as a profit-producing enterprise.
5. To show by example to people who have been lured away by communism that democracy is the better ideology.
6. To prove by concrete, definite actions that the government is sincere in the implementation of its social and economic amelioration program.
7. To provide convenient credit facilities to settlers, especially at the initial stage of the project.¹⁷

Eligibility for settling in these EDCOR projects was established to insure loyalty to the government and the sincerity of the recipients. The plan provided for initial settlers to come from surrendered or

¹⁶ Republic of the Philippines, The EDCOR Plan (Camp Murphy, Quezon City: Office of the Chief, Economic Development Corps, Department of National Defense), p. 1.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

captured HUKs, but after the dissident elements had been accommodated, applications were to be accepted from four additional categories in the following order of preference:

1. Ex-servicemen.
2. Former guerrillas.
3. Applicants already in the vicinity of the settlement site but also who do not own a piece of land.
4. All other applicants who may be recruited by recruiting officers or who apply direct to the EDCOR Office.¹⁸

The administration and support of the EDCOR projects were to be the responsibility of the armed forces. Commanding Officers of Military Areas would be charged with the transportation, security, billeting and feeding of the settlers from the time they left their homes or collecting areas until they left the port of embarkation. Assistance in transportation would be furnished by the Quartermaster General as required. The Commander of the Philippine Navy had the responsibility for transportation, security, and mess of settlers from the port of embarkation to the port of debarkation. Upon arrival at the port of debarkation, the settlers were the responsibility of the Chief of the Economic Development Corps.¹⁹

At the EDCOR settlement, the settlers would be housed in temporary barracks until their own home could be constructed. EDCOR was to furnish assistance in building the houses, and in some cases would do the complete construction so that the settlers could concentrate on planting their first crop. The cost of labor and material of home construction was charged to the settler. The fundamental concept was that EDCOR would help the settler to help himself. However, in order to

¹⁸Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 3-4.

accomplish this, it would be necessary to advance considerable credit. Such necessities as work animals, farm implements, carpentry tools, food, clothing, and other household needs would be supplied to each settler and charged to his account. There would be no cash advanced, and only absolute requirements would be provided on credit. It was estimated that the average settler would require credit in the amount of 1860 pesos.²⁰ If a settler were to work for EDCOR and receives wages, his credit would be reduced accordingly. Each settler would have five years to repay his loan. However, additional credit could be made available to those settlers that wanted to expand their production.²¹

The EDCOR Plan provided for the issuance of a home lot and a farm lot to each family of settlers. The home lot would be located within an established townsite where administrative buildings, barracks, schools, churches, parks, and markets would be provided by EDCOR. Each home lot would include space for vegetables, fruit and shade trees, toilets, a garbage pit, a piggery and poultry project, and a small flower garden. The farm lot to be issued to settlers would be at least six hectares in area.²² Advice as to crop selection, methods of planting, and agricultural techniques would be provided by EDCOR agricultural experts. In providing this guidance, EDCOR officials would consider the overall economic needs of the country and not encourage competition

²⁰1860 pesos is approximately equal to \$930.00 in U. S. currency.

²¹Republic of the Philippines, op. cit., pp. 4-6.

²²Six hectares are equal to 14.826 acres.

in the production of crops that were already amply produced in other parts of the country.²³

At the end of five years or earlier, if the settler had repaid his debts and cultivated at least a fourth of his farm lot, and had complied with all EDCOR regulations, arrangements would be made for the issuance of the title to him for both his home and farm lots.²⁴

Magsaysay's EDCOR Plan provided for more than agrarian reform. An experimental farm was to be established in each settlement to advance agricultural technology. A poultry and piggery project was to be initiated as a source of credit livestock for the settlers and food for EDCOR officials. Where the settlement area was suitable, goat ranches would be operated for the same purposes. Neither was social welfare to be neglected. Athletic equipment, playground facilities, libraries, schools for juvenile and adult education, medical facilities, and recreation would be provided. Boy and Girl Scout Troops would be started in those villages with sufficient candidates. Women would be trained in such cottage industries as weaving, basket making, twine making, mat weaving, hat making, and similar enterprises. The men who indicated an interest could learn a trade such as carpentry, cobbling, blacksmithing, tinsmithing, metal working, simple construction, pottery, and allied trades. Movies would be provided for both entertainment and education. Community life would be stressed. Also in order to inspire patriotism, retreats would be conducted every afternoon.²⁵

²³Republic of the Philippines, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

²⁴Ibid., p. 7.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 8-10.

Above all, the EDCOR Plan emphasized justice to the settlers. Discipline was not to be ignored, but punishments would fit the offenses and be applied without favoritism. The atmosphere of a police state was to be avoided. EDCOR officers were encouraged to mix socially with the settlers, and assume the attitude of instructors and helpers rather than overseers. Officers were therefore to be selected with care for assignment to EDCOR duty.²⁶

The first two EDCOR settlements were established on Mindanao in 1951. One was located at Kapatagan in Lanao Province, and the other at Buldon in Cotabato Province. Both settlements were located in unused territory, and the settlement at Buldon was carved out of virgin jungle. The standard unit used by the Philippine Army in these settlements had a strength of twelve officers and ninety-one enlisted men. These troops preceded the settlers to build roads, clear the area, establish security and to construct initial housing. Once the settlers arrived, they worked side by side with the soldiers, clearing additional land for farming and building family housing, community centers, schools, churches, and dispensaries. Sawmills were set up and operated, wells were dug, sanitary facilities put in, and markets constructed. These pilot projects were established and operated just as Magsaysay had envisioned and planned.²⁷

In 1953 an additional project was initiated at Echague in Isabella Province, and the next year a fourth settlement was established at Midsayap, Cotabato Province. These two projects followed the pattern

²⁶Ibid., pp. 11-12.

²⁷Lansdale, op. cit., p. 3.

of their predecessors. By 1958, the four EDCOR farms had a population of 5,175 and were capable of providing most of their own administration. Consequently, military strength started a gradual reduction.²⁸

Magsaysay used his military forces for two other notable EDCOR projects. The first of these was the EDCOR Rehabilitation Center which had the mission of providing vocational training to deserving surrendered HUKs. A wood working shop was built in part of an army warehouse, and the HUKs were taught to make furniture. The profits from selling the furniture went to the workers, and the project developed into a highly successful enterprise.²⁹

The other EDCOR project was undertaken to demonstrate the faith of the government, to induce additional army-civilian cooperation, and to encourage further HUK surrenders. For this project, the Army selected San Luis, Pampanga Province, which was the center of HUK activities and the home town of Luis Taruc, the HUK military chief. In this area the depressed economic conditions had been used by the HUKs as a propaganda theme to obtain support. The Army located some available government land in the Candaba Swamp, several miles away and across a river, and then persuaded one of the villages to move to this new location. Army troops first cleared the land and drained the area. Then a bridge was constructed, the suitable houses from San Luis were moved intact, and additional housing was built to replace that which could not be moved. Wells were dug, schools were built, and assistance was provided the farmers in starting their crops. But, most impressive of

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., p. 4.

all, arrangements were made for the settlers to acquire title to their newly obtained land. The constructive effect of this project was manifested by the many HUK surrenders that soon followed. Magsaysay equated the value of this project to that of several deployed battalions.³⁰ In discussing the suppression of the HUKs with representatives of the U. S. State Department, Magsaysay credited the EDCOR Plan with success in the following terms: "We have to destroy the raw materials of the Communists, in other words, give land to the landless. The alternative is to use more ammunition to kill more HUKs. I prefer to convert them."³¹

In 1957, Jesus Vargas, then Philippine Secretary of Defense, mentioned several countermeasures that had been successful in arresting the spread of Communism in his country. From a total of twenty-one, nine of these have been extracted as pertinent to this study. Listed below, the first countermeasure made possible the execution of the others which may be readily identified as civic action.

1. A general overhaul of the armed forces to ensure a sound leadership not only in terms of professional efficiency but also with the purpose of ensuring that leadership shall be furnished with men of character and discipline. This was part of the programme to gain public confidence and civilian cooperation and to bring the government closer to the people.

2. Organization of civilian-commando units which were, for the most part, led by regular servicemen. Their duty was mainly to maintain a community's security, thus freeing regular troops for offensive operations.

3. Psychological action aimed at enlisting civilian support (especially in supplying information and refusing material support to the enemy) and in exposing the real nature of Communism.

4. Keeping elections free to prevent faith-sapping political terrorism and to strengthen free institutions and processes in the country.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Romulo, op. cit., p. 155.

5. Construction by army engineers of village roads, bridges, pre-fabricated school houses, artesian wells and other essential public works. These engineers also assisted in the resettling of homeless families.

6. Organization of army legal officers into field teams to help arbitrate or give advice on tenant-landlord problems and other agrarian disputes.

7. Resettlement of penitent Communists and destitute and landless citizens on farms, where they are given titles to the land and supplied with completed homes, farm implements, and work animals.

8. Resettlement programs whereby congested peasant areas were relieved as tenants were given the chance to have their own land in areas cleared by the government. Those resettled were given the necessary material aids to establish themselves in their new homes.

9. Laying of emphasis on public relations as a vital part of counter-subversion programmes. Thus, military personnel were so trained and indoctrinated that they became themselves public relations men.³²

Between 1957 and 1961, civic action activities in the Philippines were considerably reduced. One result of this was a decrease in the information on HUK movements as the Army lost much of its close contact with the people. In 1961, HUK operations again began to increase, and the old threat of Communist insurgency reappeared. However, when Diosdado Macapagal was elected President, he directed that military participation in socio-economic efforts be increased. As a result, the Department of National Defense's Public Affairs office became the Civil Affairs-Civic Action office for the Philippine military effort. In 1962, troops were deployed to central Luzon to suppress HUKs, and civic action was an important part of their operations. In 1962-1963, in Luzon and other parts of the Philippines, the Army started new resettlement projects, promoted vocational

³²Vargas, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

agriculture, rebuilt engineer equipment for civic action, and provided additional engineer training.³³

An analysis of civic action in the Philippines reveals many ingredients for success. The most apparent, of course, is the honest and dynamic leadership of Ramon Magsaysay in using the armed forces to improve the social and economic conditions in the Philippines. These qualities of leadership are undeniably important, but the direction to which he oriented civic action is of at least equal importance. He recognized that before material assistance could be effective, the civilian sector would have to trust and respect their benefactors. So, his first campaign was to improve civilian-military relations by reorganizing and reteaching his army. He also correctly analyzed the desires of the people- honest elections, freedom from oppressive absentee-landlordism, agrarian reform, security from HUK terrorism, and an opportunity to improve the impoverished environment in which they existed. The efforts of the military were directed to satisfy these justifiable wants. Magsaysay recognized that as he relieved the frustrations of the peasants, he simultaneously dealt a blow to the Communists and improved the economy of his people. His enforcement of honest elections and insistence upon honesty in the armed forces not only improved the civilian-military relations, but it countered the Communist charge of corruptness and injustice. His instructions to the Army to assist, not exploit, the peasants, emphasized the exploitations of the HUKs. His use of the Army through the EDCOR projects

³³Colonel John J. Duffy, "Signpost: Success In The Philippines," Army (July 1963), pp. 60-61.

to provide land for the landless deprived the HUKs of their primary stated goal. Of course, Magsaysay's civic action program was more readily acceptable because he was dealing with a homogeneous population. This receptiveness contributed to the success of the program; the civic action program, being directed to the needs of the people, was well received.

As mentioned early in the chapter, U. S. military forces did not play a major role in this civic action activity. The support provided was largely financial, although U. S. advisors did participate. One of Magsaysay's early assistants was Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, an Air Force officer who was detailed by the Joint U. S. Military Aid Group to assist with psychological warfare.³⁴ Colonel Lansdale's assistance was not restricted to this field alone. He was instrumental in the support that Magsaysay received from the Lions International, to include the invitation to be the key speaker at the International Lions Convention at Mexico City in 1952.³⁵ The support that Magsaysay received from this capable officer was invaluable, and it contributed to Magsaysay's later election to the Presidency of the Philippines.³⁶

The degree of success which Magsaysay's civic action activities would have enjoyed without U. S. support will never be known. There is

³⁴Romulo and Gray, op. cit., p. 125.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 163-164.

³⁶Although Romulo spells this name as "Landsdale," the fact that this is the same officer whose work is cited in this thesis was verified by Colonel William H. Blakefield, U. S. Army, during an interview at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 21 January 1964. Colonel Blakefield and Colonel Lansdale were fellow members of the Anderson-Southeast Asia Subcommittee of the Draper Committee.

little doubt that he was prepared to conduct his operations with whatever resources that were available. Although this was not required, it detracts nothing from his accomplishments. Civic action was successful in the Philippines for two fundamental reasons- it was honestly and ably administered and it was directed to the needs of a receptive people.

CHAPTER VI

CIVIC ACTION IN MALAYA

In many respects, civic action in Malaya was similar to the civic action in the Philippines that was previously examined. However, the civic efforts by the British in Malaya are not well known in this country, undoubtedly because U. S. news media have been more concerned with events that directly involved Americans. Lack of U. S. participation in civic action in Malaya is no excuse for lack of interest and knowledge. Communist insurgency readily crosses national boundaries in its world wide endeavors of expansion; and, protesting powers almost universally utilize some form of civic action as a weapon of resistance. Such was the case in Malaya, and there is much to be learned by studying the operations of the British there.

The Malayan population is approximately 50% native Malays, 40% Chinese, and 10% other races of which Indian is predominant. It was the Chinese element from which Communist insurgency was generated.

In its early years, Dr. Sun Yat Sen's Kuomintang Party included both Communists and conservatives, and both factions sent agents to establish branches in Malaya.¹ The competition between the conservative and the Communist elements of the Kuomintang resulted in a purge of the left-wing by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. This conflict was reflected

¹Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A Political And Economic Appraisal (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 43.

in Malaya, and resulted in the separate formation of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930.² After 1933, the Malayan Communists came under the Moscow-established Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai. Now with instructions from above, the MCP concentrated on recruiting, spreading propaganda, exploiting labor disputes, and conducting limited raids on mines and plantations.³ The MCP was illegal in Malaya because they had not properly registered. Consequently, they lost no opportunity to oppose the British in all sectors of the Malayan society. However, upon the alliance of the United Kingdom and Russia in 1941, the Communists stopped their oppositionist tactics and offered to cooperate in the British war effort in Malaya. They actively assisted in the defense of Singapore in 1942. They formed the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), and moved into the jungles before the fall of Singapore on February 15, 1942. They received some air dropped supplies from the British, and used these effectively in conducting harassing operations against the Japanese.⁴

With the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, the MPAJA emerged from the jungles as heroes. They attempted to assume control from the Japanese, but were forced to relinquish it with the arrival of the British forces the next month. However, unlike their counterparts in the Philippines, the MPAJA handed over those weapons they were known

²Vernon Bartlett, Report From Malaya (New York, New York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 33.

³Harry Miller, The Communist Menace In Malaya (New York, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1954), pp. 29-30.

⁴Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 94.

to possess, received a monetary reward, and was officially demobilized.⁵ It was later learned, however, that the MPAJA had retained secret dumps of weapons that they had acquired in the chaos of the British and Japanese defeats.

During the next three years, the Malayan Communist Party attempted to gain control of the country without resorting to open violence. Conditions of economy and society at the end of World War II were similar to those of other countries liberated from wartime Japanese occupation. Poverty and disease were prevalent. Criminals armed with captured Japanese weapons, or arms concealed from the British, had little difficulty in pursuing their interests before a depleted police force. Labor unrest and unemployment were wide-spread. After the short-lived enthusiasm of liberation, the British were scornfully regarded because they had failed to hold the country during the war. Even more demoralizing to the Malaysians was the proposed Malayan Union. Under this concept, the nine protected independent States were to be converted into a single British colony.⁶ Although the nine Sultans reluctantly agreed, public opposition, particularly by the Chinese element, was so great that the Malayan Union was never formalized.

The Communists, according to pattern, exploited each undesirable condition to the utmost. By 1947, many of the labor unions were Communist controlled. During that year there were over 300 major strikes and disputes. There was a total work loss of 696,036 man days.⁷ Even

⁵J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya: A. D. 1400-1959 (New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), p. 262.

⁶Miller, op. cit., pp. 52-54.

⁷Ibid., p. 74.

though the British hastily revised their previous plans and established the Federation of Malaya in February 1948, violence and strife continued. It was this newly established Federation that proclaimed a state of emergency on June 18, 1948.⁸

The decision for open Communist revolt in Malaya was apparently made at the Moscow sponsored Communist Youth Conference in Calcutta in February 1948. The outlined strategy included disruption of the economy, taking control of certain areas, and leading a popular revolt with a liberation army.⁹ This plan was put into effect without delay. Casualties and damage were extensive. About one in ten of the planters was killed, as were many of their laborers. Buildings, vehicles, and rubber trees were destroyed.¹⁰

In 1948 there were an estimated 4000-5000 guerrillas, operating in bands of 100 to 300. They were supported by the Min Yuen, a fifth column type organization that collected food, money, and information from the Chinese squatters. These squatters were estimated to number a half million, and had settled on the fringes of the jungle during the depression preceding World War II. They had no legal title to their land, as all land in Malaya belongs to the Sultans, but under the British administration they had not been disturbed. They had become productive farmers, and now were the logistic base for the guerrillas, either through sympathy or fear.¹¹

⁸Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 52.

⁹J. M. Gullick, Malaya (New York, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. 96-97.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 98.

¹¹Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., pp. 50-52.

Even though Malaya was initially under a civil administration after the emergency had been declared, the problem of counterinsurgency was recognized as being primarily military in nature. At times it was impossible to separate military and civil effort because they were so closely and cooperatively interrelated in this struggle. The forces involved included British soldiers, Malayan soldiers, Gurkhas, Fijians, King's African Rifles, Dayak trackers from Borneo, Malayan Police, Home Guards, Air Force elements from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, and some ships and aircraft from the Royal Navy.¹²

As a military problem, it was apparent that the Communist guerrillas must be separated from their source of supply. The initial solution was to gather thousands of the Chinese squatters and place them in internment camps from which they were encouraged to return to China. In the first ten months of 1949, over 6000 people were so relocated. The disadvantages, both social and economic, precluded the application of this plan to the entire half million Chinese squatters.¹³

Civic action did not become an element of the resettlement until after the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as Director of Operations in April 1950. General Briggs soon recognized that the resettlement of the Chinese squatters should be aimed at bringing them to the side of the government as well as for the purpose of depriving the guerrillas of a source of supply. His solution to this

¹²Ibid., pp. 53-54.

¹³Gullick, op. cit., p. 100.

two-fold problem became known as the "Briggs Plan," and within this framework over a half million Chinese were to be relocated.¹⁴

The Briggs Plan referred to the proposed resettlement sites as "new villages." Although the motive of resettlement remained primarily military, civic action was inferred in the following official guidance:

"The new villages mean in effect a new mode of life for the people who dwell in them, and it is imperative that this new life should, after the initial disturbance of moving, be more attractive than the old."¹⁵

The Briggs Plan also considered the improvement of individual and national economies. This was pointed out in the official Report to the Nation as follows: "By and large, the Chinese agriculturalist is being put back on his feet and enabled again to play his important part in the food production of the country."¹⁶

When the Briggs Plan was put into operation in June 1950, many problems were encountered. Site selection, by itself, required the combined efforts of military and civil officials. Because General Briggs stressed the urgency of the program, there was insufficient time to lay out complete towns in virgin jungle. Consequently, the initial location of sites was restricted by the existing road net.¹⁷ This problem was even further aggravated by the fact that the land was owned by the Sultans of the individual states who had no desire to relinquish it to the Chinese. However, under the persuasion of the

¹⁴Miller, op. cit., p. 144.

¹⁵Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist Or Free? (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 79.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Miller, op. cit., p. 145.

High Commissioner, Sir Henry Lovell Goldsworthy Gurney, and his successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, land reform was the first of the great concessions to aliens made by the Sultans. These concessions had the dual effect of providing land for the squatters and implicitly accepting them into the Malayan society.¹⁸ Although the Chinese were not given freehold titles, the government did attempt to provide each family with a thirty year lease. This was in sharp contrast to their previous status as squatters under which they had no right at all to the land they occupied.¹⁹ Within the new villages, the land allotment to each squatter was one-sixth of an acre. This was his home lot, upon which he was expected to build his shack, keep his poultry, and plant his fruit trees. If the squatter had a vegetable garden within two miles of the perimeter of the new village, he was permitted to keep it. Squatters that were brought in from beyond the two mile limit were given tracts of not less than two acres that were within the prescribed distance from the settlement. Some of the new villages were formed by moving outlying squatters into an already existing village, while others were created on previously unused land.²⁰

Communist opposition to the resettlement projects added to the problem of moving the squatters. A directive issued by the Communist high command stated: "If the masses are unwilling to oppose resettlement, they are to be intimidated, and any of the masses trying to take refuge in the jungle as a result of our agitation should be tactfully

¹⁸Ibid., p. 233.

¹⁹Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 56.

²⁰Miller, op. cit., p. 151.

discouraged and induced to return to their houses owing to the shortage of food in the jungle."²¹ In compliance with this policy guidance, the terrorists directed propaganda and intimidation tactics against the squatters. They urged the squatters to retard the movement by requesting additional time to round up their pigs, to harvest crops, or to pack personal belongings. But, the British troops moved with speed and efficiency. Without prior notice they would surround a squatter area before daylight. A government team of police, land officers, veterinarians, social workers, doctors, and nurses would then move in. Every person would be medically examined, and treated or hospitalized as necessary. Requests to remain in order to harvest crops or to gather livestock were refused by the troops, and the owners were justly compensated by the government. Each family and their possessions were permitted one truck in which to move. On this they loaded their personal possessions, their livestock, and in some cases their dismantled homes. Receipts were given for crops and livestock that were to be left behind, and they were later repaid at market prices. British troops helped load the squatters, guarded them in transit, and assisted them in unloading at their destination.²² The new settlers were first accommodated in transit camps while they were building their new homes from materials supplied at cost by the government.²³ Additionally, the families who moved into the new villages from a distance of less than two miles received a subsistence allowance for two weeks in addition to

²¹Ibid., p. 152.

²²Ibid., pp. 149-151.

²³Purcell, op. cit., p. 77.

a cash grant of nearly forty pounds. The squatters who moved in from outside the two mile radius were provided with a subsistence allowance for five months. Insofar as possible, each squatter was permitted to select a home site of his choice.²⁴

Within the new villages, the government provided shops, medical facilities, schools, and community centers. Agricultural assistance, to include the import of breeding stock, was carried out. Education was made available to adults as well as to children. Utilities such as electricity and piped potable water were installed.²⁵

The British troops, unlike those of Magsaysay, were unable to provide the staff for administering the new villages. The Briggs Plan called for each village to be placed in charge of a Chinese-speaking British Civil Service officer. This officer was to be assisted by a native of Malaya, preferably of Chinese descent, who would ultimately replace the British officer. As the tempo of resettlement increased, it became increasingly difficult to obtain qualified administrators. In some cases, otherwise qualified administrators were sent to Macao to learn the Chinese language; in other cases, Chinese speaking volunteers were taught administration. General Briggs searched far and wide, and the Chinese-speaking administrators were provided.²⁶

A final obstacle to the resettlement projects was the reaction of the Communist terrorists. As they found their sources of supply steadily removed, the guerrillas reacted violently. They raided the

²⁴Miller, op. cit., p. 152.

²⁵Gullick, op. cit., p. 101.

²⁶Miller, op. cit., pp. 146-147.

new villages at night, burning houses and slaughtering the occupants. When the perimeters were not assailable, they would fire into the villages from the shelter of nearby hills.²⁷ Initially, local protection was provided by the Malayan Police, augmented as necessary by mobile companies of British troops that were strategically located. Later, they were augmented and partially relieved by a Home Guard recruited from the villagers themselves. By the end of 1953, some 150 villages were thus providing their own protection.²⁸

Following High Commissioner Gurney's assassination in October 1951, General Templer was appointed as his successor. General Templer, an active duty military officer, was given widely increased powers to direct both military and civil operations. General Templer unreservedly subscribed to the new village concept and expedited their expansion and self-sufficiency. He emphasized the training and employment of the Home Guards, and permitted the Chinese to manage their village affairs. He realized that the civic action aspects, as well as the purely military activities, were essential to the defeat of the insurgents. He expressed this in the following words: "The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people."²⁹ There is a remarkable similarity between these words and those that Magsaysay used in speaking to members of the U. S. State Department. (See footnote 31 in Chapter 5). General Templer reiterated

²⁷Ibid., p. 153.

²⁸Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 57.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 62-63.

his views when he announced the completion of resettlement during a broadcast in February 1952:

The one-time so-called squatters have now been resettled, but that is by no means the end of the problem; in fact, it is only the beginning. We are now faced with the human problem, and this human problem can only be solved by methods which spring from the heart rather than from the mind. Many of these people have felt that they are not really part of the community and have gained an impression that they are not wanted.

Do we want this state of affairs to continue, or are we really sincere in our desire that they should be given the opportunity to become useful citizens? If we believe, as we should and must believe, that the latter is the true objective, then every decent man and woman must do his or her share to bring about a change.³⁰

Although not so eloquently expressed, this "hearts and minds" concept had met with considerable success under the Gurney administration. This is well illustrated in an account by journalist Harry Miller of his trip through several new villages with High Commissioner Gurney and General Briggs:

Kemayan was run by its own elected committee. Wai Chee, forty-six-year-old headman of fifty tappers, many of whom had lived in the area for sixty years, had gone off on election day to the nearby town of Kuala Pilah, to marry. He returned to find himself elected first chairman of the village committee. His wife became the 'first lady' of the settlement.

We journeyed on and stopped again, climbed into motor transport and travelled two and a half miles over a road laid down by the Royal Engineers to a new settlement of agriculturalists at a place called Paya Lang, once the rice bowl of the bandits in South Pahang. It was a neatly-laid-out village of three hundred zinc-roofed homes, occupied by 1200 Chinese. Every agricultural squatter in the district had apparently come willingly into the relative security of the wired-in settlement. They humped everything they owned on their backs or on bicycles and lugged them to the site of their new home.

The Chinese headman was one of the cheeriest individuals I met in the whole of my two months' tour. He was outright anti-Communist, and his grizzled face broke into delighted smiles as he showed Gurney and Briggs around his domain and proudly told them that Paya Lang was so self-sufficient already that it had begun to sell rice to neighbouring villages.

³⁰ Bartlett, op. cit., p. 54.

Our next stop was Triang, a little village on the banks of the Triang river. It was also the local military headquarters. Attached to it was a new settlement of smallholders, men with money of their own, becoming richer with every day that the price of rubber went up.

The District Officer said that when resettlement had been mentioned to them they agreed to it on the condition that they paid for their own homes. The Triang 'suburb' became one of the neatest of its type in the whole country. The smallholders laid it out as a garden village. One resident said to me, "We want to grow trees along our roads and build a temple for our community."

Triang was still in the process of erection. We walked past smiling Chinese nailing windows, hinging doors, or laying sheets of corrugated zinc on to the roofs. Piglets crossed our path. A little Chinese girl played with a pet- a brown and black-striped baby wild boar, caught in the jungle some distance away.

A little farther north was the one-street village of Mengkarak, which had been attacked by 150 bandits a year before. Here Gurney met the village committee and gave it the first stern warning of the trip: "The Government does not want to punish this village, but if it does it is because you have not helped us."

This warning was really not deserved, because, according to the District and Army officers, the village had been co-operative. Gurney's words, however, had the effect of making the village committee think still more; the threat also went up and down the line by word of mouth.

So, without any incident, we eventually arrived at Mentakab, a town which had doubled its population of 3500 in the past months, as all people living within five miles of it had been brought within the extended perimeter. The same thing had happened to Temerloh, an important town six miles east. The stretch of river along which both towns sit was closed to river traffic to prevent possible food supplies going out by water.

When chain-link fencing had been erected around both towns there were no Chinese living outside any wired-in towns or villages in an extensive isolated territory between Mentakab and Bahau, over forty miles south. Thirty-five thousand people had once lived scattered lives in that stretch of land, which was beginning to give itself back to jungle.³¹

In the fall of 1953, General Templer felt that the Communists were sufficiently suppressed for the relaxation of certain military controls. He removed British troops and regular police from local defense duties, giving this responsibility to the Home Guard and to special constables recruited locally for this purpose. He established

³¹Miller, op. cit., pp. 169-170.

"white areas," where there appeared to be no Communist threat. In these "white areas" food control, travel restrictions, and curfews were cancelled. Normalcy had begun to return to Malaya.³² By 1954, there were 600 new villages with a total population of 680,000.³³

Civic action by the British troops was not limited to the Chinese squatters. Less publicized was the assistance that they brought to the nomadic aborigines who lived in the central Malayan jungles. As with the new villages, the primary objective was military rather than humane.

When the British counterinsurgency efforts began to successfully separate the Communist terrorists from their squatter source of support, the guerrillas divided into smaller groups and sought refuge deeper in the jungle. Here they imposed their needs upon the primitive aborigines who neither knew nor cared who governed the country.³⁴

To establish rapport with the aborigines, the British assigned the Special Air Services (similar to U. S. Special Forces) the mission of sending in fifteen man detachments by helicopter. These troops lived with the aborigines, but used their own supplies which were provided by air drop. They established trade with these natives, exchanging tools and cloth for food and building materials. Their medical personnel initiated a daily "sick-call" and began to treat the routine

³²Ibid., p. 223.

³³Ibid., p. 219.

³⁴Colonel Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Military Engineering as a Weapon in the Cold War," The Military Engineer, Volume 55, Number 366 (July-August 1963), pp. 229-230.

injuries and diseases. When more specialized treatment was required, a doctor would be brought in by helicopter.³⁵

After the aborigines had accepted the presence of the British troops, officers from the Royal Engineers and additional equipment were delivered. Jungle forts, a water supply, and a helicopter pad were provided. With additional engineers, a short landing facility was carved out of the jungle, and fixed wing aircraft were able to make scheduled calls. With air traffic established, trading, schooling, and medical facilities were expanded. Gradually, the aborigines accepted the British gestures of civilization, and the guerrillas once more were deprived of a logistic base.³⁶

The last specific civic action in Malaya to be considered is that of the Kedah Roads. This project was started in 1957, when the Communists had retreated to Kedah, the food-rich northernmost province. This area was occupied by a half-caste Malay-Thai breed known as the Sum-Sums. The terrorists moved into this territory and treated the Sum-Sums well. They worked in the fields and paid for the supplies that they used.³⁷

The British solution to this problem was to connect the Sum-Sums with the outside world. By use of British, Malayan, and Gurkha Army engineers, a sixty-four mile road was constructed over a period of two years. The local natives were hired as labor in a rather unusual fashion. At the village of Naka, for instance, the engineer commander

³⁵ Ibid., p. 230.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 231.

contracted with the village headman for 100 men to work eight hours a day. The composition of this force varied, but there were always 100 men working for eight hours every day.³⁸

The Kedah Road had the desired effect. When it was completed and the Sum-Sums had access to medical facilities, education, protection, and trade, their association with the guerrillas became less attractive. Consequently, the Communist terrorists retreated even further back into the jungles, or converted their way of life to something more conventional.³⁹

In addition to the civic action type projects of the Commonwealth forces, the Sum-Sums enjoyed implicit benefits. Their association with the engineers while building the road revealed a way of life which had been previously unknown. The wages that they drew from this same project provided an economic stimulus that enabled them to improve their living standards. And, when the road was completed, the Sum-Sums were able to trade their surplus agricultural produce for something more beneficial than Communist good will.

Communist insurgency was suppressed in Malaya, but only with a tremendous assignment of resources. More than 325,000 soldiers, police, and home guards were employed against a Communist force of less than 10,000. However, these 10,000 guerrillas were potentially supported by over a half million Chinese squatters, though actually supported by some unknown portion of this total number.⁴⁰ The largest

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 232.

⁴⁰ Colonel Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Malaya: A Case Study," Military Review, Volume XLIII, Number 9 (September 1963), p. 64.

expenditure of British and Malayan manpower was not in actual conflict with the terrorists, but in resettling over a half million Chinese squatters in new villages and providing them with the necessary protection and support. Perhaps the success of this operation is best manifested by the attainment of Malayan independence on 31 August 1957, and its subsequent admission as the eighty second member of the United Nations on 17 September of the same year.

Civic action in Malaya differs considerably from the rather restricted definition in Chapter I. This is readily evident when it is recalled that this study is primarily concerned with civic action by military forces. In Malaya, civic action was administered in a military manner, but with civilians integrated into a coordinated effort. Consequently, military and civil participation in civic action were often indistinguishable. Not infrequently, the civilian officials received the recognition for completed projects. In fact, the British Army was careful not to detract credit from the civil government, for the goal of civic action in Malaya was to win support for the government rather than popularity for the British forces. This is illustrated by the statement of the United Kingdom's Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Right Honorable Oliver Lyttelton, who said in 1952: "The most important object is that there is no division whatever between military and civil authority, and that the responsibility is vested in one man it is only possible to get the necessary gearing between military and civil operations if the responsibility is vested in one man."⁴¹

⁴¹Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 62.

But, the fact that civic action was not exclusively military does not preclude its value as a subject for study, comparison, and analysis.

While U. S. participation in civic action was minor in the Philippines, it was totally absent in Malaya. Indeed, at that time, the term "civic action" was unknown, even though both the United States and British forces were well familiar with the concept. Again, as in the preceding chapter, U. S. planning and participation is not a requisite for consideration in this study.

Civic action in Malaya was being executed concurrently with Magsaysay's civic action in the Philippines. Had it occurred with some time separation, one program could have learned from the other because of their remarkable similarity. Both were centered on two objectives- to win public good will for government forces and to deprive the insurgents of a support base by resettlement.

In Malaya, the objectives were not reached as expeditiously and as harmoniously as they were in the Philippines. There were many reasons for this. First, in the Philippines, the independent government was administering to its own more or less homogeneous population. In Malaya, civic action was British directed at its colony of composite races. In the Philippines, nationalism was on the side of the administration; in Malaya, it was frequently an opposing factor. In the island Republic of the Philippines, Communist support from other countries was largely moral; in Malaya, Communist support could be infiltrated from contiguous Thailand or Singapore. So, a different environment and different circumstances can be readily cited as justification for different measures and varying levels of success.

There appears to be little doubt that civic action in Malaya, at least initially, was administered in a high-handed manner and with less regard for social and economic objectives than for purely military ones. Resettlement was firmly instituted, and individual desires were not a major consideration. Regardless of military necessity, and with complete awareness of the imminent insurgent threat, the initial resettlement might well have been executed with more compassion for the Chinese squatters. This same approach was used after the squatters had been resettled. Instead of taking steps to preserve individual rights, the right of habeas corpus was revoked and all persons leaving the new villages were summarily searched. Admittedly, these measures were effective in reducing support for the terrorists, but they did nothing to endear the government forces to those receiving this involuntary treatment.

It is questionable if the land reform program could have been improved. While the EDCOR policy of making available freehold titles to the settlers was indeed enviable, land ownership in the Philippines was quite different from that in Malaya. In Malaya, as previously brought out, the land was historically the property of the Sultans. For the British to bequeath a plot to each settler, it would have been necessary to first confiscate the land from the Sultans, with or without recompense. This would have undoubtedly reversed the loyalty of the native Malays, and deprived the British of their assistance in the counterinsurgency campaign. In turn, Great Britain and the Commonwealth nations would have been required to furnish more troops to suppress the terrorists. All this hardly seems justified, inasmuch as the Chinese squatters had no legal right to the new land. As a

matter of fact, they did not even have a legal right to the land from which they were displaced.

In retrospect, the British handling of the land reform requirement was an excellent solution. It must be accepted that resettlement, however handled, was a military necessity. Further, it did not seem appropriate to upset the social structure of Malaya by unequivocally forcing the squatters upon the Sultans. Opposition to the Malayan Union was a vehement indication that the Malaysians were not at all receptive to sudden changes in their traditional society. However, by working through the existing civil and social structures, the settlers were given leases to the land upon which they were placed. This left the title to the land where it had previously been- with the Sultans. Moreover, through payments of rent, the settlers provided the Sultans with an income from land that had previously been of little economic value. At the same time, of course, the Sultans and their subjects received protection from the Communist terrorists as those guerrillas were forced back from civilization. As for the Chinese settlers, they had everything to gain and nothing to lose. They obtained a thirty year lease to the land they occupied. Certainly they would have preferred to own the land outright, but the legal right of occupancy through leasehold was a major improvement over their no-status squatting. Additionally, owning a lease was a measure of social acceptance that they had not previously enjoyed.

Civic action within the villages improved as the resettlement program gained momentum and experience. Better living conditions, water supply, education, and medical facilities were provided for civic, not military purposes. When these projects were to be initiated, it

was arranged for the village occupants to suggest the specific project that would be most desirable. A government official would approach the settlers to inquire what was needed. Following this conference, the project would be agreed upon, and the government would supply supervision, material, and equipment while the village supplied the labor. In this manner, civic action was executed for a maximum benefit at a minimum cost.⁴²

The most important lesson to be learned from analyzing civic action in Malaya seems to be the importance of coordination between it and the strictly military effort. In Malaya, civic action supported military action in the same manner that tactical doctrine requires a plan of supporting fires to supplement a scheme of maneuver. Neither activity operated in a vacuum of information, nor without a common objective. Military operations took precedence. Yet, especially after the arrival of General Templer, civic action was an element of every plan, implicitly if not specifically. Military action and civic action cannot be evaluated separately in Malaya because they were mutually supporting.

The integration of military and civil resources to accomplish civic action was noteworthy. It is even more remarkable when it is considered that the military effort was British in origin while the civilian effort was local. This combination of talents, under central direction, illustrates the cooperation that is possible between an

⁴²Interview with Colonel Richard L. Clutterbuck, British Army, at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 21 September 1963.

external military force and the indigenous civil administration. Such cooperation is essential to successful civic action.

The direction of civic action in Malaya, as in the Philippines, was toward the needs of the people at the grass roots level. It was aimed at the things the natives most needed- education, medical facilities, water, electricity, and roads. It was concentrated on fulfilling small needs, but needs in which satisfaction was quick and visible.

Civic action was not always well received in Malaya. Understandably, and probably due to the shortage of qualified civil administrators, there were individual cases where civic action contributed little. These occurred most frequently in the early phases of the campaign. However, in the aggregate, civic action played a major role in the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya. It was directed to the needs of the people, as it should be. But, of importance here, it was regarded and employed for what it was- an element of a coordinated effort to suppress Communism, elevate the economy, and to win public support for the established government.

CHAPTER VII

CIVIC ACTION IN KOREA

An examination of civic action in Korea will disclose two significant differences from the civic action in the other countries included in this study. First, of the five countries studied, Korea alone has not used civic action to directly oppose Communist insurgency. Second, the study of civic action in this chapter is almost entirely limited to that sponsored by U. S. forces. Although not primarily conducted by indigenous forces, this civic action was directed at improving the social and economic standard of living. Understanding the conditions that prompted this U. S. action in 1953 requires a brief examination of Korean history prior to that date.

Korea had enjoyed varying degrees of independence punctuated by periods of outside influence until the country was annexed by Japan in 1910. During the Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945, the Korean economy was subjected to exploitation in furtherance of Japanese goals. Upon Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945, the occupation agreement provided for U. S. occupation south of the 38th parallel and U. S. S. R. occupation north of the 38th parallel. Although the Koreans welcomed both countries as liberators, they soon found that they had merely passed from the occupation of one power to that of two others. However, both the United States and Russia moved to turn the leadership of Korea back to Koreans, but differences between the two great powers soon

developed. Consequently, two groups of Koreans emerged; the South Koreans were led by Syngman Rhee, while Russia established Kim Ilsung, a Korean Communist, as head of the North Koreans. Thus Korean nationalism which had been fostered for hundreds of years commenced its division as a result of its liberation. This partition was completed on 15 August 1948 when General MacArthur proclaimed Korean self-rule, and Syngman Rhee took office as the first president. On 10 September, Kim Ilsung took office as premier of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea). Within a year both the United States and Russia had declared the occupation at an end, and that troops had been withdrawn.

On 25 June 1950 the North Korean Peoples Army crossed the 38th parallel in full strength and initiated a multi-nation conflict. After three years of international struggle on Korean soil, an uncertain truce was established with no great territorial nor political gains by either side. But, the toll had been heavy. The Republic of Korea had suffered 1,312,836 casualties with about one million of them civilians. Over 75% of the physical facilities had been destroyed, and ten million refugees were without food and shelter. The problem of economic recovery was the greatest of any period of Korean history.¹

Hostilities ended in Korea on 27 July 1953. At that time there were two separate programs for economic recovery in this war-torn nation. The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) had been active in Korea since the previous year. The second program was

¹Neil B. Mills, "The Development Of Korean Markets For U. S. Agricultural Commodities," (unpublished Master's thesis, The Ohio State University, 1962), p. 59.

that of U. S. economic assistance under the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and its successor organizations, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). However, in the summer of 1953 it was difficult to find qualified civilian personnel who were willing to go to Korea to administer economic aid. It was decided, therefore, that economic aid programs in Korea would be carried out by military administrators. To do this, the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) was formed on 1 July 1953. KCAC established field offices in each of the nine provinces, operated supply and forwarding facilities and conducted planning, programming, and operations with its own technical staff. This staff was organized into branches for agriculture and forestry, commerce and industry, labor, civil education, social affairs, public health, public works, and transportation. U. S. military personnel were augmented by such U. S. civilians as could be obtained and some foreign civilians borrowed from UNKRA. KCAC continued to administer economic aid until ICA was able to obtain its own personnel and establish its own operations. As ICA activities in Korea expanded, those of KCAC were phased out.² While KCAC operations did not fall within the scope of civic action, they did demonstrate the military capability of rendering economic assistance in underdeveloped countries.

Throughout the Korean conflict, U. S. servicemen had shown a willingness to share their food and other necessities with the less fortunate Koreans. Some servicemen wrote home for additional food,

²William H. Draper, Jr., et al., Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Volume II (Draper Report, August 17, 1959), pp. 133-134.

clothing, and relief supplies. It is probable that many Korean orphans are alive today because of this spontaneous generosity.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, then the Commanding General Eighth Army, recognized the value of these individual efforts, but felt that a coordinated movement would help even more. With this in mind, he wrote to Assistant Defense Secretary John A. Hannah, proposing that surplus war materials stockpiled in Korea be used to help in reconstruction.³ The proposal was promptly endorsed by President Eisenhower, and in November 1953 Congress authorized the diversion of the surplus war material and provided an initial appropriation of \$15,000,000.00 for supplies. This legislation was titled Civil Relief In Korea (CRIK), but the program became known as the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK).⁴ This program was designed to help those who had suffered most by supporting their efforts to help themselves. Priorities of assistance were established in the order of schools, public health, orphanages, civic buildings, public utilities, and bridges. Projects were to be sponsored by military units of company size and larger, after selection in coordination with local Korean civil officials. A prerequisite for initiating a project was the assurance that it could be operated and maintained by Koreans after it was completed. Also, the Koreans were expected to furnish local materials and labor. AFAK was to provide other construction material, volunteer labor from U. S. servicemen, direction and supervision, and the use of military equipment when such

³SP5 Don Anglin, "AFAK Marks 10 Year Service in ROK," Pacific Stars and Stripes, November 4, 1963, p. 7.

⁴Alfred H. Hausrath, Civil Affairs in the Cold War (Bethesda, Maryland: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, February 1961), p. 59.

use did not detract from the combat readiness of the providing unit.⁵

Construction work under the AFAK Program commenced as soon as it was authorized. Lumber that had been ordered for war-time building was used to build peace-time schools; cement intended for field fortifications went into foundations for orphanages; U. S. servicemen worked in their off-duty time alongside Korean laborers; army trucks and construction equipment, when not needed for military purposes, were used to speed the progress of the projects.⁶

By November 1955, 2914 projects had been completed. This included 813 rehabilitation projects in Pusan, 769 schools, 349 civic buildings, and 248 public health installations. The cost to the United States had been \$14,924,602.00, but the completed projects had an estimated value to the Korean economy in excess of \$48,000,000.00.⁷

With the initial appropriation nearly expended, Congress allocated an additional \$5,000,000.00 in 1955 from economic aid funds. Although these allocations have been gradually reduced, the practice has been continued each year, and the United States Operations Mission (USOM) continues to provide financial support.⁸ Through 1962 AFAK contributions totalled \$30,000,000.00.⁹

⁵Draper, et al., op. cit., p. 132.

⁶United States Army Pacific, "Armed Forces Assistance To Korea Program," undated, p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

⁷Draper, et al., op. cit., pp. 132-133.

⁸United States Army Pacific, loc. cit.

⁹General G. S. Meloy, Jr., address to the Seoul Correspondents Club, Seoul, Korea, on 24 September 1962, and reprinted in Pacific Stars and Stripes, 26 September 1962, p. 7.

The AFAK Program is organized into three sub-programs- medical, construction, and non-construction. The medical assistance provides emergency medical treatment in U. S. medical facilities for qualified Korean personnel. It also provides artificial limbs for Koreans who have lost an arm or leg in an accident that involved either U. S. or U. N. forces. Additionally, the AFAK Program supplies medicines and equipment to Korean medical installations.¹⁰ AFAK medical assistance through December 1963 was valued at almost \$6,500,000.00 while the direct cost to AFAK was less than \$2,000,000.00.¹¹

The non-construction phase of AFAK assists Koreans by two methods. The first of these is the assistance provided for natural disasters. Under this provision, salvage materials are transferred from U. S. property disposal facilities to AFAK relief representatives who distribute the goods to the disaster victims. The second method of non-construction assistance is through AFAK collections of voluntary contributions of money, gifts, and services of U. S. personnel stationed in Korea. These contributions are distributed by AFAK to worthy projects.¹² Through 1963 nearly \$3,500,000.00 had been expended for public welfare, public health, education, and religion.¹³ The funds allocated for each of these non-construction activities are depicted in Table 3. A good example of the type of disaster relief that is available through

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Eighth United States Army, "Consolidated Quarterly Report of Armed Forces Assistance to Korea Program- 2d Quarter 1964" (Status Report # 89), 23 January 1964, inclosure 7. (Mimeographed.)

¹²Meloy, loc. cit.

¹³Eighth United States Army, op. cit., inclosure 8.

TABLE 3

AFAK EXPENDITURES FOR NON-CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE,
BY ACTIVITY, THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1963

Activity	Total Expenditure
Public Welfare	\$2,682,049.20
Public Health	279,677.38
Education	164,800.36
Religion	372,590.40
Total	<u>\$3,499,117.34</u>

Source: AFAK Status Report #89.

this program was that provided during the floods of July 1961. Over 100 tons of tenting, clothing, and bedding were donated to the villagers in the Yongju and Namwon river areas. Another disaster for which relief was provided was the Pusan fire in March 1962. Again, in 1962, twenty-three tons of relief supplies were provided to the flood victims of Sunchon, Chongnyong, Masan, Chinju, and Sangju.¹⁴

It is the construction assistance program that attracts most of the AFAK effort. Requests for construction originate with Korean officials through the forty-two Community Relations Advisory Councils. Other projects are proposed by U. S. troops who notice a requirement that could be filled by AFAK construction. Regardless of the origin of the idea, the project proposal is first cleared with the local civil affairs officer and then forwarded to Headquarters Eighth United States Army. At this level the proposed project is studied for feasibility and coordinated with the U. S. Operations Mission (USOM) and appropriate Korean government agencies. If the project is considered appropriate by

¹⁴Meloy, loc. cit.

all interested parties, it must satisfy three criteria before formal approval. These are: (1) an American military unit will sponsor it; (2) it will be of socio-economic benefit to the local Korean community; and, (3) the local community will agree to participate in the project.¹⁵

For approved projects, the authorized funds are used primarily to pay for U. S. furnished supplies and materials that are not locally available. The construction materials are normally procured through military supply channels. As a rule, American military personnel provide architectural and construction guidance, engineering supervision, and operation of heavy equipment that is not available to the Koreans. The military equipment provided for construction is so authorized only when its use does not detract from the combat readiness of the providing unit. Any labor provided by U. S. military personnel is welcomed, but it is voluntary and without extra pay. The Korean community is expected to supply most of the labor, locally available materials, and the land upon which the project is to be constructed. It is estimated that a one dollar expenditure of AFAK funds results in at least three dollars of project value.¹⁶

Through December 31, 1963, 4980 separate AFAK construction projects had been completed, 160 were under construction, and 60 more had been approved but not started. The construction of schools accounted for 2346, or nearly one-half of the completed projects. This was in accordance with the priority established at the commencement of

¹⁵Anglin, loc. cit.

¹⁶United States Army Pacific, op. cit., p. 3.

the AFAK Program.¹⁷ A complete break-down of all the construction projects is listed in Table 4.

TABLE 4
AFAK PROJECTS, BY NUMBER AND TYPE,
THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1963

Projects	Authorized	Cancelled	Not Yet Started	Under Construction	Completed
Schools	2,561	58	34	123	2,346
Churches	250	0	0	0	250
Orphanages	457	6	6	26	419
Bridges	121	2	2	2	115
Public Health	371	5	2	4	360
Civic Buildings	432	3	5	2	422
Public Utilities	150	0	11	3	132
Reclamation	53	0	0	0	53
Flood Control	12	1	0	0	11
Highways	56	1	0	0	55
Rehabilitation	813	0	0	0	813
Total	5,276	76	60	160	4,980

Source: AFAK Status Report #89.

Although construction projects are preferred to be small, they have varied considerably in size. The largest project completed was the Eighth U. S. Army Memorial Chest Wing of the Yongsei Medical Complex in Seoul. Over \$750,000.00 of AFAK funds plus the furnishing of transportation of materials and the use of heavy equipment made this project possible.¹⁸

¹⁷Eighth United States Army, op. cit., inclosure 7.

¹⁸U. S. Information Service, Free World, Volume 11, Number 5, 1963, p. 20.

One of the smallest projects constructed was a \$16.00 foot bridge which was described by the Eighth Army G-5, Colonel James Taylor, Jr., as follows: "The foot bridge saved school children in the Pyongtaek area an extra three-mile walk during the rainy season and the U. S. forces project sponsor has closer understanding with the local community as a result of their practical assistance."¹⁹

Probably the project sponsored by Headquarters Detachment, Eighth U. S. Army Support Command, could be considered typical. They supported the building of a classroom addition to the Seoul Buddhist Bo Hwa Orphanage. The total cost was \$1000.00 in AFAK money supplemented by \$1300.00 in local labor and material.²⁰

Undoubtedly the main reason for the success of the AFAK Program is that it is administered by a stable and efficient organization, the Eighth United States Army. The Commanding General is designated the Executive Agent for, and Program Director of, the AFAK Program. In this connection, he is charged with the following ten responsibilities:

- a. Execute Commander, United States Forces, Korea (COMUSFKOREA) functions pertaining to the AFAK Program.
- b. Coordinate and supervise participation in the program by U. S. Armed Forces in Korea.
- c. Appoint an AFAK accountable officer.
- d. Establish detailed procedures and publish directives necessary to implement the program.
- e. Handle logistic and funding aspects in accordance with current U. S. assistance and armed forces regulations.
- f. Plan, establish project criteria for, develop, and supervise implementation of annual operating programs.
- g. Coordinate project criteria through the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5 (ACofS, J5), USFK, with the Director, U. S. Operations Mission to Korea (USOM-K) and appropriate ROK Ministries.

¹⁹Anglin, loc. cit.

²⁰Ibid.

h. Coordinate proposed annual operating programs through the ACofS, J5, USFK, with Director, USOM-K, and interested agencies of ROKG to prevent duplication of effort.

i. Provide AFAK Program requirements for inclusion in AID (Agency for International Development) and military assistance plans and programs when indicated.

j. Maintain official AFAK records and prepare reports of activities as provided herein.²¹

AFAK responsibilities have included the distribution of nearly \$30,000,000.00 resulting in about \$86,000,000.00 worth of improvements. The amounts allocated to various types of projects are shown in Table 5. Those who are close to the program are convinced that this money has been wisely spent. General G. S. Meloy, Jr., Commanding General of the Eighth United States Army, stated on 24 September 1962:

AFAK is a coordinated effort to extend the hand of American friendship to the Korean people. It means many things- hospitals, schools, orphanages, abundant rice fields- all helped to realization through AFAK assistance, and the particularly appealing aspect of this program to me is that it operates under the principle of 'helping the people to help themselves.'²²

Colonel James Taylor, Jr., Eighth U. S. Army Civil Affairs Officer, more recently stated:

AFAK helps Koreans to understand their American neighbor and Americans to understand more closely the country in which they are stationed.

By being a good neighbor the American serviceman is a credit to his uniform, his country and to the joint cause in which the Korean and American people believe.²³

Praise for AFAK has not been limited to those who have been working with the program. The Draper Report in 1959 recognized AFAK

²¹United States Forces Korea, "Civil Relations, Government Affairs: Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) Program," (Policy Directive Number 5-12, 25 October 1962), pp. 2-3. (Mimeographed.)

²²Meloy, loc. cit.

²³Anglin, loc. cit.

TABLE 5

EXPENDITURE OF AFAK FUNDS AND VALUE OF OTHER EXPENDED RESOURCES, IN
U. S. DOLLARS, BY PROJECT TYPE, THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1963
(TO THE NEAREST DOLLAR)

Projects	Material Provided		Equipment and Labor	Total Value
	AFAK	Korean		
Schools	\$14,435,061	\$13,417,379	\$19,213,780	\$47,066,220
Churches	972,331	156,450	708,576	1,837,357
Orphanages	1,476,189	1,004,696	1,818,579	4,299,464
Bridges	474,364	61,760	634,678	1,170,802
Public Health	2,020,369	1,855,553	2,734,192	6,610,114
Civic Buildings	1,784,845	748,533	4,563,849	7,097,227
Public Utilities	441,506	83,571	901,854	1,426,931
Reclamation	134,272	17,258	476,935	628,465
Flood Control	26,700	0	103,454	130,154
Highways	83,858	30,312	754,647	868,817
Rehabilitation	1,097,018	27,817	3,616,364	4,741,199
Total				
Construction	\$22,946,513	\$17,403,329	\$35,526,908	\$75,876,750
Non-construction	3,499,117	0	0	3,499,117
Medical	1,885,252	0	4,580,368	6,465,620
Total AFAK	\$28,330,882	\$17,403,329	\$40,107,276	\$85,841,487

Source: AFAK Status Report #89.

as an instrument of U. S. policy, and commented on some of the reasons for its success.

The Eighth U. S. Army in Korea made a most valuable contribution to American policy in the Far East through the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program. It is unusual for a combat army in the field to participate in a program of rehabilitating the war-torn nation it has fought over. The accomplishments of this program have done much to demonstrate to the world that while communism destroys and exploits, the United States reconstructs and assists those who need aid.

.....
The great success of the AFAK program was due to several factors: The need for cooperative assistance in Korea was very real and very great; U. S. forces had a large concentration of personnel in the theater and relatively large stocks of supplies and equipment; and

above all the program had encouragement and support of commanders in the field as well as government agencies in Washington. It was a well-coordinated and well-directed program serving a distinctly worthwhile purpose. It exemplifies the possibilities of using military resources to assist in social-economic fields without detriment to the military mission.²⁴

The AFAK Program, through the concept of civic action, has proved to be a creditable instrument of U. S. foreign policy. It has helped the Korean people; it has improved the relations between the Koreans and the U. S. Armed Forces in Korea; and it has strengthened the bonds between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

Civic action is conducted by the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, though not on such a formalized and comprehensive scale as the AFAK Program. Requirements for civic action are determined at the ROK government level by the Ministry of Reconstruction (successor agency of the Ministry of Rehabilitation). These requirements are then discussed with representatives of the Ministry of Defense, and the two cabinet level agencies reach an agreement on the projects to be undertaken. The approved projects are planned, and the responsibility for execution is forwarded down through the chain of command to a ROK Army division located in the vicinity of the proposed project. At this level the project is assigned to a regiment or a battalion, depending upon the tactical commitments of these units and the size of the civic action projects.²⁵

Typically, government directed projects since 1954 have consisted of home construction for families who were displaced as a result of the

²⁴Draper, et al., op. cit., pp. 132-133.

²⁵Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Kim Pyungman, Republic of Korea Army, at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 April 1964.

Korean War. Home construction projects were assigned to regiments or battalions, and the labor was provided by ROK soldiers under the direction of their officers. The government provided the land and such major construction materials as lumber and cement. Nails and other inexpensive materials were obtained from salvaged buildings or purchased with unit funds and donations. Other materials, such as straw and adobe, were readily obtainable by local procurement. From this variety of sources, the ROK Army has been able to conduct worthwhile civic action projects at a minimum expense.²⁶

The ROK Army also practices civic action on a locally approved basis. Without direction from above, battalions and smaller units assist the Korean farmers in busy seasons by helping harvest their crops or transplanting rice shoots for future crops. During the floods of 1961, 1962, and 1963 the ROK Army moved quickly to assist those in stricken areas. They used military equipment for the evacuation of homeless peasants and their belongings. Later they used their equipment to help repair the damage. Along the Demilitarized Zone, ROK officers have set up temporary schools in tents for children who do not have access to educational facilities. Classes are taught by off-duty personnel in such basic subjects as reading and writing. The ROK Army also has authority to admit Korean civilians to their medical facilities when they are operating in an area where such services are not available from other sources.²⁷

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

Civic action by indigenous forces in Korea is necessarily conducted on an austere basis. However, limited facilities are no bar to such civic action projects as providing educational opportunities and simple medical facilities. Civic action projects such as those reported from Korea provide good examples of what can be done in underdeveloped countries by indigenous personnel whose major resource is initiative.

There are also lessons to be learned by studying the AFAK Program. This program is not descriptive of military civic action as defined in the Dictionary of United States Army Terms because it is not executed by "preponderantly indigenous military forces." Neither, at first glance, does it appear to offer any constructive information to MAAGs and Missions for the same reason. But, is this necessarily the case? Why couldn't indigenous forces, with U. S. assistance and advice, implement a similar program?

Administration of the AFAK Program has not detracted from the combat readiness of U. S. forces in Korea. Admittedly, these forces have not been engaged in combat since 1953, but the requirement for readiness has been ever present. This is analagous to the situation in many of the underdeveloped countries. The presence of large military forces is necessary to deter insurgency, even though many of them have never been engaged in actual warfare. Such an army, it would seem, would at least have the time to underwrite a program of civic action similar to AFAK.

But, resources as well as time is required for a major program of civic action. U. S. forces have expended \$30,000,000.00 for materials in the AFAK Program. Yet, U. S. funds and materials have been

made available to other underdeveloped countries in which the United States has a military interest. Reference to Appendix I discloses that of the forty-eight countries in which the U. S. has MAAGs or Missions, only two- Mali and Senegal- have received less than \$30,000,000.00 in U. S. aid during the period 1946-1962. But, Mali, with a population of four million, has only been independent since 1962; Senegal, with three million people, became independent in 1960. So, neither country is big enough nor old enough to have received aid comparable to that of Korea. Besides these two small nations, only eight additional countries- Burma, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay- have received less than \$100,000,000.00 in U. S. aid during the same period. The other countries have received larger amounts. So, outside resources could be made available for such a program, providing that aid from the United States continues in the future.

The final element required for instituting an AFAK-like program is a dual necessity for leadership and organization. It is in this element that the MAAG advisor could play a significant role. Such an advisor trained in civil affairs could, with the coordination of the host military forces, design a civic action program along the lines of AFAK. The MAAG advisor, through the Country Team chain of command, has access to the U. S. Operations Mission from whom an allocation of resources could be made available. Once obtained, he would be in a position to influence the distribution of these resources through his position as military advisor. Inasmuch as MAAGs are already involved in the distribution of military resources, the distribution of economic resources should present no great additional problems.

The proposal previously outlined has been greatly oversimplified. The characteristics of underdeveloped countries, described in Chapter III, in themselves present an inherent obstacle. Even with U. S. resources and MAAG assistance, the armed forces of the underdeveloped countries are not capable of administering a program with the efficiency of the Eighth United States Army. However, the program would not have to be as broad as the AFAK Program. It does not take a great deal of imagination to visualize a program such as AFAK was in its infancy, transplanted to another underdeveloped country, with each participating U. S. soldier replaced by an indigenous serviceman. This, incidentally, would constitute military civic action in the most definitive terms.

The lessons to be learned by examining the AFAK Program go beyond the mere definition of military civic action. The AFAK Program could be used by MAAGs as a model, and its duplication with indigenous personnel provides a worthy military objective.

CHAPTER VIII

CIVIC ACTION IN LAOS

Civic action in Laos has the dubious distinction of being the most cited example of a country-wide failure in civil affairs. Of all the country programs described and analyzed in this study, Laos enjoyed the least success. However, in an objective appraisal, it cannot be arbitrarily stated that a program must be either completely successful or a total failure with no degrees of attainment between the two extremes. A program can only be truly evaluated by comparing its results to the conditions that would have existed had it not been executed. Obviously, this is impossible. It is also acknowledged that a lack of understanding often creates the label of failure. The situation in Laos, against a background of confused politics, has been difficult to comprehend. So, while civic action in Laos was not successful, it may not be fair to describe it as having contributed nothing.

Laos was a state within French Indochina between 1904 and 1954. During World War II, the Japanese overran much of Indochina, and Laos was subjected to attacks from Thailand as well. During this period the Japanese were harassed in north Indochina by the Vietminh, a Communist guerrilla organization commanded by Ho Chi-minh. After the war, when the French attempted to regain control of their Asian colonies,

they were forcefully opposed by the Vietminh. The first exchange of shots on 23 November 1946 marked the beginning of the Indochinese War.¹

In an attempt to consolidate their pre-war colonies, France established the French Union in 1946. In 1949, Laos was given its independence within the French Union. Prince Boun Oum was the first prime minister under this semi-independent status. He was followed in February 1950 by Phoui Sananikone. Commencing 14 April 1950, the new Lao government assumed responsibility for all state administration. In May, the United States agreed to provide economic assistance.²

By 1950, Laotian Communists under the leadership of Prince Souvanna Vong had united in an organization called the Pathet Lao. This political organization was formed under the sponsorship of the Vietminh government in North Vietnam as part of the overall Communist movement in Southeast Asia. Pathet Lao activities increased, and in April 1953 the Vietminh forces invaded Laos to assist the Pathet Lao in establishing an independent government in the two northern provinces of Phongsaly and Samneua.³ The national assembly ordered mobilization, and the prime minister appealed to the world for assistance. France opposed intervention by other powers, and responded to the appeal by sending paratroopers into the troubled area. They forced

¹"Indochina," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 12 (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1963), p. 264.

²"Indochina," 1951 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1951), p. 364.

³"Laos," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 13 (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1963), p. 711.

the Vietminh to retreat into Samneua Province, but were unable to dislodge them from this limited area.⁴

Fighting between the French and the Pathet Lao continued in 1954. On 21 July, the Geneva Agreement was signed, partitioning Indochina into the countries of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Under this agreement, the Laotian territory occupied by Vietminh forces was to be turned over to the Royal Lao government. The Pathet Lao forces were to pull back until differences could be settled between the Communists and the government factions. The Pathet Lao, led by Prince Souvanna Vong, objected to this latter provision, and insisted upon setting up an autonomous regime in northern Laos. While these internal problems remained unsolved, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization signed a treaty in Manila on 8 September 1954 recognizing the independence of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.⁵ It further extended the provisions of the SEATO Agreements to these countries.

In 1955, there was no marked improvement of conditions in Laos, and the Pathet Lao continued their operations in the north. In January 1956, the Pathet Lao forces organized a political party which they called the Neo Lao Hak Xat.⁶ In August, the Laotian Prime Minister, Souvanna Phuma, reached an agreement with his Communist half-brother, Prince Souvanna Vong, through which the Pathet Lao forces and the two

⁴"Indochina," 1954 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1954), p. 356.

⁵"Indochina," 1955 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1955), p. 407.

⁶A. M. Halpern and H. B. Fredman, Communist Strategy In Laos (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, June 14, 1960), p. 5.

provinces they held were to be integrated into the constituted Lao government.⁷ Time would prove this agreement to be more easily negotiated than executed.

Civic action was initiated in 1956 by General Ouane Ratikoun, a combat commander who was later to become chief of staff of the Royal Lao Army. General Ratikoun had been fighting the Pathet Lao in the provinces of Phongsaly and Samneua, and he recognized the need to take steps that would unify the country. His troops were assigned tasks of public works, education, welfare, health and sanitation, and informational services.⁸ There is little information available as to the extent of their accomplishments.

Unification of the two factions proved extremely difficult. Finally, after extended controversy, the Pathet Lao agreed to integrate into the Royal Lao Army in exchange for two cabinet appointments. However, on 29 May 1957, the Souvanna Phuma government tumbled. Then in rapid succession came a new series of prime ministers- Katay Sasorith, Phoui Sananikone, and the Pathet Lao leader Souvanna Vong. However, none of them could obtain the required two-thirds majority endorsement by the national assembly. Then, on 9 August 1957, Souvanna Phuma was reappointed as prime minister to replace his leftist half-brother. A few months later the half-brothers released another agreement by which

⁷"Laos," 1957 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1957), p. 455.

⁸Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, Civic Activities of the Military, Southeast Asia (Report of the Anderson-Southeast Asia Subcommittee of the Draper Committee, 13 March 1959), p. 9.

1500 Pathet Lao soldiers would join the royalist forces, while the remainder of the pro-communist military organization would be disbanded.⁹

With a semblance of government stability and a prospect for domestic peace, civic action was renewed as a formal project in the fall of 1957. The Royal Lao Civic Action Program was organized at the national level with a National Committee of Civic Action. This committee was headed by the Prime Minister of Laos, and composed of his directors of the various ministries that had an interest in civic action. A Commissioner General of Civic Action was appointed to administer the program.¹⁰

Although Colonel Oudone Sananikone was assigned as the Commissioner General, the program was established as a civilian organization. A nation-wide recruiting program was instituted to acquire personnel, and most of those obtained were civil servants and school teachers. Government pressure overcame the understandable objections raised by the losing agencies at this appropriation of their talent. Rigid standards were established for applicants. They were required to be at least twenty-five years old, of good character and personal habits, in excellent health and good physical condition, and professionally qualified in a desirable field. Acceptable professions included

⁹"Laos," 1958 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1958), p. 395.

¹⁰Brigadier General Oudone Sananikone, Royal Lao Army, "Laos, Case Study In Civic Action: The Royal Lao Program," Military Review, Volume XLIII, Number 12 (December 1963), p. 46.

public administration, health, engineering, or agriculture. From all applicants, fourteen teams of ten men each were selected.¹¹

These men were qualified for assignments in the civic action organization. However, there were no replacements for the positions that they had vacated, and their loss was sorely felt. This transfer of skilled civilian personnel violates the concept of civic action. By following doctrine, qualified military personnel could have engaged in civic action when they were not required for strictly military duties. But, this doctrine was not followed.

The civic action teams were given an intensive training program in two phases. The first six weeks phase consisted of general instruction. The curriculum covered the history of Laos, Lao politics, Lao constitution, election regulations, government structure, government policies, government administration, international organizations, international communism, evaluation of communism in Southeast Asia, principles of intelligence, the Pathet Lao, and the background of Pathet Lao leaders. This phase of instruction was mostly conducted by government officials.¹² This program was obviously designed to strengthen the position of the government in the regard of the peasant population.

The second phase of instruction consisted of a week of technical instruction. Each of the teams had two specialists trained in the areas of public health and sanitation, public works, education, agriculture, and public relations. Additional instruction was given in the

¹¹Ibid., p. 48.

¹²Ibid.

relationship with the Royal Lao Army and the support that could be obtained from these military forces. Upon completion of this phase of training, the team leaders were sent to Saigon for a special two-weeks course conducted by the government of South Vietnam.¹³

The first civic action personnel were recruited to serve for one year. They were well paid, and given the status of Royal Lao Army officers. Their training, though brief, was intensive and well directed. It remained to insure that they were well received. To assist in establishing this rapport, the government first brought the district officials to Vientiane for a six-weeks course similar to that given to the civic action trainees. Then, the village headmen were brought in for an abbreviated one-week civic action orientation. This orientation was presented by the team leaders with whom the village headmen would be expected to cooperate. Following the instruction for the civic action teams and the various officials, the teams were sent to the field.¹⁴

When the teams arrived in the objective area, they initially concentrated on becoming familiar with the people, the environment, and the local situation. The teams had previously been provided with all available intelligence but it was frequently obsolete. It was necessary to become familiar with the current Communist organization and strength, as well as to determine the needs of the villagers. During this "visiting period" information was gathered and analyzed, and a proposed course of action was developed to implement selected projects.

¹³Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁴Ibid.

In this planning phase, the village officials were frequently consulted and invited to help.¹⁵

The selected projects were intentionally simple. Typical tasks were the improvement of the local pagoda, work on the village school, construction of a dispensary, road development, minor irrigation projects, or the construction of a community building. There was not always complete agreement between the civic action teams and the villagers as to what constituted a suitable project. Rather than waste time in bickering, the team leaders usually yielded to the villagers' desires.¹⁶

It was originally planned that the civic action teams would remain in an area for a month and move on to another locality. During this month, it was intended to complete various simple projects and to also select a local inhabitant to take charge of a continued program of civic action. However, it was found necessary for the teams to stay in each locale for a slightly longer period, at times extending their residence to two months or longer. After departure, one of the team members would return every few weeks to encourage the continuance of civic action, to replenish medical supplies, and to make a limited replacement of tools.¹⁷

This formalized civic action program was fraught with many obstacles. It was recognized that this program created a new requirement for trained leaders in a country that had none to spare. Potential

¹⁵Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 51-52.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 52.

volunteers were discouraged by their superiors, and it was necessary for the government to engage in "forced volunteering." This practice did little to maintain the esprit of the civic action teams.¹⁸ Additionally, the lack of communications in Laos made administration difficult. The expense of maintaining these teams was also a hardship in a nation short of funds. Furthermore, the villagers were not always receptive. It appeared to them, at times, that the government sent in its representatives to insure political control rather than to improve their standard of living. Finally, the unarmed civic action teams were unable to protect themselves when operating in areas of Pathet Lao activity. Consequently, by late 1958, the National Committee of Civic Action was dissolved.¹⁹

In the 1958 elections, the Neo Lao Hak Xat party of the Pathet Lao acquired nine seats in the national assembly. Souvanna Phuma resigned as prime minister in July, and the following month Phoui Sananikone was appointed as his replacement.²⁰ With a pro-Western prime minister, but with Pathet Lao representation in the National Assembly, civic action in Laos was about to be returned to military jurisdiction.

In late 1958, civic action became strictly military in nature. It was to be carried out by soldiers from the volunteer battalions that were stationed in permanent locations throughout the country.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁹Major Charles W. Stockell, "Laos, Case Study In Civic Action: The Military Program," Military Review, Volume XLIII, Number 12, (December 1963), p. 57.

²⁰"Laos," 1959 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1959), p. 391.

It was felt that such an organization, centrally controlled by the military, would have greater stability and the necessary longevity to undertake long-term projects. Also, being military in character, it should serve to improve the relations between the army and the villagers.²¹

The goal of this civic action program was to place a team in each of the 877 tassengs in Laos.²² Prior to being deployed, each team was given four weeks of classroom instruction and one week of practical work. Each team consisted of six men, one of whom was the non-commissioned officer team leader. The other five were specialists, one in each of the basic civic action fields- education, public health and sanitation, public works, agriculture, and public relations. The team leader had responsibility for establishing liaison with the tasseng head-man and assisting him in setting up his local government. Of course, it was also the team leader's job to coordinate the efforts of his team on projects that were selected as a result of his coordination with the tasseng head-man. One of the first projects for each team was the construction of a tasseng center. The reason for this priority of work was to provide the villagers with a visible example of the presence of the government. When the tasseng head-man used his own home as a community building, this influence was not so evident.²³

The effects of this new civic action program was retarded by the Pathet Lao who lost no opportunity to turn the accomplishments to

²¹Sananikone, op. cit., p. 54.

²²A tasseng is a political subdivision in Laos that is roughly equivalent to a small county or a township in the United States.

²³Lansdale, loc. cit.

their advantage. For instance, for one construction job in the mountains, a bulldozer came into use with no immediate identification of its source. The Pathet Lao propagandists immediately went to work, and convinced the people that it was they who had provided the equipment.²⁴ Other Pathet Lao propaganda campaigns spread information of vast projects for which the Royal Lao government should be responsible. Those villagers that subscribed to these tales were disillusioned when confronted with the comparatively meager accomplishments of the Royal Lao Army. In some cases it was necessary to counter this propaganda by abandoning a practical long-range project in favor of a showy improvement that could be quickly completed.²⁵

Despite Pathet Lao opposition, eighty six teams had been formed by the spring of 1959, and more were in the process of being trained. The emphasis was on self-help projects such as starting schools and the construction of simple public works.²⁶ Eventually there were 200 to 300 civic action teams trained. A large amount of equipment had been amassed, though distribution was slow. Although many simple projects had been completed, political events brought the program to an end before its beneficial results could be widely recognized.²⁷

In the spring of 1959, Phoui Sananikone's government proclaimed hostility toward the Neo Lao Hak Xat and openly opposed the neutralists. He also berated the International Commission for Supervision and Control

²⁴Major Harold F. Bentz, Jr., "Psychological Warfare And Civic Action," Army (July 1963), p. 64.

²⁵Sananikone, op. cit., p. 54.

²⁶Lansdale, loc. cit.

²⁷Stockell, loc. cit.

of Laos which had been established by the Geneva Agreements of 1954, and invited them to leave the country. He ordered the disarming of the integrated Pathet Lao battalions, one of which escaped to the jungles where it was augmented by Pathet Lao guerrillas. This combined unit promptly commenced operations in the northern part of the country. The Lao government reported that these Pathet Lao forces were reinforced by troops from North Vietnam, and assistance was requested from the United Nations. However, an investigating subcommittee reported back to the United Nations that there was no evidence of physical aggression, and no further action was taken. In July 1959, Souvanna Vong was arrested, but he later escaped and found refuge in North Vietnam.²⁸

On 7 January 1960, Kou Abbay Og Long became prime minister, only to be followed on 31 January by Prince Tiao Somsanith. On 9 August 1960, elements of the Royal Lao Army were led by Captain Kong Le in a revolt that seized Vientiane and split the Royalist forces into two factions. To preclude civil war, the King asked neutralist Souvanna Phuma to again head the government, and the appointment was made on 15 August. However, Kong Le refused to participate, and maintained his own separate army. The Pathet Lao took advantage of this situation, and launched an offensive in the north that regained control of Samneua Province by September. Souvanna Vong, back from his exile in North Vietnam, was again directing the Pathet Lao operations which were now openly supported by Russia. By December there were three armies in the vicinity of Vientiane- the Pathet Lao, Kong Le's forces, and the Royal Lao Army under General Phoumi Nosavan. On 9 December,

²⁸"Laos," 1960 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1960), pp. 385-386.

Souvanna Phuma fled to Cambodia as the forces of Kong Le united with the Pathet Lao. The pro-Western forces of General Phoumi Nosavan emerged as the victor of a bitter battle for Vientiane that ended on 16 December. A new pro-Western government was formed under Prince Boun Oum.²⁹

In January 1961, Laos was further harassed by troops from North Vietnam and an increasingly active Pathet Lao. By March, most of northern Laos was in Communist hands. The exiled Souvanna Phouma still considered himself the head of the government, and vigorously campaigned for another neutrality conference. Under pressure from other nations, such a conference convened at Geneva in May 1961. Delegations from the Pathet Lao, the anti-Communist Royal Government, and the neutralists were present. Negotiations appeared to be leading toward the formation of a coalition government.³⁰

While negotiations continued in Geneva, Prince Boun Oum continued with the administration of his government in being. Civic action was reorganized in July 1961, under a central directorate that also had responsibility for psychological warfare and troop information activities. A U. S. Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team was requested to augment the efforts of the MAAG to support this new civil affairs operation. This Mobile Training Team was used to train an initial cadre of Lao officers who were slated to become instructors in a civil affairs school. They also trained the civic action team leaders for

²⁹"Laos," 1961 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1961), pp. 392-393.

³⁰"Laos," 1962 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1962), pp. 388-390.

the first ten teams to be deployed. Difficulties were experienced by both U. S. and Lao personnel. There were many demands for qualified Lao officers during this period, and it was only with considerable delay that the initial input of sixteen junior officers were made available for training. The U. S. instructors were not proficient in the Lao language, and this handicap was compounded by the six-grade educational level of their students. The periods of instruction were necessarily longer than originally planned.³¹

In spite of their many problems, the Lao Royal Armed Forces prepared a comprehensive plan for civic action. Emphasis seemed to be on winning the support of the people, a logical objective when the political situation at that time is considered. The three basic functions pointed out to the civic action teams were:

- a. To establish the closest possible rapport with the village people.
- b. To lead the inhabitants to esteem the military.
- c. To show the village people how to apply the laws and execute orders given by superior authorities.³²

These functions were to be carried out by living, working, and eating with the local inhabitants; by providing the people with information about the Royal Lao Army and countering the propaganda of the Pathet Lao; by instructing the villagers in law, order, obedience, and respect; by complying with the desires of the majority of the people as long as these desires were logical and reasonable; and by

³¹Stockell, op. cit., p. 59.

³²Lao Royal Armed Forces Training Manual For Civic Action, G-5, Forces Armees Royales, 30 September 1961 (Translated by Major Victor L. Oddi, U. S. Army), p. 1.

complimenting those who did well while disciplining those who committed misdeeds.³³

Like their predecessors, these civic action teams consisted of six men. The team leader was assigned the responsibility for psychological warfare and intelligence, while the assistant team leader doubled as a public safety specialist. The other four members were trained in the fields of education, public health and sanitation, public works, and agriculture.³⁴

Each team member was provided with detailed guidelines. These directions were political as well as technical, and teams were instructed to keep the national government informed on local matters of interest.³⁵

The success of these civic action teams in the field was not outstanding. The old theory of getting projects started and then moving on to the next village was employed. When a civic action team had several villages engaged in projects, they would check them all by periodic visits. However, the projects suffered by this lack of attention. Moreover, many of the Lao commanders interpreted the civic action projects as primarily an additional means for bringing the villagers under their control. The political aspects were often emphasized at the expense of the economic intentions. In such instances, the desires of the tasseng head-men or the village priests were ignored. The priests, being one of the best educated groups in Laos, were usually

³³Ibid., pp. 1-6.

³⁴Ibid., p. 7.

³⁵Ibid., p. 13.

school teachers as well as spiritual leaders, and their alienation was expensive to the Lao effort. On the other hand, the Pathet Lao recognized the standing of the priests, and solicited their good will. Frequently, the individual Lao soldiers would further antagonize the villagers by taking what they wanted and setting their own price for it. Thus, the 1961 civic action program was not initially well received, and so its early progress was slow.³⁶

U. S. participation was largely confined to the instruction provided by the Mobile Training Team. However, in one instance, a Special Forces detachment carried out civic action in the village of Ken Thao. They obtained support from the MAAG, the U. S. Information Service, and the U. S. Operations Mission. With this support and the self-help of the natives, they sponsored dispensaries, pure-water wells, and local public works. According to Major Stockell, one of the MAAG officers, the change in the village was remarkable. The people took an interest in the projects and welcomed them. However, when the Special Forces detachment was withdrawn, the program deteriorated because of lack of direction and supervision.³⁷

While the Royal Lao Army was establishing its U. S. assisted civic action program, negotiations continued in Geneva. In the spring of 1962, while the neutrality conference was still in progress, 10,000 North Vietnam soldiers crossed the Lao border to reinforce the Pathet Lao. In a counter move, President Kennedy ordered 3000 marines to take up positions in Thailand across the Mekong River. Tensions

³⁶Stockell, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

³⁷Ibid., p. 60.

increased, and pressure from many nations was applied to the differing factions to reach an early agreement. Finally, the three princes got together. Neutralist Prince Souvanna Phuma was to be premier and defense minister; pro-Communist Prince Souvanna Vong was to be vice premier and minister of economics and planning; pro-Western General Phoumi Nosavan was to be vice premier and finance minister. Prince Boun Oum, the incumbent prime minister was not given a position of importance in the coalition government. The new government assumed control on 23 June 1962, and a cease-fire was effected the next day. This government indicated its political attitude by promptly recognizing East Germany, Communist China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and North Vietnam. Souvanna Phuma's policy statement rejected protection by the SEATO organization, prohibited the establishment of foreign bases in Laos, and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Meanwhile, the marines had quietly departed from neighboring Thailand, and after the new cabinet had formally taken office on 27 August, MAAG personnel started their exodus from Laos. By U. S. estimates, 6000 North Vietnam soldiers remained in the country, but Communist spokesmen denied their presence.³⁸

Since the departure of MAAG personnel from Laos, there has been practically no information available concerning civic action in that country. If the effort was continued at all, apparently the results were not worthy of the attention of the various news media.

Civic action in Laos never had a chance to prove the worthiness of the concept. The frequent changes in administration left the nation

³⁸"Laos," 1963 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1963), pp. 505-507.

without a stable and continuous control, and this indirection was reflected in the performance of civic action. This one factor, while not wholly responsible, certainly created a disadvantage that was not present in either the Philippines or Malaya. It is not necessary to trace the evolution of policy through an entire chain of command to realize that a change in policy at the head of the government was eventually felt in the lower ranks. Were this the only detriment to civic action in Laos, the programs could well have failed as a result. However, failure was not solely dependent on government instability.

It must be remembered that one of the constructive principles of civic action in underdeveloped countries is the utilization of military abilities to advance the economy. In the early Laotian program, this principle was flagrantly violated. Leaders were drawn from civilian sources that needed to increase, not decrease, their able personnel. Civic action leaders, removed from their vocations as teachers and civil servants, were not able to contribute to the national improvement in their new and unfamiliar jobs to the same extent that they had previously. And, there being no suitable replacements, their withdrawal had a significant impact upon education and government administration- the two areas most fundamental to government stability and economic development.

The economic environment of Laos also contributed to the lack of success of civic action. Reference to Appendix II will reveal that 85% of the population is illiterate, and that the 1961 per capita income of \$60.00 is one of the lowest in the world. Only 5% of the population attends school. Annual per capita electricity generation is only four kilowatt hours. There are 55,000 people for every doctor.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to interest the people in self-help through civic action or any other program. The will to seek improvement cannot be aroused without inspired leadership, and leadership in Laos was one of its scarcest commodities. The physical condition of the inhabitants and the sanitary conditions of their abodes were extremely low. So, with both mental and physical capabilities at a low level, the peasants did not present a likely prospect for self-help programs.

The political outlook of the villagers made civic action difficult. They shared the attitude of most peasants- that the government was something that extracted taxes and enforced laws in return for little other than interference with a simple way of life. Lao civic action was theoretically designed to counter this attitude, but in practice the action by individual team members only reinforced the original beliefs. Quite naturally, the Pathet Lao exploited this situation at every possible opportunity.

Social factors also constituted a deterrent to civic action in Laos. The national religion of Buddhism, advocating self-denial and passivity, inhibits the socio-economic betterment to which civic action is directed. Changes in social attitudes are not readily attainable where traditions and cultures have been uninterruptedly influential for centuries. In Laos, where inhibitive social factors are reinforced by an impoverished economic environment and a resentment toward central government, the acceptance of civic action by the villagers must be a long run objective.

The adequacy of U. S. support of civic action in Laos has been questioned. Advisory personnel, thoroughly competent in their technical

fields, had difficulty in imparting their knowledge and experience because of an inability to communicate in the native language. The use of interpreters proved a doubtful substitute, as much was lost of the personal rapport that is so essential between teacher and pupil. Besides, there was no way of being sure that the translation was correct or thoroughly understood.

One inexcusable obstacle to civic action in Laos was the lack of coordination and cooperation between U. S. agencies represented in that country. Mr. Rufus C. Phillips, III, among others, has sharply criticized U. S. behavior in this regard. Mr. Phillips went to Laos in 1957 on behalf of the International Cooperation Administration to work with the Lao government on their civic action program. His appraisal, in part, is quoted verbatim below:

In short, the methods were direct and unsophisticated, and wherever the program was thoughtfully planned and adequately supported, it worked very well and, by its demonstration at the village level, provided the spark for undertakings on a district or provincial scale. However, this program, too, suffered from inadequacies and delays in the material support it received from the U. S. government (owing at least in part to disputes over which agency, DOD or ICA, was primarily responsible for it), and never had the consistent support needed to gain the fullest co-operation of the villagers.³⁹

It was situations of this nature that prompted President Kennedy's letter to all Ambassadors on 29 May 1961 (see Appendix III). This letter and the "country team" concept which was described in Chapter IV have apparently reduced the frequency of such occurrences.

Leftist sources, of course, place the blame for the entire Laotian crisis upon the United States. One author even goes so far as to charge the Central Intelligence Agency with many of the changes

³⁹S. T. Hosmer, et al., Counterinsurgency: A Symposium (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, January 1963), p. 83.

of government and many of the atrocities that took place in Laos prior to the establishment of the coalition government.⁴⁰ Regardless of the validity of such accusations, they can only serve to the detriment of future U. S. participation in civic action in Southeast Asia.

In the beginning of this chapter the point was made that it is impossible to label civic action in Laos as a total failure. This opinion is also held by Brigadier General Oudone Sananikone who guided the program for some time. While admitting its shortcomings, General Sananikone feels that a closer relationship was established between the people and the Lao government, that local leadership was developed and strengthened, and that many civil servants received training and experience which equipped them for more effective service to the people.⁴¹

But, the attainments listed by General Sananikone do not satisfy the criteria of civic action objectives, and so the Lao program is rightfully considered as unsuccessful. The many reasons for this have been examined in some detail. The primary reason was the instability of the government, and many of the subsidiary causes were descendants of this instability. While a temporary contributing reason was the use of qualified civilians instead of army personnel, this criticism must be tempered with the realization that the army was busily engaged in defense against Pathet Lao insurgency. Collectively,

⁴⁰Wilfred G. Burchett, The Furtive War: The United States In Vietnam And Laos (New York, New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 161-217.

⁴¹Sananikone, op. cit., p. 54.

the reasons for lack of success appear to point to the lack of local leadership. Developing this leadership may well have to be a priority objective for future civic action in similar environments.

CHAPTER IX

CIVIC ACTION IN VIETNAM

An examination of civic action in Vietnam results in mixed feelings. Here U. S. efforts have closely followed doctrinal concepts, and there has been no apparent lack of financial support. Coordination between the MAAG and other government agencies has been good. The MAAG and USOM have mutually supported civic action as part of the counter-insurgency operation. But, the impact of civic action has been limited as outside support has enabled the Communist insurgents to steadily increase in strength and scope of operations.

There is considerable material available on civic action in Vietnam. However, in this chapter, emphasis is placed on those activities that are administered to augment the normal efforts of the MAAG. Also examined are the civic activities of the Vietnamese from the time of acquiring independence through the Strategic Hamlet Program in 1963.

The Geneva Agreement of 1954 marked the end of French Indochina and created the independent countries of Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. The latter two countries were clearly divided by the 17th parallel, but no such sharp division of ideologies was possible. Generally, the people of the north were pro-Communists under the leadership of Ho Chi-minh. Also in a general sense, the Vietnamese in the south were anti-Communists. However, there were many

pro-Communists south of the 17th parallel just as there were many anti-Communists north of it.

In order to permit the Vietnamese to live under the ideology of their choice, the Geneva Agreement provided for the withdrawal of forces on both sides of the 17th parallel. From zones well back of the border, Vietnamese were free to go either north or south. This shift was completed in the spring of 1955.¹

The withdrawal of local officials from provinces that had been Communist held, together with the arrival of 900,000 refugees from North Vietnam, created serious problems for the new South Vietnam government. The only arm of the government equipped to cope with such a situation was the Vietnamese Army. Ngo Dinh Diem, head of the new country, ordered his troops into the troubled areas to establish security and administration.² It was in connection with this pacification campaign that civic action was first undertaken by the Vietnamese government.

Before troops were sent into the troubled areas, they were given special civic action training. Some of this training was so elementary that it instructed the soldiers how to be courteous to civilians and how to answer Communist propaganda. Other training included more technical subjects, such as the disbursing of aid, administrative practices, and simple construction.³

¹Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, Civic Activities of the Military, Southeast Asia (Report of the Anderson-Southeast Asia Subcommittee of the Draper Committee, 13 March 1959), p. 5.

²Ibid.

³William H. Draper, Jr., et al., Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Volume II (Draper Report, August 17, 1959), pp. 135-136.

Two large pacification campaigns were initiated early in 1955. The first of these operations was in the Camau area of An Xuyen Province at the southern tip of the country. The military force employed in Camau approximated brigade strength. The second pacification campaign was conducted in the provinces of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh in the central coastal region. Here the military force had about the strength of a corps. In both campaigns, the troops moved in, secured the area, and established a free government. They carried out civic action projects such as training teachers and giving instruction in first aid, village administration, and public works. Medical treatment in these rehabilitated areas was provided through "Operation Brotherhood" by volunteer Filipino doctors, dentists, and nurses. This operation, sponsored by the International Jaycees, also trained Vietnamese in hospital work, first aid, sanitation, and food preparation.⁴ The efforts of the Vietnamese Army and the Filipino volunteers were coordinated with the civic action officials that soon joined them. This presents a good example of marshalling diverse resources to accomplish a common civic action goal.

During the pacification campaigns it was recognized that some agency was required to bring public administration to the villages. To satisfy this need, civic action was set up as a civilian organization within the Ministry of Defense and under the coordinated operational control of the Vietnamese Army. As in Laos, recruiting was aimed at civil service employees, and selected candidates were given appropriate training. After training, teams of four men each were dispatched to various villages to lead the inhabitants in building

⁴Lansdale, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

schools, community houses, first aid clinics, information centers, and public markets. They also gave instruction in health and sanitation, public works, education, administration, and agriculture. After initiating the building program and training the villagers, the civic action team would move on to another village to repeat the process.⁵

In addition to rehabilitating those areas that had been previously under Communist control, there remained the bigger problem of resettling the repatriated refugees from North Vietnam. With the assistance of the United States and France, many of these people were resettled on virgin land, much in the manner of the EDCOR projects in the Philippines. Civic action by the Army of Vietnam was responsible for digging canals, clearing land, erecting huts, building roads, and constructing schools. Assistance was given in establishing local security. Farm tools, animals, and seed were distributed. Within a year, many of these peasants were self sufficient.⁶ These resettlement projects were one of the most successful civic action activities administered by the Vietnamese. Engineer troops were particularly active. It was reported by U. S. observers that some 4000 troops were employed to construct 152 bridges and 174 kilometers of roads. In the period between May and October 1957, army personnel constructed 804 homes, cleared 9150 acres of land, dug 27 wells, and built 5 reservoirs.⁷ By 1961, more than 200,000 people had been resettled, with each family

⁵Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁶Alfred H. Hausrath, Civil Affairs in the Cold War (Bethesda, Maryland: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, February 1961), p. 52.

⁷Draper, et al., op. cit., p. 136.

receiving five hectares of land of which one hectare had been cleared or reclaimed.⁸ These resettlement projects were the forerunners of the strategic hamlet program which has been so widely publicized.

The Geneva Agreement that gave birth to Vietnam provided for free elections in 1956. It was the intent of the Communists to gain control of South Vietnam through these elections while retaining control of North Vietnam by force. In this manner they hoped to unite Vietnam as a Communist state. However, President Ngo Dinh Diem refused to hold elections on the grounds that his government had not signed the Geneva Agreement and that Communist interference would prevent free elections even if he should decide to hold them.⁹

As the Communists were unable to penetrate the Vietnam government by election, they increased their strength by infiltrating agents and recruiting local sympathizers. Cells were formed in villages and hamlets, and the organization became increasingly active during the period between 1956 and 1958. In the usual pattern, emphasis was placed on propaganda, persuasion, and terrorism to gain the support of the rural population. By the end of 1958, it was estimated that Communist guerrilla strength in Vietnam was between 8000 and 9000 men organized into thirty battalions.¹⁰ With support from North Vietnam, the Communists resorted to open guerrilla warfare.

⁸U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Vietnam- A Story Of Nation Building While Fighting An Insurgency," (Saigon, Vietnam, 14 March 1963), p. 3. (Mimeographed.)

⁹Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁰Major William Smith, untitled treatise submitted as a requirement of the Associate Course, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December 1963, pp. 1-2. (Typewritten.)

President Ngo Dinh Diem, with U. S. assistance, continued to build up his country despite guerrilla interference. Industrial enterprises were increasing substantially, and land reform was satisfactorily progressing with landlords being compensated by the government for lands confiscated and redistributed to the peasants. Exports set a record in 1960, and U. S. economic aid, which had been \$300,000,000.00 in fiscal year 1954-1955, dropped to \$150,000,000.00 in fiscal year 1960-1961. However, military aid and the number of military advisors were increased to assist in meeting the continued threat of Communist insurgency. On 9 April 1961, the first election was held, and Ngo Dinh Diem was overwhelmingly reelected as president.¹¹

The Communists responded to the improved conditions in Vietnam by launching a guerrilla offensive in 1961 that was intended to overturn the Diem government by armed force. U. S. military assistance was substantially increased, and the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was established late in 1961 to assist the Vietnamese government in containing the insurgency.

Because of continued Communist terrorism of the peasants, President Ngo Dinh Diem took steps to protect the rural population through resettlement. One of the first attempts in this direction was the establishment of "agrovilles" by grouping isolated farmers. This differed from the earlier pacification resettlements in that it involved confiscating land from remote inhabitants and repaying them with land within the agrovilles. It may be recalled that the previous resettlements had resulted in landless refugees acquiring five hectares of land.

¹¹"Vietnam," 1962 Britannica Book Of The Year (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1962), p. 726.

The agrovillage program was abandoned early in 1962 because of the peasant opposition and the lack of security that could be obtained. A new approach, the National Strategic Hamlet Program, was officially launched by President Diem on 3 February 1962.¹²

The Strategic Hamlet Program, patterned after the "new villages" of Malaya, was designed to eliminate Vietnam's three major problems--insurgency, disunity, and underdevelopment.¹³

The strategic hamlets were designed for protection from the Communist (Viet Cong) guerrillas in much the same manner that the early western forts of the United States were designed for protection from the Indians. Ideally, the strategic hamlet was to be built around an existing cluster of houses. This settlement would then be augmented by new houses to accommodate the scattered rural residents that were to move into the strategic hamlet for protection. However, on occasion, strategic hamlets were entirely new settlements of peasants who were relocated under varying degrees of coercion. When this was necessary, attempts were made to locate the new settlement centrally to the inhabitants' cultivated fields.¹⁴

Building the strategic hamlets around existing settlements made it difficult to attain satisfactory defensibility. There was a tendency for the houses to be located along, or astride, a road in

¹²U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, op. cit., p. 8.

¹³U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, memorandum for record of a presentation to senior advisors on 19 April 1963 (Saigon, Vietnam: Strategic Hamlets Division, U. S. Army Section, 24 April 1963), p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

¹⁴Rufus C. Phillips, "Notes on Strategic Hamlets," (Saigon, Vietnam: U. S. Operations Mission, September 9, 1963), p. 4. (Mimeographed.)

long narrow bands. This type of arrangement was easily penetrated by the Viet Cong. Another problem of defense was the location of the strategic hamlets in relation to each other. If the distance between strategic hamlets was over five kilometers, it was impossible for one to go to the aid of another in time to forestall a Viet Cong assault.¹⁵

Defense for the individual hamlets was simple and primitive. Fortifications usually consisted of a moat lined with sharpened bamboo stakes, or a parapet topped by nails, broken glass, and bamboo spikes. Additional defenses were an inner and an outer fence built of wood, bamboo, or barbed wire. Guard posts were constructed on the perimeter at appropriate intervals. Gates were provided so that entry and exit could be controlled.¹⁶

When a strategic hamlet was first constructed, it had to rely upon regular Vietnamese armed forces for protection. However, with government assistance, each hamlet was expected to organize its own Self Defense Corps. This militia was supposed to be of such strength that the Viet Cong would have to mass a company or battalion sized force to effect a successful attack. When the Self Defense Corps forces were sufficiently prepared, the regular troops were to be withdrawn and regrouped at a central location as a mobile counterattack force.¹⁷ Each hamlet was to be provided with a radio with which it could call for assistance from the mobile counterattack force.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

¹⁶ Smith, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁷ Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam's Strategic Hamlets (Saigon, Vietnam: Directorate General of Information, February 1963), pp. 5-7.

The strategic hamlet was also designed to improve political unity. Soon after the establishment of each strategic hamlet, a hamlet committee was to be elected to handle local affairs. Village by-laws were to be locally drafted to provide for justice and community development.¹⁸ These measures were intended to provide political stability and a sense of association with the Vietnam government. Civic action by the military forces was limited to supervising the introduction of those democratic processes.

To improve the economic status of the hamlet dwellers, the Joint General Staff took measures to conduct civic action in a more vigorous manner. Three civil affairs companies were activated and broken down into seventy two civic action teams. These teams were sent out to strategic hamlets all over the country. Their accomplishments included assistance in the construction of defenses, market places, access roads, fish ponds, and bridges, as well as digging wells and planting fruit trees. Additionally, each unit of the armed forces of battalion size or larger was required to sponsor a strategic hamlet. By March 1963, nearly 5000 civic action projects had been completed.¹⁹

President Diem's plan for strategic hamlets was an ambitious cure-all for Vietnam's difficulties. The strategic hamlets were intended to protect the rural population and separate them from the Viet Cong guerrillas. With a degree of self defense, the strategic hamlets would force the Viet Cong to mass and attack, thereby becoming vulnerable to a counterattack by regular forces. This strategy was

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 8-9.

¹⁹U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

also expected to reduce sympathy for the Viet Cong who shot up the hamlets, and increase the respect for the regular forces who would rush to its defense. This protection, combined with the civic action of the civil affairs companies, was intended to improve the relations between the peasants and the armed forces and bind the people closer to their government. Then, the democratic processes of local hamlet administration was supposed to build political unity and further contribute to the betterment of peasant-government relations. Finally, the civic action, the protection against insurgents, and the fostering of local government would have a collective effect of raising the social and economic standards of the peasants while improving the relationship between peasant and soldier. In short, the Strategic Hamlet Program was not only a measure of counterinsurgency, but represented a whole new way of life for the rural Vietnamese. To do this, President Diem planned to establish over 11,000 strategic hamlets by 30 June 1964.²⁰

After a brief period of appraisal, the United States fully supported Diem's strategic hamlet concept. The agencies charged with administering this assistance were the MAAG and USOM. The two organizations worked so closely together that at times it was impossible to determine the exact origin of the assistance. In fact, in the early days of the strategic hamlet construction, MAAG Sector Advisors assumed the additional duty as USOM Provincial Representatives in several areas.²¹ This cooperation and coordination was in sharp

²⁰U. S., Department of State, "Social and Economic Progress Achieved Under the Counterinsurgency Program in Vietnam Through August 1963," (Saigon, Vietnam: undated), p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

²¹U. S. Operations Mission, USOM Provincial Guide (Saigon, Vietnam: Office of Rural Affairs, January 1963), p. 14.

contrast to relations in previous years between the MAAG and the USOM office of the International Cooperation Administration. As an example, a dispute between the two agencies as to which direction newly constructed roads should run had to be referred to Washington for a decision.²²

MAAG support for the strategic hamlets was primarily concerned with security. Materials were furnished to assist in the construction of fortifications; tactical communications and weapons were provided for the hamlet militia. Also important, of course, was the assistance provided by MAAG advisors in developing concepts and plans, in training the militia in the use of the weapons and communications, and in implementing the construction of fortifications.²³

USOM support for the strategic hamlets, in large part administered by MAAG advisors, was considerable. In many cases, this support constituted civic action, because the self help programs were initiated by military personnel of the United States and the Government of Vietnam. A recent U. S. State Department report listed some of the specific achievements and expectations of USOM in connection with their support of strategic hamlets:

A. The rat control program so successful in Central Vietnam is being extended countrywide this year to cover 1,200,000 farm families, 60 per cent of the farm population. Three quarters of the nation's farm population will also be covered under the crop insecticide program.

B. The pig compost program already successful on a pilot basis in 6 provinces of Central Vietnam with 6633 improved piglets distributed to date, some of which have already farrowed, is now being

²²Hausrath, op. cit., p. 94.

²³U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, op. cit., p. 2.

extended to 12 other impoverished provinces. It is being increased ten-fold in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces nearest the 17th parallel. This will cover more than 20,000 poor farm families by the end of the year.

C. 19,000-plus metric tons of chemical fertilizer have been received and distributed as rewards for strategic hamlet construction to 200,000 farm families in the ten central lowland provinces. This should increase their rice crop yield 25 percent in this traditionally rice deficit area.

D. Improved varieties of rice, corn, sweet potatoes, legumes, and fruits are being multiplied and extended as quickly as possible to help farmers increase production and income. This program is already achieving excellent results. A plan is now under study to distribute countrywide through Strategic Hamlet Committees, improved rice seed in small quantities to farmers in every completed hamlet.

E. The National Agricultural Credit Organization plans to loan small farmers approximately 1,000,000 piastres this year which is nearly double last year's total. Loans and collections to date this year are running double last year's figures.

F. The 1963 Hamlet School Program is nearly completed in 26 provinces through Provincial Rehabilitation Agreements and is now being expanded to include an additional 14 provinces and 562 additional classrooms. In the first twenty six provinces, 853 classrooms have been constructed in more than 300 hamlets with 50,000 new pupils taught by 625 newly trained teachers. Plans are under study to try to start at least one classroom in every hamlet in the country needing one by 1965 supported by self help and local PTA's. "Goal: A School for Every Hamlet."

G. Under the Hamlet Accelerated Health Program up to 8000 rural health workers are to be paid by the GVN to service hamlet peoples from USOM provided health kits, 6000 of which are already out. In addition, U. S. Public Health Service surgical teams are now operating in three province capitals and one New Zealand surgical team is in another capital. For Hamlet Health, plans are also being made to have this program locally supported in future years.

H. Lowcost, hand-operated ("jet") well-drilling rigs have been developed locally and are being used in hamlets countrywide to drill up to 1200 wells this year down to 100 meters in depth. This is more than all the wells drilled in the past five years. Windmills for lifting water and generating electricity are also being perfected locally. Water for drinking and irrigation is a major need.

I. 5000 community listening sets plus ten thousand individual transistor receivers will be distributed to hamlets to improve the government's reach to its people (Over 4000 sets have already been distributed).

J. The Amnesty Program (Chieu Hoi) announced by the President on April 17 is progressing satisfactorily with about 9300 returnees to date of whom a substantial number are Viet Cong activists including many officers. Most ponderous returnee to date is one elephant who came in with two Viet Cong on the high plateau.

K. Counterinsurgency supply handling records show that in the nine months since USOM counterinsurgency supplies have been arriving in Vietnam for social and economic development, 110,000 metric tons have been received, 16,000 of which have been turned over to the concerned ministries, and 94,000 metric tons (mainly foodstuffs, fertilizer and cement) of which have been moved by GVN/USOM logistics direct to the provinces and hamlets.²⁴

By spring of 1963, over one half of Vietnam's population of 14,000,000 was reported to be living in 8000 completed strategic hamlets. Support from the United States in this program had averaged about \$20,000.00 per strategic hamlet.²⁵ A substantial amount of these funds were spent in support of civic action activities. Figure 4 shows the organization of the agencies of the United States and Vietnam in coordinating this support.

In response to a MAAG request, four Mobile Training Teams were deployed to Vietnam in January 1963. One team was assigned to each of the four corps areas into which Vietnam is tactically divided. During their five months stay in Vietnam, the Mobile Training Teams coordinated their civic action activities with civilian and military officials of the Republic of Vietnam as well as with those of U. S. agencies. The teams found that problem areas could be identified by determining requirements from MAAG advisors, Army of the Republic of Vietnam civil affairs personnel, and province chiefs. Many of these problems could then be relieved by locating and distributing available resources from the U. S. Operations Mission, the U. S. Information Service, the International Voluntary Service (IVS), or other voluntary organizations. A good example of this type of accomplishment was the work done by the

²⁴U. S., Department of State, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

²⁵William L. Ryan, "Hamlet Plan Hurts Reds," The Kansas City Times, October 24, 1963, p. 16C.

Public Education Officer of Civil Affairs Advisory Team #1 in the I Corps area. This advisor found it worthwhile to inform the provincial education officials of the educational materials that were available from USOM and the proper requisitioning procedure by which they could be obtained. He also provided numerous visual training aids for provincial schools by personal solicitation of various agencies and organizations in the United States. An additional liaison project by this same officer was the arrangement for native handicraft items to be marketed through the U. S. Post Exchange in order to raise funds for teachers salaries, school construction, and textbooks. Further arrangements were made for an IVS representative to monitor this project after the departure of the Mobile Training Team.²⁶

In the IV Corps area, Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team #4 worked closely with USOM personnel to conduct an extensive survey of the school system in seven provinces. They compiled information on the number of schools, the number of teachers, the number of pupils, the future needs of individual schools, and the extent of Viet Cong activity in the vicinity of each school. This team also tested several hundred students for a USOM evaluation and helped province chiefs obtain educational materials. They issued and instructed in the use of movie projectors and strip projectors of electrical and sunlight types.²⁷

Veterinarians with the Mobile Training Teams devoted most of their time to pig vaccination, animal diets, and pig sty construction.

²⁶Civil Affairs Advisory Team #1, "Final Report," 31 May 1963, pp. 1-2. (Mimeographed.)

²⁷Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team #4, "Final Report," 17 June 1963, p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

Vaccination programs were successful, and U. S. surplus grains were obtained through USOM to improve animal diets. However, major problems were encountered in advising on pig sty location and construction. The peasants preferred to build the pig sties inside their homes, thus depriving the animals of adequate sunlight and ventilation.²⁸ This is a good illustration of the problem of project acceptance in under-developed countries.

Advice by Food and Agriculture Officers was largely restricted to instruction on the preparation of food. Many bulgur wheat cooking demonstrations were arranged. Following instruction, Vietnamese women conducted these demonstrations and prepared some sixty special recipes using bulgur wheat in conjunction with native foods.²⁹

In the field of public health, efforts were concentrated on training indigenous health workers. These newly trained personnel were used to assist at various Vietnamese health and medical facilities. Advisory personnel also assisted in hospital grounds improvement and the handling of medical supplies. Coordination was effected with Vietnamese Medical Civic Action Teams.³⁰ Medical assistance proper was used to augment the medical efforts of MAAG personnel. This involved work in province hospitals to improve surgical techniques and hospital organization, as well as assistance at the district and hamlet level.³¹

²⁸Civil Affairs Advisory Team #1, "Monthly Activities Report," 30 April 1963, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

²⁹Civil Affairs Advisory Team #1, "Final Report," p. 2.

³⁰Ibid., p. 3.

³¹Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team #4, loc. cit.

Engineering activities of the Mobile Training Teams consisted of assistance and advice in strategic hamlet construction, and in digging wells and installing electrical facilities. Well digging was generally not successful because the equipment used was too light to reach the depth required for potable water.³²

Psychological warfare representation was included in these Mobile Training Teams, but their activity was limited to observing, advising, and distributing Free World Magazines.³³

While the Mobile Training Teams generally regarded their civic action activities as beneficial, they encountered several obstacles that detracted from their full potential. For simplicity of presentation, the most frustrating of these obstacles are listed below.

1. Some planned programs could not be executed because the government of Vietnam would not release programmed funds.
2. Many of the Vietnamese peasants lacked initiative in working on self help projects.
3. Some of the farmers would not grow worthwhile food crops, but preferred to plant tobacco on their limited land.
4. Local populations displayed a tendency to wait for someone to make improvements for them rather than to undertake self improvement.
5. An apparent friction between civilians and Vietnamese military forces created a reluctance on the part of the army to engage in civic action.

³²Ibid., pp. 1-2.

³³Civil Affairs Advisory Team #1, "Monthly Activities Report," 31 March 1963, p. 5. (Mimeographed.)

6. Some of the medical support was accomplished with no help from indigenous forces.

7. In some areas, a lack of interest in sanitation jeopardized the health of the inhabitants and the U. S. personnel working there.

8. Local engineering equipment was scattered, unaccounted for, and poorly maintained.

9. Vietnamese psychological warfare efforts were concentrated on deriding the Viet Cong, while improvements by the government were not fully explained.³⁴

Obviously, the obstacles listed inhibited the accomplishment of civic action. Frequently, U. S. advisors did the work themselves when it should have been undertaken by indigenous military forces. Consequently, this type of civic action failed to accomplish one of its objectives- that of improving relations between the population and their armed forces. However, these projects did tend to raise the social and economic standards of the peasants and, in so doing, the second goal of civic action was attained. Also, it is probable that the elevation of social and economic standards was temporary. The Mobile Training Teams were only able to supervise the projects for six months, and experience has proved that the acceptance and maintenance of civic action improvements requires a long period of indoctrination and familiarization.

A civic action program that met with considerable success was the result of a 120 day test by the U. S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV). The purpose of this test was to evaluate Engineer Control and Advisory Detachments (ECADs) in support of counterinsurgency

³⁴Civil Affairs Team #2, "Report of Activities for Period 1-31 January 1963," 5 February 1963, pp. 2-14. (Mimeographed.)

operations. These ECADs were designed to augment special action forces, to provide engineer support, and to conduct civic action.

For the test in Vietnam, two ECADs were formed. The first of these consisted of one five-man control and three five-man advisory teams. This ECAD operated under the Senior MAAG Advisor, IV Corps. The other ECAD was composed of a control team and two advisory teams. This ECAD worked with special forces detachments in II, III, and IV Corps areas.³⁵

As with the Mobile Training Teams, few civic action projects were conducted in conjunction with indigenous military forces. Generally, unskilled local labor was employed on either a volunteer basis or by payment with ECAD funds. On a few occasions, payment for local services was made with wheat and cooking oil obtained from USOM.³⁶

The ECAD that was attached to the MAAG worked through the engineer of the IV Corps MAAG Advisory Team. The control element of the ECAD remained at this level while the advisory detachments were assigned to MAAG units in proximity of MAAG sector advisors and Vietnamese province chiefs. The control team commander retained supervision over the advisory detachments except in project assignment. In this important area, the province chief, through the MAAG sector advisor, selected projects that he considered essential to improve conditions in his village. When it had been determined that the

³⁵Army Concept Team in Vietnam, Engineer Control and Advisory Detachments: Final Test Report (Saigon, Vietnam: 15 October 1963), p. vii.

³⁶Ibid., p. 9.

project was feasible, and agreements had been reached for the provision of labor and materials, the advisory team commander was free to start work.³⁷

The ECAD that worked with special forces operated somewhat differently. Here, the control team was attached to Headquarters, U. S. Army Special Forces, Vietnam, where they acted as an engineer staff. The two advisory teams were detached to special forces "B" detachments in the II and IV Corps areas. The advisory team in the II Corps area did little civic action, but was used almost exclusively to support "clear and hold" operations and to improve special forces cantonment areas. In the IV Corps area, the advisory team operated similarly to those supporting the MAAG, with civic action type projects being coordinated with special forces detachment commanders, as well as with MAAG sector advisors and local officials.³⁸

During the test period, the ECADs initiated ninety six projects, eighty-eight of which were completed. Fifty-six civic action projects were among those successfully finished. These civic action activities included school construction, bridge and foot bridge construction, generator repair, latrine construction, housing improvements, well drilling, culvert construction, school design, strategic hamlet design, market place improvements, street lighting installation, pier construction, street and road repairs, and bridge repairs.³⁹

³⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. Cii-Civ.

U. S. and Vietnamese authorities agreed that ECAD operations were highly successful. In those provinces where advisory teams were deployed, every province chief requested replacement teams. All advisory team chiefs received letters of appreciation from MAAG sector advisors, and special forces detachment commanders wrote letters of appreciation to selected individuals.⁴⁰ Perhaps the most meaningful appraisal of ECAD civic action operations was that of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam, a portion of which is reprinted below.

Public officials and military authorities have been enthusiastic in praising the accomplishments of the ECADs under test. The factor contributing most to the successful test of the ECAD concept in Vietnam was sticking to a policy of undertaking modest structures at the "grass roots" level. The impact on small village economy and welfare was immediate. Local public officials, who sponsored worthwhile projects, became identified with them. Peasants were trained in new and different construction techniques and procedures. These people form a potential labor force, capable of building additional similarly unsophisticated structures. The over-all cost of these modest civic action projects, whether the labor force was hired or worked on a volunteer basis, was exceptionally low.⁴¹

The ACTIV report points out that the ECADs, in conducting civic action, trained a potential labor force while improving the peasants' standard of living. This training is a valuable bonus effect. But, without continued leadership and supervision, this potential labor force is more likely to lie dormant than to become permanently productive.

By the end of 1963, the United States had over 15,500 military personnel in Vietnam, and was providing military and economic aid in excess of \$400,000,000.00 per year. The Communists had also increased their efforts, and guerrilla strength was estimated to be 35,000 Viet

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 3.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

Cong regulars with as many as 300,000 sympathizers.⁴² With increased strength, the Viet Cong was able to interfere with the expansion of the strategic hamlet program. In November 1963, the Diem regime was overthrown by a revolution, and the new government was in turn replaced by a "palace revolt" in January 1964.

Any examination of civic action in Vietnam must be evaluated in conjunction with the strategic hamlet program. This is necessary, because all rural life has been so markedly affected by this plan. The strategic hamlet has been promoted to a status beyond a measure of counterinsurgency; it has literally become the basic unit of the country for social, economic, and political purposes. Consequently, much of the description devoted to strategic hamlet development has been an implicit description of civic action type projects. An appraisal of these civic action projects indicates that more success was attained in the early years of the program. As a matter of fact, the pacification campaigns and the resettlement projects prior to 1956 were carried out more efficiently than the strategic hamlet program that evolved from them. However, during these early projects, it was the peasants with nothing who were provided a home and land through government assistance. Civic action gave them something that they had not enjoyed before. But, the strategic hamlet resettlement was concerned with different people. Here, it involved the movement of peasants who already had a home, or it required the fencing in of those who were already residing within the settlement. Quite naturally, civic action that tended to change their way of life

⁴²Norman Skarewitz, "Viet Gamble: New Strongman," The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 1964, p. 14.

was not so graciously received. Yet, through 1962, the strategic hamlet program appeared to be a valuable counterinsurgency measure that was improving the standard of living of the Vietnamese peasants. In February 1963, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, made the following statement after an inspection trip to Vietnam:

I have said that the tide was turning in our favor. The military measures being taken in South Vietnam are providing increasing opportunities for political and economic growth, and the government is beginning to reach the people and the people are beginning to reach for the government. The strategic hamlet program is perhaps the greatest single factor in this encouraging development. It is a program aimed directly at the people and provides them with defense against and isolation from the Viet Cong. It is also a vehicle by which democratic processes can be developed and expanded, and human needs can be met.

More than 4000 strategic hamlets were completed in 1962 alone. This program was instrumental in bringing an additional 500,000 people under control of the government. Elections have been held in more than 1000 hamlets to select a hamlet chief and council. These elected officials then decide themselves on projects for improvements of the well-being and living conditions of the people. The United States advisory effort, and here I include the Agency for International Development, is assisting these officials in achieving their expectations for better life. The peasant wants two things: first, physical security for himself and his family; and second, a measure of social and economic progress. He will support the side that shows him the greatest promise of achieving these things. The government of Vietnam is showing him both promise and progress and he is responding encouragingly. This is a slow process but it is fundamental to eventual success.⁴³

It was after General Wheeler's visit that the Viet Cong intensified their 1963 offensive in Vietnam. The accelerated strategic hamlet program concentrated on the quantity of hamlets rather than on defensibility, and the new settlements were more vulnerable to Viet Cong attacks. After the overthrow of the Diem government on 1 November 1963, the new regime ordered the strategic hamlet construction to slow down. It has been reported that a joint U. S.-Vietnamese field study

⁴³General Earle G. Wheeler, "Statement On Vietnam," Current Civil Affairs Trends, February 1963, pp. 2-3.

of the situation in Long An and Kien Hoa Provinces revealed some disturbing facts. Supposedly, the main findings were:

1. There was a widespread fear of the Communists winning the war, and many of the peasants were tending to shift their loyalty to the Viet Cong in order to be on the winning side.

2. The strategic hamlet program was becoming unpopular for the following reasons: people were deprived of freedom of movement; villagers were burdened with extra work; people were deprived of land without compensation; living space in the hamlets was cramped; and, the hamlet organization made it easier for corrupt officials to suppress the peasants.

3. There was frequent misbehavior of the Self Defense Corps and the Civil Guard that alienated the people and made them more receptive to the Viet Cong. Most frequent abuses of power were chicken stealing, blackmail, fooling with the local girls, and forcing labor from the peasants.

4. There were not enough villagers willing to fight and defend themselves against the known Viet Cong strength in the area.⁴⁴

The conditions just enumerated are similar to those encountered by the Mobile Training Teams in the spring of 1963. Collectively, these conditions made it necessary for the Mobile Training Teams to conduct most of their civic action projects without benefit of assistance from indigenous military forces. Civic action activities by the ECADs were executed in a similar manner. Local labor was almost entirely civilian with a minimum participation by the Vietnamese Army.

⁴⁴"Fear Viet War Loss," The Kansas City Star, January 17, 1964, p. 12.

So, in 1963, the U. S. forces followed civic action doctrine but the Vietnamese did not. The end result was to improve the social and economic standards of living of the peasants, but the relationship between local civilians and indigenous military personnel was not improved. However, in practice as in theory, where U. S. military personnel carried out civic action projects, they won the appreciation of the rural inhabitants. It would seem that if the Vietnamese military forces had taken a more active interest in civic action, that they could have won the support of the people. However, the situation in Vietnam warrants a closer inspection.

The people of Vietnam have lived under conditions of conflict almost constantly since the start of World War II- first against the Japanese, then against the French, and finally against each other. The military forces have seldom been gentle with the peasants during these wars. In the counterinsurgency campaigns against the Viet Cong, the government forces have tried to separate the peasants from the insurgents by the use of strategic hamlets. For these resettlements, force has been used when necessary. Furthermore, because they have been actively engaged in combat, the army has had little time to pursue civic action.

There is also some basis for the passive attitude of the rural population. During the day government forces come, extract taxes from the peasants, and punish them for assisting the insurgents; during the night, the insurgents come, take food and supplies from the peasants, and punish them for assisting the government forces. Both sides recruit their young men. The peasants neither know nor care much about ideologies, but merely desire to be left in peace; therefore, they are

in sympathy with the side that gives them the most or takes from them the least.

A summary evaluation of civic action in Vietnam paradoxically indicates that it has been successful for U. S. forces and not so successful for the Vietnamese. In opposing insurgency with civic action, the coordination and cooperation between military forces and U. S. civilian agencies in the area have been worthy of favorable comment. The concepts of the Mobile Training Team and the ECAD have proved valid. The people of Vietnam hold Americans in high regard.

As for the Vietnamese peasants, civic action has done much to make their life easier. But, because it has been mostly accomplished by U. S. personnel, civic action has not improved the regard in which these peasants hold their armed forces. It has been frequently postulated that military forces must have the support of the rural population as a prerequisite to successful counterinsurgency operations. If the Army of the Republic of Vietnam intends to win this rural support, a conscientious program of civic action is indicated.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the cold war between the Western Powers and their Communist opponents, the alignment of underdeveloped countries has become an important consideration in the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. While the foreign policy objective of co-alignment is common to both factions, the methods used to approach these goals are distinctly different. This is evident in four of the five countries (excepting Korea) examined in this study. In the Philippines, Malaya, Laos, and Vietnam, the pattern of Communist insurgency has been remarkably similar. This similarity is an obvious indication that the insurgencies in all these countries have a common origin. This is verified by the summary of an article by Ugrinovich which was published in Moscow in 1951 advocating the following technique:

- (a) Incite the inherent spirit of nationalism in all classes of the population.
- (b) Encourage the formation of an all-national 'united front' which may include the 'vacillating national bourgeoisie' and the 'petty bourgeoisie and its political parties.'
- (c) Wrest leadership of the United Front from these two latter groups in favour of the working class and its political party, the Communist Party.
- (d) Develop the United Front into a purely working-class and peasantry organization in the form of an alliance 'of the two basic classes which constitute the overwhelming majority of the working people of the population of the colonial and dependent territories.' The 'alliance' should be led by the working class, the Communist Party.
- (e) 'Form, when possible and where possible, powerful people's liberation armies, skillful in battle with the enemy, under

leadership of the Communist Party.' The struggle of the masses must be identified with the armed struggle.¹

The United States and its allies have employed a different approach in this struggle for the hearts and minds of men. The Western strategy has been to assist the underdeveloped countries to maintain their political independence, to suppress Communist insurgency, and to improve their standard of living. Civic action has been a significant element of this assistance.

In Chapter I, military civic action was defined "as the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population." A strict adherence to this definition will deny the label of military civic action to all the activities examined in this study with the exception of those in the Philippines. In three countries, civic action has gone beyond the fields of social and economic development to include certain aspects of political development. This has been evidenced in the Philippine EDCOR projects, the new villages of Malaya, and the strategic hamlets of Vietnam. Because of the foregoing reasons, it is reasonable to propose a more appropriate and less verbose definition than that found in the Dictionary of United States Army Terms.

¹Vernon Bartlett, Report From Malaya (New York, New York: Criterion Books, 1955), pp. 34-35, quoting from the Moscow University Herald of 9 December 1951.

Military civic action, as it has been employed, is more aptly described as "the use of military forces to conduct projects that contribute to the economic, social, and political development and also serve to improve the standing of the participating military forces with the local population." Such a definition provides MAAGs and Missions with clear guidance as to the conduct and scope of civic action. It also encompasses those activities that all U. S. forces have previously carried out in underdeveloped countries as civic action. Thus MAAGs and Missions are permitted to look to past examples of civic action for additional guidance.

Of course, care must be exercised not to distort the true concept of civic action. This concept is based upon using abilities in the armed forces to improve the standard of living in underdeveloped countries when those abilities are not required for primary military duties. The purpose of civic action is defeated when military forces are withdrawn from essential assignments to perform in non-military capacities. Likewise, the use of civil servants, as was done in Laos and Vietnam, merely exchanges one job for another, and frequently results in less productive work being accomplished. Also, the use of civilians obviates the collateral purpose of civic action of improving the standing between the military forces and the population. Civic action, then, should exploit talents in the military forces. This is especially true in the area of leadership. Leaders are not plentiful in underdeveloped countries, and a high percentage of them are in the armed forces. If their abilities can be utilized in non-military endeavors, but not to the detriment of their military duties, the objectives of civic action are attainable.

Probably no country in the world can compare with Red China in exploiting military leadership for civic action. This has been possible for two reasons. First, these soldiers are in reality armed peasants and are readily acceptable to the local population. Second, the entire Chinese Communist society has been so regimented that the employment of soldiers in non-military pursuits is acceptable without question.² The scope of the civic action program in Red China is indicated by the fact that the Peoples Liberation Army worked a total of 59,000,000 obligatory man days in 1958.³

A civic action program as comprehensive as that of Communist China would not necessarily be desirable in democratic countries. In underdeveloped countries with unemployment problems, care must be exercised that civic action by military forces does not deprive the people of employment opportunities. The intent of civic action is to result in more improvements rather than to replace civilian effort with military effort.

Civic action in the Philippines was integrated into an overall plan to combat an internal insurgency. Outside support for both government and the insurgents was small compared to later insurgencies. The Philippines bordered no other country, so Communist infiltration was not possible through a neighboring nation. In this environment, counter-insurgency operations over a period of six years suppressed the HUK rebellion.

²John F. Brohm, "Lessons For Civic Action: The Experience of the Peoples Liberation Army," Report prepared for the Far Eastern Bureau of the Agency for International Development, 19 September 1962, pp. 2-3. (Mimeographed.)

³U. S., Congress, Committee on the Judiciary, The Effect of Red China's Communes on the United States (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 54.

In Chapter V, it was mentioned that civic action was successful because of the leadership of Magsaysay and the direction of civic action to the needs of the people. This is all the more significant because the leadership in the Philippines was internal. In other campaigns, such has not always been the case.

Magsaysay repeatedly used civic action to support other elements of his campaign, just as these other elements supported civic action. Realizing that he needed the support of the people, Magsaysay used the armed forces to gain this support by insuring honest elections, land reforms, and justice. Knowing that he must separate the HUKs from the peasants, he used civic action in resettlement through his EDCOR Plan. To encourage defection from the HUKs and to rehabilitate dissident peasants, Magsaysay employed civic action in special resettlement projects. So, under Magsaysay's leadership, civic action at the village level was successfully incorporated into overall counterinsurgency operations.

There were many similarities between civic action in the Philippines and in Malaya. In both countries, a major emphasis of civic action was in conjunction with resettlement projects to separate the guerrillas and the peasants. In both countries, there was little danger of Communist infiltrated support, although Malaya did share boundaries with Thailand and Singapore. In Malaya as in the Philippines, civic action was aimed at the needs of the peasants. Even more than in the Philippines, civic action in Malaya was integrated into the overall counterinsurgency effort.

But, there were also some differences in the two campaigns, and this may be why it took the British twelve years to attain success

while it required only six years in the Philippines. Of course, the most obvious difference in the two campaigns was the composition of the forces involved. In Malaya, the leadership was imported rather than native. This does not mean that it was less capable, but only that it was less acceptable to the natives. The British officials and their troops were also confronted with a language problem that did not face Magsaysay. Consequently, the British were not able to provide administrators with the same expediency as the Filipinos. Also, the British were dealing with a heterogeneous population with diverse cultures and traditions. Finally, it must be remembered that the British resettled over a half million people in Malaya while only a few thousand settlers were involved in the Philippines. However, in the aggregate, the success of civic action in Malaya was due to the same factors that contributed to success in the Philippines. In this case, the leadership was provided by the British, but they coordinated civic action with other efforts and made sure that it was directed to the needs of the peasants.

Civic action in Korea differed considerably from that studied in the other four countries. Here, there was no immediate threat of a Communist insurgency; there was no requirement for civic action to be integrated into other military operations. In Korea, civic action administered through the AFAK Program was almost entirely a U. S. effort. In this single respect, it was similar to the British activities in Malaya.

There is little doubt as to the success of the AFAK Program in accomplishing civic action objectives. It has concentrated on problems of underdevelopment at the lowest level. It has been amply supported

and ably administered by U. S. military personnel, and has improved the standing of these military forces with the Korean people. However, this has been done by tactical forces in the field rather than through the efforts of MAAG. But, as stated in Chapter VII, the AFAK Program may be used by MAAGs as a model for similar programs administered by indigenous forces in other underdeveloped countries.

Civic action administered by the ROK Army provides good examples of projects that can be undertaken with few resources. Improvements in education and sanitation are sorely needed in all underdeveloped countries. Qualified instructors and receptive audiences are the only requirements to initiate these improvements.

Civic action in Laos did not enjoy the same environment as it did in the three countries previously mentioned. In Laos, there was an active insurgency, as there was in the Philippines and Malaya. But Laos, contiguous to North Vietnam and Red China, had to contend with Communist infiltrations from the neighboring countries. Consequently, separating the guerrillas from the population base could not be accomplished as it had been in Malaya and the Philippines.

Another major problem in Laos was the lack of capable direction. The use of civil servants to administer civic action defeated the purpose of the concept. On the other hand, the use of qualified military personnel on an as-available basis would have exploited the limited talent available in that underdeveloped country. The frequent changes in administration with differing approaches to civic action precluded the continuous direction of effort that was an element of success in the Philippines, Malaya, and Korea. Civic action was further aggravated by the ever present terrorist activities of the Pathet Lao.

Probably the greatest deterrent to civic action in Laos was the environment itself. The combination of social, economic and political inhibitions that have been built-up over centuries constituted an almost insurmountable obstacle to change. Civic action projects were unable to survive without continuous supervision. Action by the Pathet Lao and the instability of the government precluded constant supervision by the Royal Lao Army. The withdrawal of U. S. military personnel terminated the supervision by MAAG officers.

U. S. support in Laos was not all that it could have been. Coordination between agencies was frequently poor. MAAG advisors experienced difficulty in communicating with their Lao counterparts. There were inadequacies and delays in the receipt of U. S. material support. Finally, the United States endorsed the neutralization of Laos. This neutralization and the subsequent formation of a triumverate government led to the rejection of U. S. military assistance. Without this assistance, and without sufficient internal leadership, civic action in Laos was doomed to failure.

Civic action in Vietnam has been carried out in an environment which is a composite of the environments of the other four countries studied. As in the Philippines, Malaya, and Laos, civic action has been conducted as part of a counterinsurgency campaign against Communist terrorists. Here, as in Laos, Communist infiltration has been readily accomplished from neighboring nations- in this case, from North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In Vietnam, U. S. forces are involved in support of civic action, though in a different manner than they were in Korea and Laos.

Separation of guerrillas from the peasants has been attempted

in Vietnam through the use of strategic hamlets. These resettlements have been similar in many respects to the new villages of Malaya and the EDCOR Projects of the Philippines. Yet they have not met with the same degree of success. There is a possible explanation for this.

A common objective in counterinsurgency campaigns is to win the support of the people while separating them from the insurgents. This was done in the Philippines and Malaya. In Vietnam, however, the strategic hamlets were established so rapidly that they could not all be protected from the Viet Cong. Thus, complete separation of the peasants from the Communists was never attained. Also, this inability of the government to protect the strategic hamlets alienated the people from their central government.

Resettlement in Vietnam was more of a problem than in either the Philippines or Malaya. In the Philippines, less than 6000 people were resettled on four EDCOR farms. In Malaya, nearly 700,000 squatters were moved to 680 new villages. But, in Vietnam, over 7,000,000 peasants were located in 8000 strategic hamlets. These figures provide at least part of the reason why the care of the peasants and the protection of the hamlets has been less successful in Vietnam than in Malaya or the Philippines. However, even when not engaged in operations against the Viet Cong, the Vietnamese Army has demonstrated little interest in civic action. As a result, civic action has not been extensively used to improve military-peasant relations.

In 1963 and early 1964, the instability of the Vietnam government was reflected by the overthrow of Diem's regime and the second coup de etat which followed. These changes in government resulted in changes in the leadership of both military and political

organizations. Under increased Viet Cong pressure, these changes in leadership inhibited civic action and other measures that could have gained support for the government.

U. S. participation in civic action in Vietnam has been considerable and creditable. Unlike the situation in Laos, U. S. agencies have obtained extensive additional support for civic action by the temporary assignment of Mobile Training Teams and ECADs. Civic action has been concentrated at the village and hamlet level where it has been well received.

Civic action in Vietnam has not accomplished its purpose. Although it has raised the socio-economic standard of the hamlet dwellers, it has not improved the relations between them and the Vietnamese armed forces. Civic action in Vietnam could be more closely integrated into the overall counterinsurgency effort. This would require active participation by the armed forces in civic action projects after an area had been cleared of insurgents. If military forces had remained in the cleared area to protect the hamlets, civic action could have been easily incorporated into military operations. This type of operation, termed "clear and hold," has had some success in Vietnam. All too often, however, the military forces have turned the "hold" mission over to local self-defense militia once the area has been "cleared".

From an examination of civic action in these five countries, it is possible to extract some elements that are consistently associated with success and other elements that are just as consistently associated with failure. As a rule, these elements are common because they are associated with problems which are common. In this study, the major

characteristic common to all five countries is underdevelopment. Underdevelopment is host to a multitude of component problems, many of which were explained in detail in Chapter III. It is generally true, though, that underdevelopment is most obvious at the lower echelons of society. Here are found the deficiencies in diet, education, medical facilities, sanitary conditions, public works accommodations, and civic administration. So, it is quite understandable that civic action projects aimed at these deficiencies- the immediate needs of the people- are normally successful unless some negating factor such as an active insurgency is present. This success has been demonstrated so many times that the desirability of applying civic action at the lowest level is more of an assumption than a hypothesis. In this study, this has been verified in the case studies of civic action in the Philippines, Malaya, Korea, and Vietnam.

Even though common elements of success and failure can be determined from a series of case studies, it must be emphasized that there is no packaged plan that will insure success in all environments. The inhabitants of all underdeveloped countries may have common problems, but ethnic characteristics vary considerably from nation to nation. Some countries, like Korea and the Philippines, may have homogeneous populations; other countries, like Malaya, may have heterogeneous populations. Some countries, such as the Philippines and Malaya may have borders relatively free from Communist infiltration; countries such as Laos and Vietnam have borders that may be infiltrated with ease. So, the aims of civic action may differ in different countries to fit local environment and requirements. However, in all underdeveloped countries there are common civic action targets

such as education, medical facilities, sanitary conditions, public works, and local administration. But, the application of civic action in these areas of need will not always utilize the same methods.

In the preceding paragraphs, the factors contributing to successes and failures in civic action have been extracted from five case studies. These factors have been translated into ten guidelines which may prove of value to officers ordered to duty involving civic action in underdeveloped countries. They are explained below in a probable chronological order of application.

1. Undertake self-preparation to become familiar with the concept of civic action and to learn as much as possible about the host country. Many officers will have the advantage of attendance at a language school, the Military Assistance Institute at Arlington, Virginia, the Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, or the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) Course at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. All officers, but particularly those not attending one of the mentioned schools, should endeavor to learn as much as possible about the language, military forces, cultures, traditions, religion, economics, and politics of the host country. The success of civic action in the Philippines and Malaya illustrate the importance of this guideline. This same point is illustrated in a negative sense by the difficulty that U. S. officers experienced in Laos.

2. Understand the U. S. national objectives relative to the host country and how civic action fits into the country plan. The Ambassador in the host country has the responsibility of implementing U. S. national objectives through the country plan. Civic action,

coordinated throughout the Country Team, fits into the country plan in furtherance of its mission. Understanding this, the MAAG officer will be better guided in the selection of civic action projects. This integration of civic action into the overall effort was well illustrated by the British in Malaya and by the Filipinos in their own country. In Korea, Eighth Army officers have also illustrated this guideline in the administration of the AFAK Program.

3. Determine the specific needs of the people and orient civic action to those needs. The most recognized needs at the village level are small and simple. As an example, there is always a need in underdeveloped countries for improved educational opportunities and better medical facilities. Such civic action projects do not require extensive and costly resources and the results are quickly manifested. There are many examples of the application of this principle. The Filipinos, for instance, determined that the peasants needed legal representation in the land courts. In Malaya, British officers interviewed native officials to determine their needs. Invariably they found that the villagers needed a small and inexpensive project such as a well or an irrigation ditch. In Korea, AFAK projects are initiated by the requests of local Korean officials. Most of these requests have been for improvement of schools or for construction of simple public works. Civic action can best accomplish its purpose if it is well received. It will be better received if it satisfies needs of which the recipients are aware.

4. Don't be handicapped by a restrictive definition of civic action. There is no evidence that this has been a major problem in

the past. Yet, some of the most successful civic action projects examined in this thesis (the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam) do not fall within the scope of the current definition. Therefore, it is emphasized that the ability of a civic action project to accomplish its purpose is more important than the words by which it is described.

5. Coordinate with other U. S. agencies in the area and work through command channels within the Country Team. Other U. S. agencies located in the host country have resources which can help the MAAG officer in the execution of civic action. USOM has the responsibility of providing certain material and monetary support. USIS can be of assistance in educational and recreational projects. Various volunteer agencies can provide material and supervisory support. It is mandatory that the MAAG officer works through command channels and coordinates his civic action efforts with other sections of the Country Team. Only in this manner can efforts be integrated and duplication avoided. One of the best illustrations of a coordinated effort by various organizations is provided by the British in Malaya. With centralized control, civil and military officials integrated the civic action projects into the country-wide counterinsurgency operation. Another good example of this principle was the coordination of U. S. sponsored civic action in Vietnam. The various agencies within the Country Team have considerably increased the capability of the MAAG. Also in Vietnam, the action of an agent of the International Volunteer Service in supervising the marketing of native handiwork illustrates an additional source of assistance to resourceful MAAG officers. Conversely, the lack of cooperation between the MAAG and USOM has been charged with partial responsibility

of the failure of civic action in Laos. The importance of this guideline is self-evident.

6. Be aware of the external assistance available for civic action. The MAAG officer should be aware of the procedures for obtaining Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and/or Engineer Control and Advisory Detachments (ECADs) to assist in the planning and execution of a civic action program. He should also be familiar with the employment of these augmentation units to include their capabilities and limitations. The successful use of MTTs and ECADs in Vietnam illustrates the type of assistance that can be provided. These augmentations have been especially tailored to assist in civic action, and the MAAG officer should use them where they are needed to assist in the accomplishment of his mission.

7. Make every effort to get indigenous military forces to participate in civic action. The concept of civic action is to utilize military forces that are not tactically committed to improve the socioeconomic conditions in their country. The results of this are two-fold. First, there is an added utilization of the limited leadership and technical capabilities within the country. Second, the close association between the armed forces and the civilians results in a more harmonious relationship between the two groups and thereby enhances political unity. The dual benefits of civic action were apparent in the Philippine counterinsurgency campaign. On the other hand, if civic action is conducted by MAAG personnel only, the benefits are somewhat diluted. If MAAG officers are transferred or assigned to other duties that preclude supervision of projects that they had sponsored, there is a tendency for the villagers to lose interest. This condition was found

to exist in Laos and to a lesser extent in Vietnam. The use of indigenous civil servants to administer civic action is also a poor substitute. Civilians who are qualified to administer civic action can do so only at the expense of their absence from an equally critical profession. This shifting of personnel from jobs in which they are proficient to civic action assignments (where they may not be so proficient) does not constitute a net gain for the country. The importance of the improvement of relations between the people and the indigenous military forces must not be overlooked. Where insurgency is a threat, the support of the peasants can be a deciding factor. If civic action is to help gain this support for the government forces, those forces must actively participate in civic action. The case studies of Laos and Vietnam, where civic action has not been actively conducted by local armed forces, illustrate the detrimental consequences of this lack of peasant support. But, in the Philippines, where civic action was conducted by the armed forces, peasant support was instrumental in defeating the HUKs. The importance of adherence to this guideline cannot be over-emphasized.

8. Be prepared for reluctant acceptance and a lack of interest in continuing civic action projects by the recipients. The unprepared MAAG officer is likely to become frustrated by the apathy toward civic action that is frequently found in underdeveloped countries. It must be understood that peasant attitudes are the product of generations of stagnation and are based upon non-Western cultures, traditions, and religions. Changes that significantly affect the accepted way of life are unwelcome. This was evidenced by the reluctance of the Vietnamese to move their pigs out of their homes and into the sties constructed

by the Mobile Training Teams. Even when the civic action project is accepted, peasants frequently lose interest as soon as supervision is removed. This condition was demonstrated in Laos upon the withdrawal of the Mobile Training Team. The existence of these attitudes must be recognized. It must be realized that changing these attitudes is a long process. This does not mean that the MAAG officer is faced with a hopeless situation. On the contrary, there is much that can be done to enhance the acceptance of civic action. The MAAG officer can sincerely attempt to understand the attitudes of those with whom he is working. He must exercise care not to offend natives of the host country through misbehavior or ignorance. He must get to know the people and win their support. If he can get participation and endorsement by military and civilian officials, the civic action projects will be more acceptable. Above all, the advisor must be subtle and diplomatic in his efforts to "sell" civic action. An enthusiastic attempt to change a way of life in a few weeks will only result in intensified opposition. Without indigenous acceptance, the benefits of civic action are only temporary. The MAAG officer must understand this and carefully direct his efforts toward the most acceptable civic action projects.

9. Don't hesitate to actively participate in civic action projects. It may be difficult to impart advice and supervision by oral and written directions. The MAAG advisor must consider the native ability to grasp his ideas. It is frequently more expedient to demonstrate exactly what is desired. This has been indicated by the MTTs in Vietnam and the AFAK advisors in Korea. Also, indigenous personnel may be willing to work with the advisor but not under him. Therefore, the MAAG

officer should be prepared to actively participate in the civic action projects that he sponsors.

10. Ensure that measures are taken to publicize civic action to indigenous civilians. Properly handled, public information can contribute to the acceptance of civic action. The MAAG advisor has two primary sources of assistance in this regard. First, he should be aware of the potential of psychological operations in the support of civic action. Expert advice in this field is available from other U. S. officers on the MAAG staff, Mobile Training Teams which may be requested, or the armed forces of the host country. In this thesis, there are examples of both proper and improper use of psychological operations. Magsaysay used his psychological warfare officers properly in supporting civic action. They were especially valuable in publicizing the honest elections in the Philippines in 1951. On the other hand, Vietnamese psychological warfare efforts have been directed more to abusing the Viet Cong than positively supporting the activities of the Vietnamese Army. In Laos, the lack of psychological operations by the government enabled the Pathet Lao to assume credit for civic action projects of the Royal Lao Army. The Pathet Lao also used "black propaganda" in psychological operations to distort the civic action efforts of the government. Also available to the MAAG officer are the services of the U. S. Information Service. This agency, through Country Team coordination, has the capability of supporting civic action through use of its various media. Military psychological warfare personnel and the U. S. Information Service are potentially valuable assets to the MAAG officer in the accomplishment of his civic action mission.

The principles outlined above are not intended as a guaranteed formula for successful civic action. They are guidelines based upon the identification of factors associated with successes and failures of civic action in the five cases under study. The most important factor of all, and the one upon which all ten guidelines are dependent, is the MAAG officer himself. But, the competent and dedicated advisor should find these guidelines helpful. It is for his consideration and use that they are offered.

APPENDIX I

U. S. AID, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, BY REGION AND COUNTRY, FISCAL YEARS 1946-1962 (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Region and Country	Military	Economic	Total
Total All Countries	30,678	66,455	97,133
Near East and South Asia	5,144	12,703	17,847
Afghanistan	3	217	219
Ceylon	--	79	79
Cyprus	--	17	17
Greece	1,574	1,785	3,359
India	--	3,867	3,867
Iran	563	732	1,294
Iraq	46	22	68
Israel	3	879	882
Jordan	24	325	350
Lebanon	8	80	88
Nepal	--	48	48
Pakistan	(a)	1,854	(a)
Saudi Arabia	(a)	46	(a)
Syria	--	96	96
Turkey	2,235	1,580	3,815
UAR (Egypt)	--	608	608
Yemen	--	23	23
CENTO	--	27	27
Regional	687	419	1,106
Latin America	641	6,184	6,824
Argentina	46	572	618
Bolivia	4	258	262
Brazil	218	1,737	1,955
Chile	67	675	743
Colombia	50	360	410
Costa Rica	1	89	90
Cuba	11	42	52
Dominican Republic	7	39	46
Ecuador	30	113	143
El Salvador	1	40	41
Guatemala	5	158	163
Haiti	5	94	100

Region and Country	Military	Economic	Total
Latin America-Continued			
Honduras	3	43	46
Jamaica	--	9	9
Mexico	6	761	767
Nicaragua	4	66	70
Panama	1	100	101
Paraguay	1	58	59
Peru	89	388	476
Trinidad and Tobago	--	20	20
Uruguay	28	59	87
Venezuela	58	218	276
Other West Indies	--	2	2
British Guiana	--	4	4
British Honduras	--	2	2
Surinam	--	3	3
Regional	6	275	281
Far East	8,108	13,729	21,837
Burma	--	93	93
Cambodia	85	251	336
China, Republic of	2,305	2,045	4,350
Hong Kong	--	30	30
Indochina, Undistributed	710	826	1,535
Indonesia	--	682	682
Japan	1,022	2,660	3,682
Korea	1,844	3,425	5,269
Laos	151	291	442
Malaya	--	23	23
Philippines	403	1,334	1,737
Thailand	429	338	767
Vietnam	760	1,688	2,447
Western Samoa	--	(b)	(b)
Regional	401	43	444
Africa	116	1,730	1,845
Algeria	--	15	15
Burundi	--	5	5
Cameroon	(b)	15	16
Central African Republic	--	(b)	(b)
Chad	--	(b)	(b)
Congo (Brazzaville)	--	1	1
Congo (Leopoldville)	--	160	160
Dahomey	(b)	6	6
Ethiopia	68	118	186
Gabon	--	(b)	(b)
Ghana	(b)	156	156
Guinea	--	13	13
Ivory Coast	(b)	5	5

Region and Country	Military	Economic	Total
Africa-Continued			
Kenya	--	18	18
Liberia	4	125	128
Libya	5	187	192
Malagasy Republic	--	1	1
Mali, Republic of	1	5	6
Mauritania	--	2	2
Morocco	(a)	352	(a)
Niger	(b)	3	3
Nigeria	--	44	44
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	--	36	36
Rwanda	--	1	1
Senegal	2	7	10
Sierra Leone	--	4	4
Somali Republic	--	28	28
Sudan	--	65	65
Tanganyika	--	18	18
Togo	--	6	6
Tunisia	(a)	293	(a)
Uganda	--	5	5
Upper Volta	(b)	3	3
Zanzibar	--	(b)	(b)
Other Territories	--	20	20
Regional	34	13	47
Europe	15,840	28,866	44,706
Austria	--	1,176	1,176
Belgium-Luxembourg	1,242	741	1,983
Denmark	606	302	908
France	4,232	5,182	9,414
Germany (West)	951	4,050	5,001
Germany (Berlin)	--	132	132
Iceland	--	71	71
Ireland	--	146	146
Italy (Including Trieste)	2,327	3,462	5,790
Netherlands	1,234	1,230	2,464
Norway	781	352	1,133
Poland	--	523	523
Portugal	324	153	478
Spain	524	1,173	1,698
Sweden	--	109	109
United Kingdom	1,031	7,674	8,705
Yugoslavia	694	1,703	2,397
Regional	1,894	686	2,581
Non-regional	829	3,244	4,074

(a) Classified military data.

(b) Less than \$500,000.00.

Note: Due to rounding, total may not equal sum of components.

Source: Statistics and Reports Division, Agency for International Development.

APPENDIX II

BASIC ECONOMIC DATA FOR THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS OF THE FREE WORLD

Population and Gross National Product

Region and Country	Population (1962)		Gross National Product (a)	
	Total in Millions	Rate of Growth in Percent	Total in Million Dollars	Per Capita in Dollars
Near East	115.2	2.6	-----	205
Cyprus	0.6	2.0	240	416
Greece	8.5	0.9	3,625	431
Iran	21.6	2.5	4,460	211
Iraq	7.4	2.5	1,410	194
Israel	2.3	3.5	1,777	814
Jordan	1.7	2.7	308	184
Lebanon	1.7	2.3	690	411
Saudi Arabia	6.0	(c)	1,000	167
Syria	4.9	3.6	715	152
Turkey	29.2	2.9	5,468	193
UAR (Egypt)	27.3	2.5	3,185	120
Yemen	4.0	(c)	360	90
South Asia	583.1	2.3	-----	80
Afghanistan	14.1	2.0	965	70
Ceylon	10.5	2.8	1,400	137
India	452.0	2.3	35,420	80
Nepal	9.9	1.9	520	53
Pakistan	96.6	2.2	7,275	75
Latin American Republics	209.2	2.8	-----	265
Argentina	20.6	1.7	7,700	379
Bolivia	4.0	2.3	437	113
Brazil	75.0	3.1	13,546	186
Chile	7.9	2.3	3,506	453
Columbia	15.6	2.9	4,300	283

Region and Country	Population (1962)		Gross National Product (a)	
	Total in Millions	Rate of Growth in Percent	Total in Million Dollars	Per Capita in Dollars
Latin American Republics- Continued				
Costa Rica	1.3	3.9	420	344
Dominican Republic	3.2	3.5	680	218
Ecuador	4.6	3.0	810	182
El Salvador	2.6	2.6	550	220
Guatemala	4.0	3.0	680	175
Haiti	4.3	2.1	300	71
Honduras	2.0	3.0	395	207
Mexico	37.1	3.1	11,280	313
Nicaragua	1.6	3.4	325	213
Panama	1.1	3.0	460	416
Paraguay	1.9	2.4	236	130
Peru	11.6	2.3	2,062	181
Uruguay	2.9	1.6	1,290	450
Venezuela	7.9	3.4	5,290	692
Latin America- Other				
British Guiana	0.6	3.0	156	260
British Honduras	0.1	3.1	28	300
Jamaica	1.7	1.3	715	436
Surinam	0.3	4.0	100	310
Trinidad and Tobago	0.9	3.0	520	594
Far East	343.1	2.2	-----	210
Burma	23.0	1.8	1,300	58
Cambodia	5.7	2.2	563	101
China, Republic of	11.9	3.5	1,663	145
Indonesia	98.6	2.3	8,030	83
Japan	94.9	1.0	47,240	502
Korea	26.1	2.9	1,857	73
Laos	2.4	2.0	140	60
Malaya	7.3	3.2	2,025	285
Philippines	29.6	3.2	3,365	117
Thailand	28.7	3.1	2,720	97
Vietnam	14.9	2.8	1,285	89
Africa	259.2	2.2	-----	120
Algeria	11.5	2.5	3,170	281
Burundi	2.3	2.1	135	60
Cameroon	4.2	1.0	285	86

Region and Country	Population (1962)		Gross National Product (a)	
	Total in Millions	Rate of Growth in Percent	Total in Million Dollars	Per Capita in Dollars
Africa-Continued				
Central African Republic	1.3	1.8	50	40
Chad	3.0	2.5	115	40
Congo (Brazzaville)	0.9	2.6	35	40
Congo (Leopoldville)	14.8	2.5	1,220	88
Dahomey	2.1	2.8	80	40
Ethiopia	19.4	1.4	843	44
Gabon	0.4	0.8	90	200
Ghana	7.1	2.5	1,375	199
Guinea	3.2	3.0	185	60
Ivory Coast	3.4	2.3	615	184
Kenya	8.7	3.0	675	80
Liberia	1.0	1.5	160	159
Libya	1.2	1.5	248	204
Malagasy Republic	5.7	2.7	420	75
Mali, Republic of	4.3	2.0	245	58
Mauritania	0.7	3.7	(c)	(c)
Morocco	12.3	3.0	1,800	150
Niger	3.2	2.7	120	40
Nigeria	41.0	2.0	3,280	82
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	9.6	2.8	1,530	163
Rwanda	2.8	3.2	110	40
Senegal	3.1	2.5	525	175
Sierra Leone	2.5	1.9	175	70
Somali Republic	2.0	0.9	56	40
South Africa, Republic of	16.7	2.6	7,680	427
Sudan	12.4	2.8	1,132	94
Tanganyika	9.6	1.8	555	59
Togo	1.5	3.0	105	70
Tunisia	4.3	2.2	684	161
Uganda	7.0	2.5	465	68
Upper Volta	4.5	1.9	175	40
Zanzibar	0.3	1.3	(c)	(c)

Power, Education, and Health

Region and Country	Power	Education		Health
	KWH per Capita per Year	Percent Literacy	Pupils as Percent of Population (b)	Number People per Doctor
Near East	130	30	--	2,350
Cyprus	422	65	20	1,500
Greece	290	82	15	835
Iran	50	10-15	8	5,000
Iraq	120	20	11	5,600
Israel	1,165	90	21	400
Jordan	(c)	30	17	6,800
Lebanon	222	80	17	1,100
Saudi Arabia	(c)	5-15	2	24,100
Syria	52	30-35	11	4,500
Turkey	109	30	11	2,000
UAR (Egypt)	115	25	12	2,800
Yemen	(c)	25	10	125,000
South Asia	40	25	--	5,900
Afghanistan	9	5-10	2	57,000
Ceylon	35	70	22	4,700
India	43	24	9	5,000
Nepal	(c)	5	2	74,000
Pakistan	19	16	7	11,100
Latin American Republics	360	55	--	1,900
Argentina	543	86	18	780
Bolivia	119	31	5	4,000
Brazil	363	50	11	2,100
Chile	642	80	15	2,000
Columbia	275	62	12	2,900
Costa Rica	372	88	18	2,830
Dominican Republic	147	43	16	5,200
Ecuador	97	60	13	2,900
El Salvador	160	43	12	6,150
Guatemala	106	30	8	6,460
Haiti	22	10	5	11,000
Honduras	67	35	13	4,800
Mexico	337	56	11	2,050
Nicaragua	136	40	10	2,820
Panama	293	83	19	2,630
Paraguay	64	68	17	1,820
Peru	275	50	14	2,300
Uruguay	489	88	11	800
Venezuela	715	51	18	1,300

Region and Country	Power	Education		Health
	KWH per Capita per Year	Percent Literacy	Pupils as Percent of Population (b)	Number People per Doctor
Latin America- Other				
British Guiana	161	80	23	3,130
British Honduras	44	70	20	4,300
Jamaica	305	72	18	3,770
Surinam	283	75	20	2,170
Trinidad and Tobago	571	74	23	2,870
Far East	420	70	--	2,300
Burma	19	60	9	8,400
Cambodia	14	55	11	46,000
China, Republic of	390	90	20	1,600
Indonesia	20	60	10	71,000
Japan	1,400	95	25	890
Korea	75	85	18	3,000
Laos	4	15	5	55,000
Malaya	190	51	18	6,800
Philippines	100	75	18	1,700
Thailand	26	60	16	7,400
Vietnam	30	20-40	10	22,500
Africa	166	17	--	13,500
Algeria	125	9	10	57,500
Burundi	(c)	(c)	5 (d)	52,800
Cameroon	(c)	5-10	9	37,600
Central African Republic	9	5-10	6	34,000
Chad	3	5	3	73,000
Congo (Brazzaville)	36	20	16	13,600
Congo (Leopoldville)	(c)	50	11	60,300
Dahomey	4	20	5	18,100
Ethiopia	7	4	1	92,000
Gabon	49	5-10	12	7,700
Ghana	60	25	10	17,900
Guinea	8	10	3	36,000
Ivory Coast	35	5-10	7	22,700
Kenya	62	20-25	10	10,700
Liberia	186	5	8	14,700
Libya	93	35	12	4,800
Malagasy Republic	14	30-35	7	28,000
Mali, Republic of	4	2-3	2	43,800
Mauritania	(c)	1-5	1	42,700
Morocco	86	15	8	10,300
Niger	3	5	1	65,700

Region and Country	Power	Education		Health
	KWH per Capita per Year	Percent Literacy	Pupils as Percent of Population (b)	Number People per Doctor
Africa-Continued				
Nigeria	16	20	8	38,600
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	435	(c)	12	9,300
Rwanda	(c)	(c)	(c)	18,900
Senegal	55	5	6	52,500
Sierra Leone	23	10	4	22,600
Somali Republic	5	5	1	27,800
South Africa, Republic of	1,474	40-45	14	2,000
Sudan	7	5-10	3	32,000
Tanganyika	25	5-10	6	16,800
Togo	5	5-10	6	46,900
Tunisia	66	25	12	7,200
Uganda	64	25	8	12,900
Upper Volta	1	88	1	67,500
Zanzibar	(c)	5-10	7	5,200

(a) GNP is for 1961, unadjusted for inequalities in purchasing power among countries.

(b) Primary and secondary pupils.

(c) Not available.

(d) Primary students only.

Source: Agency for International Development and Department of Defense.

APPENDIX III

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S LETTER TO ALL AMBASSADORS ON 29 MAY 1961

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Please accept my best wishes for the successful accomplishment of your mission. As the personal representative of the President of the United States in (country) you are part of a memorable tradition which began with Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and which has included many of our most distinguished citizens.

We are living in a critical moment in history. Powerful destructive forces are challenging the universal values which, for centuries, have inspired men of good will in all parts of the world.

If we are to make progress toward a prosperous community of nations in a world of peace, the United States must exercise the most affirmative and responsible leadership. Beyond our shores, this leadership, in large measure, must be provided by our ambassadors and their staffs.

I have asked you to represent our Government in (country) because I am confident that you have the ability, dedication, and experience. The purpose of this letter is to define guidelines which I hope may be helpful to you.

The practice of modern diplomacy requires a close understanding not only of governments but also of people, their cultures and institutions. Therefore, I hope that you will plan your work so that you may have the time to travel extensively outside the nation's capital. Only in this way can you develop the close, personal associations that go beyond official diplomatic circles and maintain a sympathetic and accurate understanding of all segments of the country.

Moreover, the improved understanding which is so essential to a more peaceful and rational world is a two-way street. It is our task not only to understand what motivates others, but to give them a better understanding of what motivates us.

Many persons in (country) who have never visited the United States, receive their principal impressions of our nation through their contact with Americans who come to their country either as private citizens or as government employees.

Therefore, the manner in which you and your staff personally conduct yourselves is of the utmost importance. This applies to the way in which you carry out your official duties and to the attitudes you and they bring to day-to-day contacts and associations.

It is an essential part of your task to create a climate of dignified, dedicated understanding, cooperation, and service in and around the Embassy.

In regard to your personal authority and responsibility, I shall count on you to oversee and coordinate all the activities of the United States Government in (country).

You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or activities in (country). I shall give you full support and backing in carrying out your assignment.

Needless to say, the representatives of other agencies are expected to communicate directly with their offices here in Washington, and in the event of a decision by you in which they do not concur, they may ask to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority in Washington.

However, it is their responsibility to keep you fully informed of their views and activities and to abide by your decisions unless in some particular instance you and they are notified to the contrary.

If in your judgement individual members of the Mission are not functioning effectively, you should take whatever action you feel may be required, reporting the circumstances, of course, to the Department of State.

In case the departure from (country) of any individual member of the Mission is indicated in your judgement, I shall expect you to make the decision and see that it is carried into effect. Such instances I am confident will be rare.

Now one word about your relations to the military. As you know, the United States Diplomatic Mission includes Service Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups and other Military components attached to the Mission. It does not, however, include United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander. The line of authority to these forces runs from me, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the area commander in the field.

Although this means that the chief of the American Diplomatic Mission is not in the line of military command, nevertheless, as Chief of Mission, you should work closely with the appropriate area military commander to assure the full exchange of information. If it is your opinion that activities by the United States military forces may adversely affect our over-all relations with the people or government of (country), you should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander and, if necessary, request a decision by higher authority.

I have informed all heads of departments and agencies of the Government of the responsibilities of the chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions for our combined operations abroad, and I have asked them to instruct their representatives accordingly.

As you know, your own lines of communication as Chief of Mission run through the Department of State.

Let me close with an expression of confidence in you personally and the earnest hope that your efforts may help strengthen our relations with both the Government and people of (country). I am sure that you will make a major contribution to the cause of world peace and understanding.

Good luck and my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

(Signed) John F. Kennedy¹⁶

¹⁶U. S. Department of State, "President Kennedy's Letter To Ambassadors Made Public," Department of State News Letter, No. 8, (December, 1961), pp. 3-4.

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